

# THE PUBLIC ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES - VOLUME 2

## DEMOSTHENES\*

About the same time a controversy, begun in the previous year, in regard to Halonnesus, was renewed. This island had belonged to Athens, but had been occupied by pirates. At some time not recorded (but probably since the Peace of 346) Philip had expelled the pirates and taken possession of the island. He now sent a letter, offering to give Halonnesus to Athens, but not to give it back (since this would concede their right to it); or else to submit the dispute to arbitration. He also offered to discuss a treaty for the settlement of private disputes between Athenians and Macedonians, and to concert measures with Athens for clearing the Aegean of pirates. He was willing to extend the advantages of the Peace to other Greek States, but not to agree that he and Athens should respectively possess 'what was their own', instead of 'what they held'; though he was ready to submit to arbitration in regard to Cardia and other disputed places. He again denied having made the promises attributed to him, and asked for the punishment of those who slandered him. Hegesippus replied in an extant speech ('On Halonnesus'), while Demosthenes insisted that no impartial arbitrator could possibly be found. Philip's terms in regard to Halonnesus were refused, but the Athenian claim to the island was not withdrawn.

Philip spent the greater part of 342 and 341 in Thrace, mainly in the valley of the Hebrus, where he endured very great hardships through the winter, and founded colonies of Macedonian soldiers, the chief of these being Philippopolis and Cabyle. He also entered into relations with the Getae, beyond the Haemus, and garrisoned Apollonia on the Euxine. These operations were all preparatory to his projected attack upon Byzantium. (Byzantium and Athens were at this time on unfriendly terms, owing to the part taken by the latter in the Social War.)

But the immediate subject of the present Speech was the state of affairs in the Chersonese in 342. The Chersonese (with the exception of Cardia) had been secured for Athens in 357, but had been threatened by Philip in 352,[2] when he made alliance with Cardia, and forced the neighbouring Thracian Prince Cersobleptes to submit. Soon after the Peace of Philocrates, Athens sent settlers to the Chersonese under Diopieithes. Cardia alone refused to receive them, and Diopieithes, with a mercenary force, prepared to compel the Cardians to admit them; while Philip sent

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troops to hold the town, and complained to Athens in threatening terms of the actions of Diopieithes, and more particularly of an inroad which Diopieithes had made upon Philip's territory in Thrace. Diopieithes had been ill-supported with money and men by Athens, and had had recourse to piratical actions, in order to obtain supplies, thus arousing some indignation at Athens; but the prospect of the heavy expenditure which would be necessary, if an expedition were sent to his aid, was also unattractive. Demosthenes, however, proposed that Diopieithes should be vigorously supported, on the ground that Philip was really at war with Athens, and that this was not the time to interfere with the general who alone was pushing the Athenian cause. The speech was delivered early in the spring of 341. It is a masterpiece of oratory, at once statesmanlike and impassioned, and shows a complete command of every variety of tone. The latter part of it contains a strong denunciation of the Macedonian party in Athens, a defence of the orator's own career, and an urgent demand for the punishment of disloyalty. At the same time Demosthenes does not embody the policy which he advises in any formal motion. For this we have to wait for the Third Philippic.]

1 It was the duty, men of Athens, of every speaker not to allow either malice or favour to influence any speech which he might make, but simply to declare the policy which he considered to be the best, particularly when your deliberations were concerned with public affairs of great importance. But since there are some who are led on to address you, partly out of contentiousness, partly from causes which I need not discuss, it is for you, men of Athens—you, the People—to dismiss all other considerations, and both in the votes that you give and in the measures that you take to attend solely to what you believe to be for the good of the city. 2 Now our present anxiety arises out of affairs in the Chersonese, and the campaign, now in its eleventh month, which Philip is conducting in Thrace. But most of the speeches which we have heard have been about the acts and intentions of Diopieithes. For my part, I conceive that all charges made against any one who is amenable to the laws and can be punished by you when you will are matters which you are free to investigate, either immediately or after an interval, as you think fit; and there is no occasion for me or any one else to use strong language about them. 3 But all those advantages which an actual enemy of the city, with a large force in the Hellespont, is trying to snatch from you, and which, if we once fall behind-hand, we shall no longer be able to recover—these, surely, are matters upon which our interest demands that our plans be formed and our preparations made with the utmost dispatch; and that no clamour, no accusations about other matters, be allowed to drive us from this point.

4 Often as I am surprised at the assertions which are habitually made in your presence, nothing, men of Athens, has surprised me more than the remark which I heard only lately in the Council—that one who advises you ought, forsooth, to advise you plainly either to go to war or to keep the peace. 5 Very good.[3] If Philip is remaining inactive, if he is keeping nothing that is ours, in violation of the Peace, if he is not organizing

all mankind against us, there is nothing more to be said—we have simply to observe the Peace; and I see that, for your part, you are quite ready to do so. But what if the oath that we swore, and the terms upon which we made the Peace, stand inscribed for our eyes to see? 6 What if it is proved that from the outset, before Diopieithes sailed from Athens with the settlers who are now accused of having brought about the war, Philip wrongfully seized many of our possessions—and here, unrepealed, are your resolutions charging him with this—and that all along he has been uninterruptedly seizing the possessions of the other Hellenic and foreign peoples, and uniting their resources against us? What is *then* the meaning of the statement that we ought either to go to war or to keep the Peace? 7 For we have no choice in the matter: nothing remains open to us but the most righteous and most necessary of all acts—the act that they deliberately refuse to consider—I mean the act of retaliation against the aggressor: unless indeed, they intend to argue that, so long as Philip keeps away from Attica and the Peiraeus, he does the city no wrong and is not committing acts of war. 8 But if *this* is their criterion of right and wrong, if *this* is their definition of peace, then, although what they say is iniquitous, intolerable, and inconsistent with your security, as all must see, at the same time these very statements are actually contradictory of the charges which they are making against Diopieithes. 9 Why, I beg to ask,<sup>[n]</sup> are we to give Philip full leave to act in whatever way he chooses, so long as he does not touch Attica, when Diopieithes is not to be allowed even to assist the Thracians, without being accused of initiating war? But even if this inconsistency is brought home to them, still, we are told, the conduct of the mercenaries in ravaging the Hellespontine country is outrageous, and Diopieithes has no right to drive the vessels to shore,<sup>[n]</sup> and ought to be stopped. 10 I grant it: let it be done: I have nothing to say against it. Yet nevertheless, if their advice is genuinely based on considerations of right, and right alone, I consider that they are bound to prove that, as surely as they are seeking to break up the force on which *Athens* at present relies, by slandering its commander to you when he tries to provide funds to support it, so surely *Philip's* force will be disbanded if you accept their advice. If they fail to prove this, you must consider that they are simply setting the city once more upon the same course which has already resulted in the utter ruin of her fortunes. 11 For surely you know that nothing in the world has contributed so much to Philip's successes, as his being always first on the scene of action. With a standing force always about him, and knowing beforehand what he intends to do, he suddenly falls upon whomsoever he pleases: while we wait until we learn that something is happening, and only then, in a turmoil, make our preparations. 12 It follows, of course, that every position which he has attacked, he holds in undisturbed possession; while we are all behindhand; all our expenditure proves to have been so much useless waste; we have displayed our hostility and our desire to check him; but we are too late for action, and so we add disgrace to failure.

13 You must therefore not fail to recognize, men of Athens, that now, as before, all else that you hear consists of mere words and pretexts; and

that the real aim of all that is being done is to secure that you may remain at home, that Athens may have no force outside the city, and that thus Philip may give effect to all his desires without let or hindrance. Consider, in the first place, what is actually occurring at the present moment. 14 He is at present passing the time[n] in Thrace, with a great army under him; and, as we are told by those who are on the spot,[n] he is sending for a large addition to it from Macedonia and Thessaly. Now if he waits for the Etesian winds,[n] and then goes to Byzantium and besieges it, tell me first whether you think that the Byzantines will persist in their present infatuation,[n] and will not call upon you and entreat you to go to their aid? 15 I do not think so. Why, I believe that they would open their gates to men whom they distrust even more than they distrust you (if such exist), rather than surrender the city to Philip—supposing, that is, that he does not capture them first. And then, if we are unable to set sail from Athens, and if there are no forces there on the spot to help them, nothing can prevent their destruction. 16 'Of course,' you say, 'for the men are possessed, and their infatuation passes all bounds.' Very true; and yet they must be preserved; for the interests of Athens require it. And besides, we cannot by any means be certain that he will not invade the Chersonese. Indeed, if we are to judge by the letter which he has sent to you, he there says that he will punish the settlers[n] in the Chersonese. 17 If then the army that is now formed there is in existence, it will be able to help the Chersonese, and to injure some part of Philip's country. But when once it is dissolved, what shall we do if he marches against the Chersonese? 'We shall of course put Diopieithes on his trial.' And how will that improve our position? 'Well, we should go to the rescue from Athens ourselves.' What if the winds make it impossible? 18 'But, of course, he will not really get there.' And who can guarantee that? Do you realize, men of Athens, or take into account, what the coming season of the year is, the season against which some think you ought to evacuate the Hellespont and hand it over to Philip? What if, when he leaves Thrace, he does not go near the Chersonese or Byzantium at all—for this, too, is a possibility which you must consider—but comes to Chalcis[n] or Megara, just as he lately came to Oreus? Is it better to resist him here, and to allow the war to come into Attica, or to provide something to keep him busy there? The latter course is surely the better.

19 Realizing these things, therefore, as you all must, and taking due account of them, you must not, Heaven knows, look askance at the force which Diopieithes is trying to provide for Athens, or attempt to disband it. You must yourselves prepare another force to support it: you must help him freely with money, and give him in all other respects your loyal co-operation. 20 If Philip were asked to say whether he would wish these soldiers who are now with Diopieithes—describe them as you will, for I in no way dispute your description—to be prosperous and in high favour with the Athenians, and to be augmented in numbers by the co-operation of the city; or whether he would rather see them broken up and destroyed in consequence of calumnious charges against them; he would prefer, I imagine, the latter alternative. Can it then be, that there are men among us here who are trying to bring about the very thing that Philip would

pray Heaven for? And if so, do you need to seek any further for the cause of the total ruin of the city's fortunes?

21 I wish, therefore, to examine without reserve the present crisis of our affairs, to inquire what we ourselves are now doing, and how we are dealing with it. We do not wish to contribute funds, nor to serve with the forces in person; we cannot keep our hands from the public revenues;[n] we do not give the contributions of the allies[n] to Diopieithes, nor do we approve of such supplies as he raises for himself; 22 but we look malignantly at him, we ask whence he gets them, what he intends to do, and every possible question of that kind: and yet we are still not willing to confine ourselves to our own affairs, in consequence of the attitude which we have adopted; we still praise with our lips those who uphold the dignity of the city, though in our acts we are fighting on the side of their opponents. 23 Now whenever any one rises to speak, you always put to him the question 'What are we to do?' I wish to put to \_you\_ the question, 'What are we to \_say\_?' For if you will neither contribute, nor serve in person, nor leave the public funds alone, nor grant him the contributions, nor let him get what he can for himself, nor yet confine yourselves to your own affairs, I do not know what I can say. For when you give such licence to those who desire to make charges and accusations, that you listen to them even when they denounce him by anticipation for his alleged intentions—well, what \_can\_ one say?

24 The possible effect of this is a matter which some of you require to understand, and I will speak without reserve; for indeed I could not speak otherwise. All the commanders who have ever yet sailed from Athens—if I am wrong, I consent to any penalty that you please[n]—take money from the Chians, from the Erythraeans,[n] from any people from whom they can severally get it—I mean, any of the Asiatic settlers who are now in question. 25 Those who have one or two ships take less, those who have a larger force take more. And those who give to them do not give either little or much for nothing; they are not so insane: in fact, with these sums they buy immunity from injury for the merchants who sail from their ports, freedom from piracy, the convoying of their vessels, and so on. They call the gifts 'benevolences',[n] and that is the name given to the sums thus obtained. 26 And in the present case, when Diopieithes is there with his army, it is obvious that all these peoples will give him money. From what other source do you imagine that a general can maintain his troops, when he has received nothing from you, and has no resources from which he can pay his men? Will money drop from the sky? Of course not. He subsists upon what he can collect or beg or borrow. 27 The real effect, therefore, of the accusations made against him here, is simply to warn every one that they should refuse to give him anything, since he is to pay the penalty for his very intentions, not to speak of any action that he may have taken or any success that he may have achieved. That is the only meaning of the cry that 'he is preparing a blockade', or 'he is surrendering[n] the Hellenes'. Do any of his critics care about the Hellenes who live in Asia? 28 Were it so, they would be more thoughtful for the rest of mankind than for their own country. And the proposal to

send another general to the Hellespont amounts to no more than this. For if Diopeithes is acting outrageously and is driving the vessels to shore, then, gentlemen, one little wax-tablet[n] is enough to put an end to it all: and what the laws command is that for these offences we should impeach the wrong-doers—not that we should keep a watch upon our own forces at such expense and with so many ships.[n] 29 Such insanity really passes all bounds. No! Against the enemy whom we cannot arrest and render amenable to the laws, it is both right and necessary to maintain a force, to send war-ships, and to contribute war-funds: but against one of ourselves, a decree, an impeachment, a dispatch-boat[n] will answer our purpose. These are the means which sensible men would use: the policy of the other side is the policy of men whose spitefulness[n] is ruining your fortunes. 30 And that there should be some such men, bad though it is, is not the worst. No! for you who sit there are already in such a frame of mind, that if any one comes forward and says that Diopeithes is the cause of all the mischief, or Chares,[n] or Aristophon,[n] or any Athenian citizen that he happens to name, you at once agree, and clamorously declare that he is right; 31 but if any one comes forward and tells you the truth, and says, 'Men of Athens, this is nonsense. It is Philip that is the cause of all this mischief and trouble; for if he were quiet, the city would have nothing to disturb her,' you cannot, indeed, deny the truth of his words, but you seem, I think, to be annoyed, as though you were losing something.[n] 32 And the cause of these things is this—and I beseech you, in Heaven's name, to let me speak unreservedly, when I am speaking for your true good—that some of your politicians have contrived that you should be terrifying and severe in your assemblies, but easy-going and contemptible in your preparations for war. And accordingly, if any one names as the culprit some one whom you know you can arrest in your own midst, you agree and you wish to act; but if one is named whom you must first master by force of arms, if you are to punish him at all, you are at a loss, I fancy, what to do, and you are vexed when this is brought home to you. 33 For your politicians, men of Athens, should have treated you in exactly the opposite way to this; they should train you to be kind and sympathetic in your assemblies; for there it is with the members of your own body and your own allies that your case is argued: but your terrors and your severity should be displayed in your preparations for war, where the struggle is with your enemies and your rivals. 34 As it is, by their popular speeches, and by courting your favour to excess, they have brought you into such a condition that, while in your assemblies you give yourselves airs and enjoy their flattery, listening to nothing but what is meant to please you, in the world of facts and events you are in the last extremity of peril. Imagine, in God's name, what would happen, if the Hellenes were to call you to account for the opportunities which, in your indolence, you have now let pass, and were to put to you the question, 35 'Is it true, men of Athens, that you send envoys to us on every possible occasion, to tell us of Philip's designs against ourselves and all the Hellenes, and of the duty of keeping guard against the man, and to warn us in every way?' We should have to confess that it was true. We do act thus. 'Then,' they would proceed, 'is it true, you most contemptible of all men, that though the man has been away for ten months,

36 and has been cut off from every possibility of returning home, by illness and by winter and by wars, you have neither liberated Euboea nor recovered any of your own possessions? Is it true that you have remained at home, unoccupied and healthy—if such a word can be used of men who behave thus—and have seen him set up two tyrants in Euboea, one to serve as a fortress directly menacing Attica, the other to watch Sciathus; 37 and that you have not even rid yourselves of these dangers—granted that you did not want to do anything more—but have let them be? Obviously you have retired in his favour, and have made it evident that if he dies ten times over, you will not make any move the more. Why trouble us then with your embassies and your accusations?’ If they speak thus to us, what will be our answer? What shall we say, Athenians? I do not see what we can say.

38 Now there are some who imagine that they confute a speaker, as soon as they have asked him the question, ‘What then are we to do?’ I will first give them this answer—the most just and true of all—‘Do not do what you are doing now.’ 39 But at the same time I will give them a minute and detailed reply; and then let them show that their willingness to act upon it is not less than their eagerness to interrogate. First, men of Athens, you must thoroughly make up your minds to the fact that Philip is at war with Athens, and has broken the Peace—you must cease to lay the blame at one another’s doors—and that he is evilly-disposed and hostile to the whole city, down to the very ground on which it is built; 40 nay, I will go further—hostile to every single man in the city, even to those who are most sure that they are winning his favour. (If you think otherwise, consider the case of Euthykrates[n] and Lasthenes of Olynthus, who fancied that they were on the most friendly terms with him, but, after they had betrayed their city, suffered the most utter ruin of all.) But his hostilities and intrigues are aimed at nothing so much as at our constitution, whose overthrow is the very first object in the world to him. 41 And in a sense it is natural that he should aim at this. For he knows very well that even if he becomes master of all the rest of the world, he can retain nothing securely, so long as you are a democracy; and that if he chances to stumble anywhere, as may often happen to a man, all the elements which are now forced into union with him will come and take refuge with you. 42 For though you are not yourselves naturally adapted for aggrandizement or the usurpation of empire, you have the art of preventing any other from seizing power and of taking it from him when he has it; and in every respect you are ready to give trouble to those who are ambitious of dominion, and to lead all men forth into liberty. And so he would not have Freedom, from her home in Athens, watching for every opportunity he may offer—far from it—and there is nothing unsound or careless in his reasoning. 43 The first essential point, therefore, is this—that you conceive him to be the irreconcilable foe of your constitution and of democracy: for unless you are inwardly convinced of this, you will not be willing to take an active interest in the situation. Secondly, you must realize clearly that all the plans which he is now so busily contriving are in the nature of preparations against this country; and wherever any one resists him, he there resists him on our behalf. 44 For surely no one is so simple as to imagine that when Philip is covetous

of the wretched hamlets[n] of Thrace—one can give no other name to Drongilum, Cabyle, Masteira, and the places which he is now seizing—and when to get these places he is enduring heavy labours, hard winters, and the extremity of danger;—45 no one can imagine, I say, that the harbours and the dockyards, and the ships of the Athenians, the produce of your silver-mines, and your huge revenue, have no attraction for him, or that he will leave you in possession of these, while he winters in the very pit of destruction[n] for the sake of the millet and the spelt in the silos[n] of Thrace. No, indeed! It is to get these into his power that he pursues both his operations in Thrace and all his other designs. 46 What then, as sensible men, must you do? Knowing and realizing your position, as you do, you must lay aside this excessive, this irremediable[n] indolence: you must contribute funds, and require them from your allies; you must so provide and act, that this force which is now assembled may be held together; in order that, as Philip has the force in readiness that is to injure and enslave all the Hellenes, you may have in readiness that which shall preserve and succour them. 47 You cannot effect by isolated expeditions any of the things which must be effected. You must organize a force, and provide maintenance for it, and paymasters, and a staff of servants; and when you have taken such steps as will ensure the strictest possible watch being kept over the funds, you must hold these officials accountable for the money, and the general for the actual operations. If you act thus, and honestly make up your minds to take this course, you will either compel Philip to observe a righteous peace and remain in his own land—and no greater blessing could you obtain than that—or you will fight him on equal terms.

48 It may be thought that this policy demands heavy expenditure, and great exertions and trouble. That is true indeed; but let the objector take into account what the consequences to the city must be, if he is unwilling to assent to this policy, and he will find that the ready performance of duty brings its reward. 49 If indeed some god is offering us his guarantee—for no human guarantee would be sufficient in so great a matter—that if you remain at peace and let everything slide, Philip will not in the end come and attack yourselves; then, although, before God and every Heavenly Power, it would be unworthy of you and of the position that the city holds, and of the deeds of our forefathers, to abandon all the rest of the Hellenes to slavery for the sake of our own ease—although, for my part, I would rather have died than have suggested such a thing—yet, if another proposes it and convinces you, let it be so: do not defend yourselves: let everything go. 50 But if no one entertains such a belief, if we all know that the very opposite is true, and that the wider the mastery we allow him to gain, the more difficult and powerful a foe we shall have to deal with, what further subterfuge is open to us? Why do we delay? 51 When shall we ever be willing, men of Athens, to do our duty? 'When we are compelled,' you say. But the hour of compulsion, as the word is applied to free men, is not only here already, but has long passed; and we must surely pray that the compulsion which is put upon slaves may not come upon us. And what is the difference? It is this—that for a free man the greatest compelling force is his shame at the course which events are

taking—I do not know what greater we can imagine; but the slave is compelled by blows and bodily tortures, which I pray may never fall to our lot; it is not fit to speak of them.

52 I would gladly tell you the whole story, and show how certain persons are working for your ruin by their policy. I pass over, however, every point but this. Whenever any question of our relations with Philip arises, at once some one stands up and talks of the blessings of peace, of the difficulty of maintaining a large force, and of designs on the part of certain persons to plunder our funds; with other tales of the same kind, which enable them to delay your action, and give Philip time to do what he wishes unopposed. 53 What is the result? For you the result is your leisure, and a respite from immediate action—advantages which I fear you will some day feel to have cost you dear; and for them it is the favour they win, and the wages for these services. But I am sure that there is no need to persuade you to keep the Peace—you sit here fully persuaded. It is the man who is committing acts of war that we need to persuade; for if he is persuaded, you are ready enough. 54 Nor is it the expenditure which is to ensure our preservation that ought to distress us, but the fate which is in prospect for us, if we are not willing to take this action: while the threatened 'plunder of our funds' is to be prevented by the proposal of some safeguard which will render them secure, not by the abandonment of our interests. 55 And even so, men of Athens, I feel indignant at the very fact that some of you are so much pained at the prospect of the plunder of our funds, when you have it in your power both to protect them and to punish the culprits, and yet feel no pain when Philip is seizing all Hellas piecemeal for his plunder, and seizing it to strengthen himself against you. 56 What then is the reason, men of Athens, that though Philip's campaigns, his aggressions, his seizure of cities, are so unconcealed, none of my opponents has ever said that *he* was bringing about war? Why is it those who advise you not to allow it, not to make these sacrifices, that they accuse, and say that *they* will be the cause of the war? I will inform you. 57 It is because[n] they wish to divert the anger which you are likely to show, if you suffer at all from the war, on to the heads of those who are giving you the best advice in your own interests. They want you to sit and try such persons, instead of resisting Philip; and they themselves are to be the prosecutors, instead of paying the penalty for their present actions. That is the meaning of their assertion that there are some here, forsooth, who want to bring about war. 58 That is the real point of these allegations of responsibility. But this I know beyond all doubt—that without waiting for any one in Athens to propose the declaration of war, Philip has not only taken many other possessions of ours, but has just now sent an expedition to Cardia. If, in spite of this, we wish to pretend that he is not making war on us, he would be the most senseless man living, were he to attempt to convince us of our error. 59 But what shall we say, when his attack is made directly upon ourselves? He of course will say that he is not at war with us—just as he was not at war with Oreus,[n] when his soldiers were in the land; nor with the Pheraeans,[n] before that, when he was assaulting their walls; nor with the Olynthians, first of all, until

he and his army were actually within their territory. Or shall we still say that those who urge resistance are bringing about war? If so, all that is left to us is slavery. If we may neither offer resistance, nor yet be suffered to remain at peace, no other compromise[n] is possible. 60 And further, the issues at stake are not for you merely what they are for other states. What Philip desires is not your subjection, but your utter annihilation. For he knows full well that you will never consent to be his slaves, and that even if you were willing, you would not know the way, accustomed as you are to govern; and he knows that you will be able to give him more trouble, if you get the opportunity, than all the rest of the world. 61 The struggle, then, is a struggle for existence; and as such you ought to think of it: and you should show your abhorrence of those who have sold themselves to Philip by beating them to death. For it is impossible, utterly impossible, to master your enemies outside the city, before you punish your enemies in the city itself. 62 Whence comes it, think you, that he is insulting us now (for his conduct seems to me to be nothing less than this), and that while he at least deceives all other peoples by doing them favours, he is using threats against you without more ado? For instance, he enticed the Thessalians by large gifts into their present servitude; and words cannot describe how greatly he deceived the Olynthians at first by the gift of Poteidaea and much beside. 63 At this moment he is alluring the Thebans, by delivering up Boeotia to them, and ridding them of a long and arduous campaign. Each of these peoples has first reaped some advantage, before falling into those calamities which some of them have already suffered, as all the world knows, and some are destined to suffer whenever their time comes. But as for yourselves, to pass over all that you have been robbed of at an earlier period,[n] what deception, what robbery have been practised upon you in the very act of making the Peace! 64 Have not the Phocians, and Thermopylae, and the Thracian seaboard—Doriscus, Serrhium, Cersobleptes himself—been taken from you? Does not Philip at this moment occupy the city of the Cardians, and avow it openly? Why is it then, that he behaves as he does to all others, and so differently to you? Because yours is the one city in the world where men are permitted to speak on behalf of the enemy without fear; because here a man may take bribes, and still address you with impunity, even when you have been robbed of your own. In Olynthus it was only safe to take Philip's side when the people of Olynthus as a whole had shared Philip's favours, and was enjoying the possession of Poteidaea. 65 In Thessaly it was only safe to take Philip's side when the Thessalian commons had shared Philip's favours; for he had expelled the tyrants for them, and restored to them their Amphictyonic position. In Thebes it was not safe, until he had restored Boeotia to Thebes and annihilated the Phocians. 66 But at Athens—though Philip has not only robbed you of Amphipolis and the territory of the Cardians, but has turned Euboea into a fortress overlooking your country, and is now on his way to attack Byzantium—at Athens it is safe to speak in Philip's interest. Aye, and you know that, of such speakers, some who were poor are rapidly growing rich; and some who were without name or fame are becoming famous and distinguished, while you, on the other hand, are becoming inglorious instead of famous, bankrupt instead of wealthy. For a city's wealth

consists, I imagine, in allies, confidence, loyalty—and of all these you are bankrupt. 67 And because you are indifferent to these advantages, and let them drift away from you, he has become prosperous and powerful, and formidable to all, Hellenes and foreigners alike; while you are deserted and humbled, with a splendid profusion of commodities in your

market, and a contemptible lack of all those things with which you should have been provided. But I observe that certain speakers do not follow the same principles in the advice which they give you, as they follow for themselves. *You*, they tell you, ought to remain quiet, even when you are wronged; but *they* cannot remain quiet in your presence, even when no one is wronging them.

68 But now some one or other comes forward and says, 'Ah, but you will not move a motion or take any risk. You are a poor-spirited coward.' Bold, offensive, shameless, I am not, and I trust I may never be; and yet I think I have more courage than very many of your dashing statesmen. 69 For one, men of Athens, who overlooks all that the city's interest demands—who prosecutes, confiscates, gives, accuses—does so not from any bravery, but because in the popular character of his speeches and public actions he has a guarantee of his personal safety, and therefore is bold without risk. But one who in acting for the best sets himself in many ways against your wishes—who never speaks to please, but always to advise what is best; one who chooses a policy in which more issues must be decided by chance than by calculation, and yet makes himself responsible to you for both—that is the courageous man, 70 and such is the citizen who is of value to his country, rather than those who, to gain an ephemeral popularity, have ruined the supreme interests of the city. So far am I from envying these men, or thinking them worthy citizens of their country, that if any one were to ask me to say, what good *I* had really done to the city, although, men of Athens, I could tell how often I had been trierarch and choregus,<sup>[n]</sup> how I had contributed funds, ransomed prisoners, and done other like acts of generosity, I would mention none of these things; 71 I would say only that my policy is not one of measures like theirs—that although, like others, I could make accusations and shower favours and confiscate property and do all that my opponents do, I have never to this day set myself to do any of these things; I have been influenced neither by gain nor by ambition; but I continue to give the advice which sets me below many others in your estimation, but which must make you greater, if you will listen to it; for so much, perhaps, I may say without offence. 72 Nor, I think, should I be acting fairly as a citizen, if I devised such political measures as would at once make me the first man in Athens, and you the last of all peoples. As the measures of a loyal politician develop, the greatness of his country should develop with them; and it is the thing which is best, not the thing which is easiest, that every speaker should advocate. Nature will find the way to the easiest course unaided. To the best, the words and the guidance of the loyal citizen must show the way.

73 I have heard it remarked before now, that though what I *say* is

always what is best, still I never contribute anything but words; whereas the city needs work of some practical kind. I will tell you without any concealment my own sentiments on this matter. There is no work that can be demanded of any of your public advisers, except that he should advise what is best; and I think I can easily show you that this is so. 74 No doubt you know how the great Timotheus[n] delivered a speech to the effect that you ought to go to the rescue and save the Euboeans, when the Thebans were trying to reduce them to servitude; and how, in the course of his speech, he spoke somewhat in this strain:—'What?' said he, 'when you actually have the Thebans in the island, do you debate what you are to do with them, and how you are to act? Will you not cover the sea with warships, men of Athens? Will you not rise from your seats and go instantly to the Peiraeus and launch your vessels?' 75 So Timotheus spoke, and you acted as he bade you; and through his speech and your action the work was done. But if he had given you the best possible advice (as in fact he did), and you had lapsed into indolence and paid no attention to it, would the city have achieved any of the results which followed on that occasion? Impossible! And so it is with all that I say to-day, and with all that this or that speaker may say. For the actions you must look to yourselves; from the speaker you must require that he give you the best counsel that he can.[n]

76 I desire now to sum up my advice and to leave the platform. I say that we must contribute funds, and must keep together the force now in existence, correcting anything that may seem amiss in it, but not disbanding the whole force because of the possible criticisms against it. We must send envoys everywhere to instruct, to warn, and to act. Above all, we must punish those who take bribes in connexion with public affairs, and must everywhere display our abhorrence of them; in order that reasonable men, who offer their honest services, may find their policy justified in their own eyes and in those of others. 77 If you treat the situation thus, and cease to ignore it altogether, there is a chance—a chance I say, even now—that it may improve. If, however, you sit idle, with an interest that stops short at applause and acclamation, and retires into the background when any action is required, I can imagine no oratory, which, without action on your part, will be able to save your country.

#### FOOTNOTES

[1] See Third Philippic 59 sqq.

[2] See Introduction to First Philippic.

[3] [Greek: est. o d.e.]

#### THE THIRD PHILIPPIC (Or. IX)

[Introduction.] The Third Philippic seems to have been delivered in the late spring or early summer of 341 B. C., about two months after the Speech on the Chersonese, which apparently had little positive result,

though it probably prevented the recall and prosecution of Diopeithes. The immediate occasion of the Third Philippic was a request from the forces in the Chersonese for supplies. The general situation is the same as at the date of the last speech, but the danger to Byzantium is more pressing. Demosthenes now takes the broad ground of Panhellenic policy, and formally proposes to send envoys throughout Greece, to unite all the Greek states against Philip, as well as to send immediate reinforcements and supplies to the Chersonese.

Many critics, ancient and modern, have regarded this as the greatest of all Demosthenes' political orations. The lessons of history (from the speaker's point of view) are repeated and enforced by the citation of instance after instance. The tone of the speech, while less varied than that of the last, is grave and intense. The passage ( 36 ff.) in which the orator contrasts the spirit of Athenian political life in the past with that of his own day is one of the most impressive in all his works, and the nobility of his appeal to the traditional ideals of Athenian policy has been universally recognized even by his most severe critics.

The speech is found in the MSS. in two forms, of which the shorter omits a number of passages[1] which the longer includes, though there are signs of an imperfect blending of the two versions in certain places. It seems probable that both versions are due to Demosthenes, and the speech may have been more than once revised by him before publication or republication. In which form it was delivered there is not sufficient evidence to show.]

1 Many speeches are made, men of Athens, at almost every meeting of the Assembly, with reference to the aggressions which Philip has been committing, ever since he concluded the Peace, not only against yourselves but against all other peoples; and I am sure that all would agree, however little they may act on their belief, that our aim, both in speech and in action, should be to cause him to cease from his insolence and to pay the penalty for it. And yet I see that in fact the treacherous sacrifice of our interests has gone on, until what seems an ill-omened saying may, I fear, be really true—that if all who came forward desired to propose, and you desired to carry, the measures which would make your position as pitiful as it could possibly be, it could not (so I believe), be made worse than it is now. 2 It may be that there are many reasons for this, and that our affairs did not reach their present condition from any one or two causes. But if you examine the matter aright, you will find that the chief responsibility rests with those whose aim is to win your favour, not to propose what is best. Some of them, men of Athens, so long as they can maintain the conditions which bring them reputation and influence, take no thought for the future [and therefore think that you also should take none]; while others, by accusing and slandering those who are actively at work,[n] are simply trying to make the city spend its energies in punishing the members of its own body, and so leave Philip free to say and do what he likes. 3 Such political methods as these, familiar to you as they are, are the real causes of the evil. And I beg you, men of Athens,

if I tell you certain truths outspokenly, to let no resentment on your part fall upon me on this account. Consider the matter in this light. In every other sphere of life, you believe that the right of free speech ought to be so universally shared by all who are in the city, that you have extended it both to foreigners and to slaves; and one may see many a servant in Athens speaking his mind with greater liberty than is granted to citizens in some other states: but from the sphere of political counsel you have utterly banished this liberty. 4 The result[n] is that in your meetings you give yourselves airs and enjoy their flattery, listening to nothing but what is meant to please you, while in the world of facts and events, you are in the last extremity of peril. If then you are still in this mood to-day, I do not know what I can say; but if you are willing to listen while I tell you, without flattery, what your interest requires, I am prepared to speak. For though our position is very bad indeed, and much has been sacrificed, it is still possible, even now, if you will do your duty, to set all right once more. 5 It is a strange thing, perhaps, that I am about to say, but it is true. The worst feature in the past is that in which lies our best hope for the future. And what is this? It is that you are in your present plight because you do not do any part of your duty, small or great; for of course, if you were doing all that you should do, and were still in this evil case, you could not even hope for any improvement. As it is, Philip has conquered your indolence and your indifference; but he has not conquered Athens. You have not been vanquished—you have never even stirred. 6 [Now if it was admitted by us all that Philip was at war with Athens, and was transgressing the Peace, a speaker would have to do nothing but to advise you as to the safest and easiest method of resistance to him. But since there are some who are in so extraordinary a frame of mind that, though he is capturing cities, though many of your possessions are in his hands, and though he is committing aggressions against all men, they still tolerate certain speakers, who constantly assert at your meetings that it is some of \_us\_ who are provoking the war, it is necessary to be on our guard and come to a right understanding on the matter. 7 For there is a danger lest any one who proposes or advises resistance should find himself accused of having brought about the war.]

[Well, I say this first of all, and lay it down as a principle, that if it is open to us to deliberate whether we should remain at peace or should go to war ...]

8 Now if it is possible for the city to remain at peace—if the decision rests with us (that I may make this my starting-point)—then, I say that we ought to do so, and I call upon any one who says that it is so to move his motion, and to act and not to defraud us.[n] But if another with weapons in his hands and a large force about him holds out to you the \_name\_ of peace, while his own acts are acts of war, what course remains open to us but that of resistance? though if you wish to profess peace in the same manner as he, I have no quarrel with you. 9 But if any man's conception of peace is that it is a state in which Philip can master all that intervenes till at last he comes to attack ourselves, such a

conception, in the first place, is madness; and, in the second place, this peace that he speaks of is a peace which you are to observe towards Philip, while he does not observe it towards you: and this it is—this power to carry on war against you, without being met by any hostilities on your part—that Philip is purchasing with all the money that he is spending.

10 Indeed, if we intend to wait till the time comes when he admits that he is at war with us, we are surely the most innocent persons in the world. Why, even if he comes to Attica itself, to the very Peiraeus, he will never make such an admission, if we are to judge by his dealings with others. 11 For, to take one instance, he told the Olynthians, when he was five miles from the city, that there were only two alternatives—either they must cease to live in Olynthus, or he to live in Macedonia: but during the whole time before that, whenever any one accused him of any such sentiments, he was indignant and sent envoys to answer the charge. Again, he marched into the Phocians' country, as though visiting his allies:[n] it was by Phocian envoys that he was escorted on the march; and most people in Athens contended strongly that his crossing the Pass would bring no good to Thebes. 12 Worse still, he has lately seized Pherae[n] and still holds it, though he went to Thessaly as a friend and an ally. And, latest of all, he told those unhappy citizens of Oreus[n] that he had sent his soldiers to visit them and to make kind inquiries; he had heard that they were sick, and suffering from faction, and it was right for an ally and a true friend to be present at such a time. 13 Now if, instead of giving them warning and using open force, he deliberately chose to deceive these men, who could have done him no harm, though they might have taken precautions against suffering any themselves, do you imagine that he will make a formal declaration of war upon you before he commences hostilities, and that, so long as you are content to be deceived? 14 Impossible! For so long as you, though you are the injured party, make no complaint against him, but accuse some of your own body, he would be the most fatuous man on earth if he were to interrupt your strife and contentions with one another—to bid you turn upon himself, and so to cut away the ground from the arguments by which his hirelings put you off, when they tell you that he is not at war with Athens.

15 In God's name, is there a man in his senses who would judge by words, and not by facts, whether another was at peace or at war with him? Of course there is not. Why, from the very first, when the Peace had only just been made, before those who are now in the Chersonese had been sent out, Philip was taking Serrhium[n] and Doriscus, and expelling the soldiers who were in the castle of Serrhium and the Sacred Mountain, where they had been placed by your general. 16 But what was he doing, in acting thus? For he had sworn to a Peace.[n] And let no one ask, 'What do these things amount to? What do they matter to Athens?' For whether these acts were trifles which could have no interest for you is another matter; but the principles of religion[n] and justice, whether a man transgress them in small things or great, have always the same force. What? When he is sending mercenaries into the Chersonese, which the king and all the

Hellenes have acknowledged to be yours; when he openly avows that he is going to the rescue, and states it in his letter, what is it that he is doing? 17 He tells you, indeed, that he is not making war upon you. But so far am I from admitting that one who acts in this manner is observing the Peace which he made with you, that I hold that in grasping at Megara, in setting up tyrants in Euboea, in advancing against Thrace at the present moment, in pursuing his machinations in the Peloponnese, and in carrying out his entire policy with the help of his army, he is violating the Peace and is making war against you;—unless you mean to say that even to bring up engines to besiege you is no breach of the Peace, until they are actually planted against your walls. But you will not say this; for the man who is taking the steps and contriving the means which will lead to my capture is at war with me, even though he has not yet thrown a missile or shot an arrow. 18 Now what are the things which would imperil your safety, if anything should happen?[n] The alienation of the Hellespont, the placing of Megara and Euboea in the power of the enemy, and the attraction of Peloponnesian sympathy to his cause. Can I then say that one who is erecting such engines of war as these against the city is at peace with you? 19 Far from it! For from the very day when he annihilated the Phocians—from that very day, I say, I date the beginning of his hostilities against you. And for your part, I think that you will be wise if you resist him at once; but that if you let him be, you will find that, when you wish to resist, resistance itself is impossible. Indeed, so widely do I differ, men of Athens, from all your other advisers, that I do not think there is any room for discussion to-day in regard to the Chersonese or Byzantium. 20 We *must* go to their defence, and take every care that they do not suffer [and we must send all that they need to the soldiers who are at present there]. But we *have* to take counsel for the good of all the Hellenes, in view of the grave peril in which they stand. And I wish to tell you on what grounds I am so alarmed at the situation, in order that if my reasoning is correct, you may share my conclusions, and exercise some forethought for yourselves at least, if you are actually unwilling to do so for the Hellenes as a whole; but that if you think that I am talking nonsense, and am out of my senses, you may both now and hereafter decline to attend to me as though I were a sane man.

21 The rise of Philip to greatness from such small and humble beginnings; the mistrustful and quarrelsome attitude of the Hellenes towards one another; the fact that his growth out of what he was into what he is was a far more extraordinary thing than would be his subjugation of all that remains, when he has already secured so much;—all this and all similar themes, upon which I might speak at length, I will pass over. 22 But I see that all men, beginning with yourselves, have conceded to him the very thing which has been at issue in every Hellenic war during the whole of the past. And what is this? It is the right to act as he pleases—to mutilate and to strip the Hellenic peoples, one by one, to attack and to enslave their cities. 23 For seventy-three years[n] you were the leading people of Hellas, and the Spartans for thirty years save one;[n] and in these last times, after the battle of Leuctra,[n] the Thebans too

acquired some power: yet neither to you nor to Thebes nor to Sparta was such a right ever conceded by the Hellenes, as the right to do whatever you pleased. Far from it! 24 First of all it was your own behaviour—or rather that of the Athenians of that day—which some thought immoderate; and all, even those who had no grievance against Athens, felt bound to join the injured parties, and to make war upon you. Then, in their turn, the Spartans, when they had acquired an empire and succeeded to a supremacy like your own, attempted to go beyond all bounds and to disturb the established order[n] to an unjustifiable extent; and once more, all, even those who had no grievance against them, had recourse to war. 25 Why mention the others? For we ourselves and the Spartans, though we could originally allege no injury done by the one people to the other, nevertheless felt bound to go to war on account of the wrongs which we saw the rest suffering. And yet all the offences of the Spartans in those thirty years of power, and of your ancestors in their seventy years, were less, men of Athens, than the wrongs inflicted upon the Greeks by Philip, in the thirteen years, not yet completed, during which he has been to the fore. Less do I say? 26 They are not a fraction of them. [A few words will easily prove this.] I say nothing of Olynthus, and Methone, and Apollonia, and thirty-two cities in the Thracian region,[n] all annihilated by him with such savagery, that a visitor to the spot would find it difficult to tell that they had ever been inhabited. I remain silent in regard to the extirpation of the great Phocian race. But what is the condition of Thessaly? Has he not robbed their very cities of their governments,[n] and set up tetrarchies, that they may be enslaved, not merely by whole cities, but by whole tribes at a time? 27 Are not the cities of Euboea even now ruled by tyrants, and that in an island that is neighbour to Thebes and Athens? Does he not write expressly in his letters, 'I am at peace with those who choose to obey me'? And what he thus writes he does not fail to act upon; for he is gone to invade the Hellespont; he previously went to attack Ambracia;[n] the great city of Elis[n] in the Peloponnese is his; he has recently intrigued against Megara;[n] and neither Hellas nor the world beyond it is large enough to contain the man's ambition. 28 But though all of us, the Hellenes, see and hear these things, we send no representatives to one another to discuss the matter; we show no indignation; we are in so evil a mood, so deep have the lines been dug which sever city from city, that up to this very day we are unable to act as either our interest or our duty require. 29 We cannot unite; we can form no combination for mutual support or friendship; but we look on while the man grows greater, because every one has made up his mind (as it seems to me) to profit by the time during which his neighbour is being ruined, and no one cares or acts for the safety of the Hellenes. For we all know that Philip is like the recurrence or the attack of a fever or other illness, in his descent upon those who fancy themselves for the present well out of his reach. 30 And further, you must surely realize that all the wrongs that the Hellenes suffered from the Spartans or ourselves they at least suffered at the hands of true-born sons of Hellas; and (one might conceive) it was as though a lawful son, born to a great estate, managed his affairs in some wrong or improper way;—his conduct would in itself deserve blame and denunciation,

but at least it could not be said that he was not one of the family, or was not the heir to the property. 31 But had it been a slave or a supposititious son that was thus ruining and spoiling an inheritance to which he had no title, why, good Heavens! how infinitely more scandalous and reprehensible all would have declared it to be. And yet they show no such feeling in regard to Philip, although not only is he no Hellene, not only has he no kinship with Hellenes, but he is not even a barbarian from a country that one could acknowledge with credit;—he is a pestilent Macedonian, from whose country it used not to be possible to buy even a slave of any value.

32 And in spite of this, is there any degree of insolence to which he does not proceed? Not content with annihilating cities, does he not manage the Pythian games,[n] the common meeting of the Hellenes, and send his slaves to preside over the competition in his absence? [Is he not master of Thermopylae, and of the passes which lead into Hellenic territory? Does he not hold that district with garrisons and mercenaries? Has he not taken the precedence in consulting the oracle, and thrust aside ourselves and the Thessalians and Dorians and the rest of the Amphictyons, though the right is not one which is given even to all of the Hellenes?] 33 Does he not write to the Thessalians to prescribe the constitution under which they are to live? Does he not send one body of mercenaries to Porthmus, to expel the popular party of Eretria, and another to Oreus, to set up Philistides as tyrant? And yet the Hellenes see these things and endure them, gazing (it seems to me) as they would gaze at a hailstorm—each people praying that it may not come their way, but no one trying to prevent it. Nor is it only his outrages upon Hellas that go unresisted. 34 No one resists even the aggressions which are committed against himself. Ambracia and Leucas belong to the Corinthians—he has attacked them: Naupactus to the Achaeans—he has sworn to hand it over to the Aetolians: Echinus[n] to the Thebans—he has taken it from them, and is now marching against their allies the Byzantines—is it not so? 35 And of our own possessions, to pass by all the rest, is not Cardia, the greatest city in the Chersonese, in his hands? Thus are we treated; and we are all hesitating and torpid, with our eyes upon our neighbours, distrusting one another, rather than the man whose victims we all are. But if he treats us collectively in this outrageous fashion, what do you think he will do, when he has become master of each of us separately?

36 What then is the cause of these things? For as it was not without reason and just cause that the Hellenes in old days were so prompt for freedom, so it is not without reason or cause that they are now so prompt to be slaves. There was a spirit, men of Athens, a spirit in the minds of the people in those days, which is absent to-day—the spirit which vanquished the wealth of Persia, which led Hellas in the path of freedom, and never gave way in face of battle by sea or by land; a spirit whose extinction to-day has brought universal ruin and turned Hellas upside down. What was this spirit? [It was nothing subtle nor clever.] 37 It meant that men who took money from those who aimed at dominion or at the ruin of Hellas were execrated by all; that it was then a very grave thing

to be convicted of bribery; that the punishment for the guilty man was the heaviest that could be inflicted; that for him there could be no plea for mercy, nor hope of pardon. 38 No orator, no general, would then sell the critical opportunity whenever it arose—the opportunity so often offered to men by fortune, even when they are careless and their foes are on their guard. They did not barter away the harmony between people and people, nor their own mistrust of the tyrant and the foreigner, nor any of these high sentiments. 39 Where are such sentiments now? They have been sold in the market and are gone; and those have been imported in their stead, through which the nation lies ruined and plague-stricken—the envy of the man who has received his hire; the amusement which accompanies his avowal; [the pardon granted to those whose guilt is proved;] the hatred of one who censures the crime; and all the appurtenances of corruption. 40 For as to ships, numerical strength, unstinting abundance of funds and all other material of war, and all the things by which the strength of cities is estimated, every people can command these in greater plenty and on a larger scale by far than in old days. But all these resources are rendered unserviceable, ineffectual, unprofitable, by those who traffic in them.

41 That these things are so to-day, you doubtless see, and need no testimony of mine: and that in times gone by the opposite was true, I will prove to you, not by any words of my own, but by the record inscribed by your ancestors on a pillar of bronze, and placed on the Acropolis [not to be a lesson to themselves—they needed no such record to put them in a right mind—but to be a reminder and an example to you of the zeal that you ought to display in such a cause]. 42 What then is the record? 'Arthmius,[n] son of Pythonax, of Zeleia, is an outlaw, and is the enemy of the Athenian people and their allies, he and his house.' Then follows the reason for which this step was taken—'because he brought the gold from the Medes into the Peloponnese.' 43 Such is the record. Consider, in Heaven's name, what must have been the mind of the Athenians of that day, when they did this, and their conception of their position. They set up a record, that because a man of Zeleia, Arthmius by name, a slave of the King of Persia (for Zeleia is in Asia), as part of his service to the king, had brought gold, not to Athens, but to the Peloponnese, he should be an enemy of Athens and her allies, he and his house, and that they should be outlaws. 44 And this outlawry is no such disfranchisement as we ordinarily mean by the word. For what would it matter to a man of Zeleia, that he might have no share in the public life of Athens? But there is a clause in the Law of Murder, dealing with those in connexion with whose death the law does not allow a prosecution for murder [but the slaying of them is to be a holy act]: 'And let him die an outlaw,' it runs. The meaning, accordingly, is this—that the slayer of such a man is to be pure from all guilt. 45 They thought, therefore, that the safety of all the Hellenes was a matter which concerned themselves—apart from this belief, it could not have mattered to them whether any one bought or corrupted men in the Peloponnese; and whenever they detected such offenders, they carried their punishment and their vengeance so far as to pillory their names for ever. As the natural consequence, the Hellenes were a terror to the foreigner, not the foreigner to the Hellenes. It is

not so now. Such is not your attitude in these or in other matters. 46 But what is it? [You know it yourselves; for why should I accuse you explicitly on every point? And that of the rest of the Hellenes is like your own, and no better; and so I say that the present situation demands our utmost earnestness and good counsel.[n]] And what counsel? Do you bid me tell you, and will you not be angry if I do so?

[He reads from the document..]

47 Now there is an ingenuous argument, which is used by those who would reassure the city, to the effect that, after all, Philip is not yet in the position once held by the Spartans, who ruled everywhere over sea and land, with the king for their ally, and nothing to withstand them; and that, none the less, Athens defended herself even against them, and was not swept away. Since that time the progress in every direction, one may say, has been great, and has made the world to-day very different from what it was then; but I believe that in no respect has there been greater progress or development than in the art of war. 48 In the first place, I am told that in those days the Spartans and all our other enemies would invade us for four or five months—during, that is, the actual summer—and would damage Attica with infantry and citizen-troops, and then return home again. And so old-fashioned were the men of that day—nay rather, such true citizens—that no one ever purchased any object from another for money, but their warfare was of a legitimate and open kind. 49 But now, as I am sure you see, most of our losses are the result of treachery, and no issue is decided by open conflict or battle; while you are told that it is not because he leads a column of heavy infantry[n] that Philip can march wherever he chooses, but because he has attached to himself a force of light infantry, cavalry, archers, mercenaries, and similar troops. 50 And whenever, with such advantages,[n] he falls upon a State which is disordered within, and in their distrust of one another no one goes out in defence of its territory, he brings up his engines and besieges them. I pass over the fact that summer and winter are alike to him—that there is no close season during which he suspends operations. 51 But if you all know these things and take due account of them, you surely must not let the war pass into Attica, nor be dashed from your seat through looking back to the simplicity of those old hostilities with Sparta. You must guard against him, at the greatest possible distance, both by political measures and by preparations; you must prevent his stirring from home, instead of grappling with him at close quarters in a struggle to the death. 52 For, men of Athens, we have many natural advantages for a war,[n] if we are willing to do our duty. There is the character of his country, much of which we can harry and damage, and a thousand other things. But for a pitched battle he is in better training than we.

53 Nor have you only to recognize these facts, and to resist him by actual operations of war. You must also by reasoned judgement and of set purpose come to execrate those who address you in his interest, remembering that it is impossible to master the enemies of the city, until you punish those who are serving them in the city itself. 54 And this,

before God and every Heavenly Power—this you will not be able to do; for you have reached such a pitch of folly or distraction or—I know not what to call it; for often has the fear actually entered my mind, that some more than mortal power may be driving our fortunes to ruin—that to enjoy their abuse, or their malice, or their jests, or whatever your motive may chance to be, you call upon men to speak who are hirelings, and some of whom would not even deny it; and you laugh to hear their abuse of others. 55 And terrible as this is, there is yet worse to be told. For you have actually made political life safer for these men, than for those who uphold your own cause. And yet observe what calamities the willingness to listen to such men lays up in store. I will mention facts known to you all.

56 In Olynthus, among those who were engaged in public affairs, there was one party who were on the side of Philip, and served his interests in everything; and another whose aim was their city's real good, and the preservation of their fellow citizens from bondage. Which were the destroyers of their country? which betrayed the cavalry, through whose betrayal Olynthus perished? Those whose sympathies were with Philip's cause; those who, while the city still existed brought such dishonest and slanderous charges against the speakers whose advice was for the best, that, in the case of Apollonides at least, the people of Olynthus was even induced to banish the accused.

57 Nor is this instance of the unmixed evil wrought by these practices in the case of the Olynthians an exceptional one, or without parallel elsewhere. For in Eretria,[n] when Plutarchus and the mercenaries had been got rid of, and the people had control of the city and of Porthmus, one party wished to entrust the State to you, the other to entrust it to Philip. And through listening mainly, or rather entirely, to the latter, these poor luckless Eretrians were at last persuaded to banish the advocates of their own interests. 58 For, as you know, Philip, their ally, sent Hipponicus with a thousand mercenaries, stripped Porthmus of its walls, and set up three tyrants—Hipparchus, Automedon, and Cleitarchus; and since then he has already twice expelled them from the country when they wished to recover their position [sending on the first occasion the mercenaries commanded by Eurylochus, on the second, those under Parmenio].

59 And why go through the mass of the instances? Enough to mention how in Oreus Philip had, as his agents, Philistides, Menippus, Socrates, Thoas, and Agapaeus—the very men who are now in possession of the city—and every one knew the fact; while a certain Euphraeus,[n] who once lived here in Athens, acted in the interests of freedom, to save his country from bondage. 60 To describe the insults and the contumely with which he met would require a long story; but a year before the capture of the town he laid an information of treason against Philistides and his party, having perceived the nature of their plans. A number of men joined forces, with Philip for their paymaster and director, and haled Euphraeus off to prison as a disturber of the peace. 61 Seeing this, the democratic party

in Oreus, instead of coming to the rescue of Euphraeus, and beating the other party to death, displayed no anger at all against them, and agreed with a malicious pleasure that Euphraeus deserved his fate. After this the conspirators worked with all the freedom they desired for the capture of the city, and made arrangements for the execution of the scheme; while any of the democratic party, who perceived what was going on, maintained a panic-stricken silence, remembering the fate of Euphraeus. So wretched was their condition, that though this dreadful calamity was confronting them, no one dared open his lips, until all was ready and the enemy was advancing up to the walls. Then the one party set about the defence, the other about the betrayal of the city. 62 And when the city had been captured in this base and shameful manner, the successful party governed despotically: and of those who had been their own protectors, and had been ready to treat Euphraeus with all possible harshness, they expelled some and murdered others; while the good Euphraeus killed himself, thus testifying to the righteousness and purity of his motives in opposing Philip on behalf of his countrymen.

63 Now for what reason, you may be wondering, were the peoples of Olynthus and Eretria and Oreus more agreeably disposed towards Philip's advocates than towards their own? The reason was the same as it is with you—that those who speak for your true good can never, even if they would, speak to win popularity with you; they are constrained to inquire how the State may be saved: while their opponents, in the very act of seeking popularity, are co-operating with Philip. 64 The one party said, 'You must pay taxes;' the other, 'There is no need to do so.' The one said, 'Go to war, and do not trust him;' the other, 'Remain at peace,'—until they were in the toils. And—not to mention each separately—I believe that the same thing was true of all. The one side said what would enable them to win favour; the other, what would secure the safety of their State. And at last the main body of the people accepted much that they proposed—not now from any such desire for gratification, nor from ignorance, but as a concession to circumstances, thinking that their cause was now wholly lost. 65 It is this fate, I solemnly assure you, that I dread for you, when the time comes that you make your reckoning, and realize that there is no longer anything that can be done. May you never find yourselves, men of Athens, in such a position! Yet in any case, it were better to die ten thousand deaths, than to do anything out of servility towards Philip [or to sacrifice any of those who speak for your good]. A noble recompense did the people in Oreus receive, for entrusting themselves to Philip's friends, and thrusting Euphraeus aside! 66 and a noble recompense the democracy of Eretria, for driving away your envoys, and surrendering to Cleitarchus! They are slaves, scourged and butchered! A noble clemency did he show to the Olynthians, who elected Lasthenes to command the cavalry, and banished Apollonides! 67 It is folly, and it is cowardice, to cherish hopes like these, to give way to evil counsels, to refuse to do anything that you should do, to listen to the advocates of the enemy's cause, and to fancy that you dwell in so great a city that, whatever happens, you will not suffer any harm. 68 Aye, and it is shameful to exclaim after the event, 'Why, who would have expected this?'

Of course, we ought to have done, or not to have done, such and such things!' The Olynthians could tell you of many things, to have foreseen which in time would have saved them from destruction. So too could the people of Oreus, and the Phocians, and every other people that has been destroyed. 69 But how does that help them now? So long as the vessel is safe, be it great or small, so long must the sailor and the pilot and every man in his place exert himself and take care that no one may capsize it by design or by accident: but when the seas have overwhelmed it, all their efforts are in vain. 70 So it is, men of Athens, with us. While we are still safe, with our great city, our vast resources, our noble name, what are we to do? Perhaps some one sitting here has long been wishing to ask this question. Aye, and I will answer it, and will move my motion; and you shall carry it, if you wish. We ourselves, in the first place, must conduct the resistance and make preparation for it—with ships, that is, and money, and soldiers. For though all but ourselves give way and become slaves, we at least must contend for freedom. 71 And when we have made all these preparations ourselves, and let them be seen, then let us call upon the other states for aid, and send envoys to carry our message [in all directions—to the Peloponnese, to Rhodes, to Chios, to the king; for it is not unimportant for his interests either that Philip should be prevented from subjugating the world]; that so, if you persuade them, you may have partners to share the danger and the expense, in case of need; and if you do not, you may at least delay the march of events. 72 For since the war is with a single man, and not against the strength of a united state, even delay is not without its value, any more than were those embassies[n] of protest which last year went round the Peloponnese, when I and Polyuctus, that best of men, and Hegesippus and the other envoys went on our tour, and forced him to halt, so that he neither went to attack Acarnania, nor set out for the Peloponnese. 73 But I do not mean that we should call upon the other states, if we are not willing to take any of the necessary steps ourselves. It is folly to sacrifice what is our own, and then pretend to be anxious for the interests of others—to neglect the present, and alarm others in regard to the future. I do not propose this. I say that we must send money to the forces in the Chersonese, and do all that they ask of us; that we must make preparation ourselves, while we summon, convene, instruct, and warn the rest of the Hellenes. That is the policy for a city with a reputation such as yours. 74 But if you fancy that the people of Chalcis or of Megara will save Hellas, while you run away from the task, you are mistaken. They may well be content if they can each save themselves. The task is yours. It is the prerogative that your forefathers won, and through many a great peril bequeathed to you. 75 But if each of you is to sit and consult his inclinations, looking for some way by which he may escape any personal action, the first consequence will be that you will never find any one who will act; and the second, I fear, that the day will come when we shall be forced to do, at one and the same time, all the things we wish to avoid.

76 This then is my proposal, and this I move. If the proposal is carried out, I think that even now the state of our affairs may be remedied. But if any one has a better proposal to make, let him make it, and give us his

advice. And I pray to all the gods that whatever be the decision that you are about to make, it may be for your good.

#### FOOTNOTES

[1] These are printed in square brackets in the translation.

#### ON THE CROWN (Or. XVIII)

[Introduction.. The advice given by Demosthenes in the Third Philippic (spoken before the middle of 341) was in the main followed. He himself was sent almost immediately to Byzantium, where he renewed the alliance between that city and Athens, and at the same time entered into relations with Abydos and the Thracian princes. Rhodes, and probably Chios and Cos, were also conciliated, and an embassy was sent to the King of Persia to ask for aid against Philip. The king appears to have sent assistance to Diopithes, and it is also stated (not on the best authority) that he sent large sums of money to Demosthenes and Hypereides. Demosthenes further succeeded, in conjunction with Callias of Chalcis, in organizing a league against Philip, which included Corinth, Megara, Corcyra, and the Acarnanians, and which at least supplied a considerable number of men and some funds. The cities of Euboea, most of which had been in the hands of Philip's party, were also formed into a confederacy, in alliance with Athens, under the leadership of Chalcis; Philistides was expelled from Oreus, about July 341, by the allied forces under Cephisophon; and later in the summer, Phocion drove Cleitarchus from Eretria. On the motion of Aristonicus, the Athenians voted Demosthenes a golden crown, which was conferred on him in the theatre at the Great Dionysia in March 340. The arrest of Anaxinus of Oreus, and his condemnation as a spy, acting in Philip's interest, must have occurred about the same time. Not long afterwards Demosthenes succeeded in carrying out a complete reorganization of the trierarchic system, by which he made the burden of the expense vary strictly according to property, and secured a regular and efficient supply of ships, money, and men.

In the meantime (in 341 or 340) the island of Peparethus was attacked by Philip's ships, in revenge for the seizure of the Macedonian garrison in Halonnesus by the Peparethians: and the Athenian admirals were ordered to retaliate. Philip himself had been pursuing his course in Thrace; and on the rejection of his request to Byzantium for an alliance, he laid siege (late in 340) to Perinthus (which lay on his way to Byzantium), sending part of his forces through the Chersonese. Aided by Byzantine and Persian soldiers, Perinthus held out, till at last Philip took off most of his forces and besieged Byzantium itself. He had shortly before this sent to Athens an express declaration of war, and received a similar declaration from her, the formal excuse for which was found in the recent seizure by his ships of some Athenian merchant-vessels. But with help from Athens, Chios, Rhodes, and Cos, the Byzantines maintained the defence. Philip's position became serious; but he managed by a ruse to get his ships away into the open sea, and even to do some damage to the Athenian settlers in

the Chersonese. In the winter he withdrew from Byzantium, and in 339 made an incursion into Scythia; but, returning through the country of the Triballi, he sustained some loss, and was severely wounded. Later in the year a new Sacred War which had arisen gave him a convenient opportunity for the invasion of Greece.

At the meeting of the Amphictyonic Council in the autumn of 340,[1] Aeschines was one of the representatives of Athens. The Athenians had recently offended Thebes by re-gilding and dedicating in the restored temple at Delphi fifty shields, with an inscription stating that they were spoil 'taken from the Medes and the Thebans, when they fought against the Hellenes' (probably at Plataeae in 479). The Locrians of Amphissa intended (according to Aeschines' account) to propose that the Council should fine Athens fifty talents. Aeschines rose to state the case for Athens; but a delegate from Amphissa forbade all mention of the Athenians, and demanded their exclusion from the temple, on the ground of their alliance with the accursed Phocians. Aeschines retorted by charging the Amphisseans with cultivating and building upon the sacred plain of Cirrha—acts forbidden for all time in 586 B.C.—and roused the Council to such indignation that they gathered a body of men and destroyed the harbour and the unlawful buildings of Cirrha; but they were severely handled by the Amphisseans, and the Council now voted that the Amphictyonic states should send representatives, to discuss the question of war against Amphissa, to a meeting to be held at Thermopylae before the spring meeting of the Council. To this preliminary meeting, the Athenians (though inclined to view Aeschines' performance with favour), on the advice of Demosthenes, sent no representatives; nor did the Thebans (the allies of Amphissa). War was declared by the Amphictyons against Amphissa; but Cottyphus, the Thessalian, who had been appointed general, made little headway, and (at the spring or the autumn meeting of the Council) declared that the Amphictyonic states must either send men and money, or else make Philip their general. Philip was, of course, at once appointed; but instead of proceeding against Amphissa, marched to Elateia and fortified it. This caused the greatest alarm at Athens. Demosthenes was immediately dispatched to Thebes, where he succeeded, by what appear to have been liberal and judicious proposals, in making an alliance between Thebes and Athens, in spite of the attempts of Philip's envoys to counteract his influence. Euboea, Megara, Corinth, and other members of the league also sent help. Philip himself called upon his own friends in the Peloponnese for aid, and at last moved towards Amphissa. Demosthenes seems now to have succeeded in applying the festival-money to purposes of war, and with the aid of Lycurgus, who became Controller of the Festival Fund, to have amassed a large sum for the use of the State. At the Dionysia of 338 he was again crowned, on the proposal of Demomeles and Hypereides. The allies at first won some successes and refortified some of the Phocian towns, but afterwards unfortunately divided their forces, and so enabled Philip to defeat the two divisions separately, and to destroy Amphissa. Philip's proposals of peace found supporters both in Thebes and in Athens, but were counteracted by Demosthenes. Late in the summer of 338, the decisive battle was fought at Chaeroneia, and resulted in the total rout of the

allies. Demosthenes himself was one of the fugitives. Philip placed a Macedonian garrison in Thebes, restored his exiled friends to power there, established a Council of Three Hundred, and (through them) put to death or banished his enemies. He also gave Orchomenus, Thespieae, and Plataeae their independence. After a moment of panic, the Athenians, led by Demosthenes, Lycurgus, and Hypereides, proceeded to take all possible measures for the defence of the city, while private munificence supplied the treasury. Demosthenes himself superintended the repair of the fortifications, and went on a mission to secure a supply of corn. But Philip, instead of marching upon Athens, sent a message by Demades, whom he had taken prisoner at Chaeroneia; and the Assembly, in reply, instructed Demades, Aeschines, and Phocion to ask Philip to release his Athenian prisoners. Philip released them without ransom, and sent Antipater and Alexander (with the ashes of the Athenian dead) to offer terms of peace. By the 'Peace of Demades', concluded while Demosthenes was still absent, the alliance between Athens and Philip was renewed; the independence of Athens was guaranteed; Oropus was taken from Thebes and restored to Athens; and she was permitted to retain Salamis, Samos, Delos, and probably Lemnos and Imbros. On the other hand, she lost all her possessions on the Hellespont and in the Chersonese, and promised to join the league which Philip intended to form for the invasion of Persia. Demosthenes was selected by the Assembly to deliver the funeral oration upon those who fell at Chaeroneia; and although the Macedonian party attacked him repeatedly in the law-courts, he was always acquitted. Philip paid a long visit to the Peloponnese, in the course of which he placed a Macedonian garrison in Corinth, ravaged Laconia, giving parts of it to his allies, the Argives and Arcadians, and announced his plans for the invasion of Persia at the head of the Greeks; he then returned to Macedonia.

In 337 Demosthenes was again Commissioner of Fortifications, as well as Controller of the Festival Fund—the most important office in the State. He not only performed his work most efficiently, but gave considerable sums for public purposes out of his private fortune; and early in 336 Ctesiphon proposed, and the Council resolved, that he should once more be crowned at the Dionysia. But before the proposal could be brought before the Assembly, Aeschines indicted Ctesiphon for its alleged illegality. The trial did not take place until late in the summer of 330. We do not know the reason for so long a delay, but probably the events of the intervening time were such as to render the state of public feeling unfavourable to Aeschines. In 336 Philip was assassinated, and was succeeded by Alexander. In 335 Alexander destroyed Thebes, which had revolted, and sold its inhabitants into slavery. He also demanded from Athens the surrender of Demosthenes and other anti-Macedonian politicians and generals, but was persuaded to be content with the banishment of Charidemus and Ephialtes, and the promise of the prosecution of Demosthenes for using subsidies from Persia to help Thebes—a prosecution which was allowed to drop. From 334 onwards Alexander was pursuing his conquests in the East, and we know practically nothing of the history of Athens until the trial of Ctesiphon came on in 330.

Aeschines alleged against Ctesiphon (1) that it was illegal to propose to crown any one who had not passed his examination before the Board of Auditors at the end of his term of office; and that Demosthenes, who had been Commissioner of Fortifications and Controller of the Festival Fund, was still in this position: (2) that it was illegal to proclaim the grant of a crown at the Dionysia, except in the case of crowns conferred by foreign states: (3) that it was illegal to insert untrue statements in the public records, and that the language in which Ctesiphon's decree described the political career of Demosthenes was untrue. On the first point Aeschines was almost certainly right: Demosthenes' defence is sophistical, and all that could really be said was that the rule had often been broken before. On the second point, certainty is impossible: the most probable view (though it also has its difficulties) is that there were two inconsistent laws, and that one of them permitted the proclamation in the theatre, if expressly voted by the people; but the alleged illegality had certainly been often committed. The third point, which raised the question of the value to Athens of Demosthenes' whole political life, was that upon which the case really turned; and it is to this that Demosthenes devotes the greater part of his speech, breaking up his reply into convenient stages by discussions (of a far less happy description) of the other counts of the indictment, and of the character and career of Aeschines. As in the Speech on the Embassy, certain facts are misrepresented, and there are passages which are in bad taste; but Demosthenes proves beyond doubt his unswerving loyalty to the high ideal of policy which he had formed for his country, and it is with good reason that parts of this speech have always been felt to reach a height of eloquence which has never been surpassed.

The jury acquitted Ctesiphon: and Aeschines, failing to obtain a fifth part of the votes, and thus incurring a heavy fine and the loss of some of the rights of a citizen, left Athens, and lived most of the remainder of his life at Rhodes.

The following is an analysis of the speech in outline:—

- I. Introduction ( 1-8).
- II. Defence against charges irrelevant to the indictment ( 9-52).
  - (1) Introduction ( 9).
  - (2) Postponement of reply to charges against his private life ( 10, 11).
  - (3) Reply to charges against his public life ( 12-52).
    - (a) Criticism of Aeschines' method of attack ( 12-16).
    - (b) Reply in reference to the Peace of Philocrates ( 17-52).
- III. Defence against the indictment itself ( 53-125).
  - (1) Introduction ( 53-9).
  - (2) Defence of his policy B.C. 346-340 ( 60-109).
  - (3) The alleged illegality of crowning him before he had passed his audit ( 110-19).
  - (4) The alleged illegality of the proclamation in the theatre

( 120, 121).

(5) Conclusion, including criticism of Aeschines' method of attack ( 122-5).

#### IV. Aeschines' life and character ( 126-59).

(1) Introduction ( 126-8).

(2) Parentage and early life of Aeschines ( 129-31).

(3) Aeschines' connexion with Antiphon, Python, Anaxinus, and others ( 132-8).

(4) Aeschines' part in stirring up the war against Amphissa in 339 ( 139-59).

#### V. Demosthenes' own policy in 339 and 338 ( 160-226).

(1) Narrative and defence of the alliance with Thebes ( 160-95).

(2) Why did not Aeschines protest at the time? ( 196-8).

(3) Defence of his policy as true to the spirit of Athenian history ( 199-210).

(4) Narrative and defence, continued ( 211-22).

(5) Further criticism of Aeschines' method of attack ( 223-6).

#### VI. Replies to various arguments of Aeschines ( 227-96).

(1) Aeschines' comparison of the inquiry to the examination of a balance-sheet ( 227-31).

(2) A proper inquiry would show that Demosthenes had increased the resources of Athens ( 232-7).

(3) Reply to the charge of saddling Athens with an undue share of the expense of the war ( 238-43).

(4) Reply to the charge of responsibility for the defeat of Chaeroneia ( 244-7).

(5) Vindication of his policy after the battle of Chaeroneia ( 248-51).

(6) Reply to Aeschines' remarks about the harm done to Athens by Demosthenes' bad fortune ( 252-75).

(a) General remarks ( 252-5).

(b) The fortune of Demosthenes ( 257, 258).

(c) The fortune of Aeschines ( 259-64).

(d) Comparison of the two ( 265, 266).

(e) Demosthenes' use of his fortune for purposes of public and private munificence ( 267-9).

(f) Demosthenes not responsible for the misfortunes of Athens ( 270-5).

(7) Reply to Aeschines' warning against Demosthenes' cleverness ( 276-90).

(a) Comparison of the use made of their talents by the two orators ( 276-84).

(b) The choice of Demosthenes, not Aeschines, to deliver the Funeral Oration ( 285-90).

(8) Aeschines' feelings about the defeat of Chaeroneia ( 291-3).

(9) The part played by traitors in recent history ( 294-6).

VII. Epilogue ( 297-324).

- (1) Demosthenes' incorruptibility ( 297, 298).
- (2) Demosthenes' measures for the protection of Athens ( 299-305).
- (3) Comparison of the services of the two orators to Athens ( 306-13).
- (4) Reply to the comparison of Demosthenes with the men of old, by a final comparison of the two orators ( 314-23).
- (5) Peroration ( 324).]

1 I pray first, men of Athens, to every god and goddess, that the goodwill, which I ever feel towards this city and towards all of you, may in equal measure be vouchsafed to me by you at this present trial: and secondly—a prayer which especially touches yourselves, your consciences, and your reputation—that the gods may put it into your minds not to take counsel of my adversary[n] in regard to the spirit in which you ought to hear me (for that would surely be a cruel thing), 2 but of the laws and of your oath; wherein besides all other precepts of justice, this also is written—that you shall listen to both sides with a like mind. And this means, not only that you should have formed no prejudice, and should accord equal goodwill to each, but also that you should give leave to every man who pleads before you to adopt that order, and make that defence, upon which he has resolved and fixed his choice.

3 I am in many respects at a disadvantage in the present controversy, as compared with Aeschines; and particularly, men of Athens, in two points of importance. The first is that I am not contending for the same stake as he. It is not the same thing for me to lose your goodwill now, as it is for him to fail to win his case; since for me—but I would say nothing unpleasant [n] at the opening of my address—I say only that Aeschines can well afford to risk this attack upon me. The second disadvantage lies in the natural and universal tendency of mankind to hear invective and denunciation with pleasure, and to be offended with those who praise themselves. 4 And of the two courses in question, that which contributes to men's pleasure has been given to Aeschines, and that which annoys (I may say) every one is left for me. If, to avoid giving such annoyance, I say nothing of all that I myself have done, it will be thought that I am unable to clear myself of the charges against me, or to show the grounds upon which I claim to deserve distinction. If, on the other hand, I proceed to speak of my past acts and my political life, I shall often be compelled to speak of myself. I will endeavour, then, to do this as modestly as possible; and for all that the necessities of the case compel me to say, the blame must in fairness be borne by the prosecutor, who initiated a trial of such a kind as this.

5 I think, men of Athens, that you would all admit that this present trial equally concerns myself and Ctesiphon, and demands no less earnest attention from me than from him. For while it is a painful and a grievous thing for a man to be robbed of anything, particularly if it is at the hands of an enemy that this befalls him, it is especially so, when he is robbed of your goodwill and kindness, just in proportion as to win these

is the greatest possible gain. 6 And because such is the issue at stake in the present trial, I request and entreat you all alike to give me, while I make my defence upon the charges that have been brought against me, a fair hearing, as you are commanded to do by the laws—those laws to which their original maker, your well-wisher and the People’s friend, Solon, thought fit to give the sanction not of enactment only, but also of an oath on the part of those who act as judges: 7 not because he distrusted you (so at least it seems to me), but because he saw that a defendant cannot escape from the imputations and the slanders which fall with special force from the prosecutor, because he is the first to speak, unless each of you who sit in judgement, keeping his conscience pure in the sight of God, will receive the pleadings of the later speaker also with the same favour, and will thus, because his attention has been given equally and impartially to both sides, form his decision upon the case in its entirety.

8 And now, when I am about, as it seems, to render an account of my whole private life and public career, I would once more invoke the aid of the gods; and in the presence of you all I pray, first, that the goodwill which I ever feel towards this city and towards all of you, may in equal measure be vouchsafed to me by you at this trial; and secondly, that whatsoever judgement upon this present suit will conduce to your public reputation, and the purity of each man’s conscience, that judgement they may put it into all your minds to give.

9 Now if Aeschines had confined his charges to the subject of the indictment, I too, in making my defence, would have dealt at once with the actual resolution of the Council. But since he has devoted no less a portion of his speech to the relation of other matters, and for the most part has spoken against me falsely, I think it is necessary, and at the same time just, that I should deal briefly, men of Athens, with these, in order that none of you may be led by irrelevant arguments to listen less favourably to my pleas in answer to the indictment itself.

10 As for his slanderous vituperation of my private life, mark how straightforward and how just is the reply that I make. If you know me as the man that he charged me with being (for my life has been spent nowhere but in your own midst), do not even suffer me to speak—no, not though my whole public career has been one of transcendent merit—but rise and condemn me without delay. But if, in your judgement and belief, I am a better man than Aeschines, and come of better men; if I and mine are no worse than any other respectable persons (to use no offensive expression); then do not trust him even in regard to other points, for it is plain that all that he said was equally fictitious; but once more accord to me to-day the goodwill which throughout the past you have so often displayed towards me in previous trials. 11 Knave as you are,<sup>[n]</sup> Aeschines, you were assuredly more fool than knave, when you thought that I should dismiss all that I had to say with regard to my past acts and political life, and should turn to meet the abuse that fell from you. I shall not do so; I am not so brain-sick; but I will review the falsehoods and the calumnies

which you uttered against my political career; and then, if the court desires it, I will afterwards refer to the ribald language that has been so incontinently used.

12 The offences charged against me are many; and for some of them the laws assign heavy and even the most extreme penalties. But I will tell you what is the motive which animates the present suit. It gives play to the malice of a personal enemy, to his insolence, his abuse, his contumelies, and every expression of his hostility: and yet, assuming that the charges and the imputations which have been made are true, it does not enable the State[n] to exact a penalty that is adequate, or nearly adequate, to the offences. 13 For it is not right to seek to debar another from coming before the people[n] and receiving a hearing, nor to do so in a spirit of malice and envy. Heaven knows, it is neither straightforward, nor citizen-like, nor just, men of Athens! If the crimes by which he saw me injuring the city were of such a magnitude as he just now so theatrically set forth, he should have had recourse to the punishments enjoined by the laws at the time of the crimes themselves. If he saw me so acting as to deserve impeachment, he should have impeached me, and so brought me to trial before you; if he saw me proposing illegal measures, he should have indicted me for their illegality. For surely, if he can prosecute Ctesiphon on my account, he would not have failed to indict me in person, had he thought that he could convict me. 14 And further, if he saw me committing any of those other crimes against you, which he just now slanderously enumerated, or any other crimes whatsoever, there are laws which deal with each, and punishments, and lawsuits and judgements involving penalties that are harsh and severe: to all of these he could have had recourse; and from the moment when it was seen that he had acted so, and had conducted his hostilities against me on that plan, his present accusation of me would have been in line with his past conduct. 15 But as it is, he has forsaken the straight path of justice; he has shrunk from all attempts to convict me at the time; and after all these years, with the imputations, the jests, the invectives, that he has accumulated, he appears to play his part. So it is, that though his accusations are against me, it is Ctesiphon that he prosecutes; and though he sets his quarrel with me in the forefront of the whole suit, he has never faced me in person to settle the quarrel, and it is another whom we see him trying to deprive of his civil rights. 16 Yet surely, besides everything else that may be pleaded on behalf of Ctesiphon, this, I think, may surely be most reasonably urged—that we ought in justice to have brought our own quarrel to the test by ourselves, instead of avoiding all conflict with one another, and looking for a third party to whom we could do harm. Such iniquity really passes all bounds.

17 From this one may see the nature of all his charges alike, uttered, as they have been, without justice or regard for truth. Yet I desire also to examine them severally, and more particularly the false statements which he made against me in regard to the Peace and the Embassy, when he ascribed to me[n] the things which he himself had done in conjunction with Philocrates. And here it is necessary, men of Athens, and perhaps

appropriate,[n] that I should remind you of the state of affairs subsisting during that period, so that you may view each group of actions in the light of the circumstances of the time.

18 When the Phocian war had broken out[n] (not through any action of mine, for I had not yet entered public life), your own attitude, in the first place, was such, that you wished for the preservation of the Phocians, although you saw that their actions were unjustifiable; while you would have been delighted at anything that might happen to the Thebans, against whom you felt an indignation that was neither unreasonable nor unfair; for they had not used their good fortune at Leuctra with moderation. And, in the second place, the Peloponnese was all disunited: those who detested the Spartans [n] were not strong enough to annihilate them, and those who had previously governed with the support of Sparta [n] were no longer able to maintain their control over their cities; but both these and all the other states were in a condition of indeterminate strife and confusion. 19 When Philip saw this (for it was not hard to see), he tried, by dispensing money to the traitors whom each state contained, to throw them all into collision and stir up one against another; and thus, amid the blunders and perversity of others, he was making his own preparations, and growing great to the danger of all. And when it became clear to all that the then overbearing (but now unhappy) Thebans, distressed by the length of the war, would be forced to fly to you for aid,[n] Philip, to prevent this—to prevent the formation of any union between the cities—made offers of peace to you, and of assistance to them. 20 Now what was it that helped him, and enabled him to find in you his almost willing dupes? It was the baseness (if that is the right name to use), or the ignorance, or both, of the rest of the Hellenes, who, though you were engaged in a long and continuous war, and that on behalf of the interests of all, as has been proved by the event, never assisted you either with money or with men, or in any other way whatsoever. And in your just and proper indignation with them, you listened readily to Philip. It was for these reasons, therefore, and not through any action of mine, that the Peace which we then conceded was negotiated; and any one who investigates the matter honestly will find that it is the crimes and the corrupt practices of these men, in the course of the negotiations, that are responsible for our position to-day. 21 It is in the interests of truth that I enter into all these events with this exactitude and thoroughness; for however strong the appearance of criminality in these proceedings may be, it has, I imagine, nothing to do with me. The first man to suggest or mention the Peace was Aristodemus[n] the actor; and the person who took the matter up and moved the motion, and sold his services for the purpose, along with Aeschines, was Philocrates of Hagnus—your partner, Aeschines, not mine, even if you split your sides with lying; while those who supported him, from whatever motive (for of that I say nothing at present), were Eubulus and Cephisophon. I had no part in the matter anywhere. 22 And yet, although the facts are such as with absolute truth I am representing them to be, he carried his effrontery so far as to dare to assert that I was not only responsible for the Peace, but had also prevented the city from acting in conjunction with a general

assembly of the Hellenes in making it. What? and you—oh! how can one find a name that can be applied to you?—when you saw me (for you were there) preventing the city from taking this great step and forming so grand an alliance as you just now described, did you once raise a protest or come forward to give information and to set forth the crimes with which you now charge me? 23 If I had covenanted with Philip for money that I would prevent the coalition of the Hellenes, your only course was to refuse to keep silence—to cry aloud, to protest, to reveal the fact to your fellow countrymen. On no occasion did you do this: no such utterance of yours was ever heard by any one. In fact there was no embassy away at the time on a mission to any Hellenic state; the Hellenes had all long ago been tried and found wanting;[n] and in all that he has said upon this matter there is not a single sound word. 24 And, apart from that, his falsehoods involve the greatest calumnies upon this city. For if you were at one and the same time convoking the Hellenes with a view to war, and sending ambassadors yourselves to Philip to discuss peace, it was a deed for a Eurybatus,[n] not a task for a state or for honest men, that you were carrying out. But that is not the case; indeed it is not. For what could possibly have been your object in summoning them at that moment? Was it with a view to peace? But they all had peace already. Or with a view to war? But you were yourselves discussing peace. It is therefore evident that neither was it I that introduced or was responsible for the Peace in its original shape, nor is one of all the other falsehoods which he told of me shown to be true.

25 Again, consider the course of action which, when the city had concluded the Peace, each of us now chose to adopt. For from this you will know who it was that co-operated with Philip throughout, and who it was that acted in your interest and sought the good of the city. As for me, I proposed, as a member of the Council, that the ambassadors should sail as quickly as possible to any district in which they should ascertain Philip to be, and receive his oath from him. 26 But even when I had carried this resolution, they would not act upon it. What did this mean, men of Athens? I will inform you. Philip's interest required that the interval before he took the oath should be as long as possible; yours, that it should be as short as possible. And why? Because you broke off all your preparations for the war, not merely from the day when he took the oath, but from the day when you first hoped that Peace would be made; and for his part, this was what he was all along working for; for he thought (and with truth) that whatever places he could snatch from Athens before he took the oath, would remain securely his, since no one would break the Peace for their sake. 27 Foreseeing and calculating upon this, men of Athens, I proposed this decree—that we should sail to any district in which Philip might be, and receive his oath as soon as possible, in order that the oaths might be taken while the Thracians, your allies, were still in possession of those strongholds[n] of which Aeschines just now spoke with contempt—Serrhium, Myrtenum, and Ergiske; and that Philip might not snatch from us the keys of the country and make himself master of Thrace, nor obtain an abundant supply of money and of soldiers, and so proceed without difficulty to the prosecution of his further designs. 28 And

now, instead of citing or reading this decree he slanders me on the ground that I thought fit, as a member of the Council, to introduce the envoys. But what should I have done? Was I to propose *not* to introduce those who had come for the express purpose of speaking with you? or to order the lessee of the theatre not to assign them seats? But they would have watched the play from the threepenny seats,<sup>[n]</sup> if this decree had not been proposed. Should I have guarded the interests of the city in petty details, and sold them wholesale, as my opponents did? Surely not. (*To the clerk.*) Now take this decree, which the prosecutor passed over, though he knew it well, and read it.

29 [*The decree of Demosthenes is read.*]

30 Though I had carried this decree, and was seeking the good not of Philip, but of the city, these worthy ambassadors paid little heed to it, but sat idle in Macedonia for three whole months,<sup>[n]</sup> until Philip arrived from Thrace, after subduing the whole country; when they might, within ten days, or equally well<sup>[n]</sup> within three or four, have reached the Hellespont, and saved the strongholds, by receiving his oath before he could seize them. For he would not have touched them when we were present; or else, if he had done so, we should have refused to administer the oath to him; and in that case he would have failed to obtain the Peace: he would not have had both the Peace and the strongholds as well.

31 Such was Philip's first act of fraud, during the time of the Embassy, and the first instance of venality on the part of these wicked men; and over this I confess that then and now and always I have been and am at war and at variance with them. Now observe, immediately after this, a second and even greater piece of villainy. 32 As soon as Philip had sworn to the Peace, after first gaining possession of Thrace because these men did not obey my decree, he obtained from them—again by purchase—the postponement of our departure from Macedonia, until all should be in readiness for his campaign against the Phocians; in order that, instead of our bringing home a report of his intentions and his preparations for the march, which would make you set out and sail round to Thermopylae with your war-ships as you did before,<sup>[n]</sup> you might only hear our report of the facts when he was already on this side of Thermopylae, and you could do nothing. 33 And Philip was beset with such fear and such a weight of anxiety, lest in spite of his occupation of these places, his object should slip from his grasp, if, before the Phocians were destroyed, you resolved to assist them, that he hired this despicable creature, not now in company with his colleagues, but by himself alone, to make to you a statement and a report of such a character that owing to them all was lost. 34 But I request and entreat you, men of Athens, to remember throughout this whole trial, that, had Aeschines made no accusation that was not included in the indictment, I too would not have said a word that did not bear upon it; but since he has had recourse to all kinds of imputation and slander at once, I am compelled also to give a brief answer to each group of charges. 35 What then were the statements uttered by him that day, in consequence of which all was lost? 'You must not be

perturbed,' he said, 'at Philip's having crossed to this side of Thermopylae; for you will get everything that you desire, if you remain quiet; and within two or three days you will hear that he has become the friend of those whose enemy he was, and the enemy of those whose friend he was, when he first came. For,' said he, 'it is not phrases that confirm friendships' (a finely sententious expression!) 'but identity of interest; and it is to the interest of Philip and of the Phocians and of yourselves alike, to be rid of the heartless and overbearing demeanour of the Thebans.' 36 To these statements some gave a ready ear, in consequence of the tacit ill-feeling towards the Thebans at the time. What then followed—and not after a long interval, but immediately? The Phocians were overthrown; their cities were razed to the ground; you, who had believed Aeschines and remained inactive, were soon afterwards bringing in your effects from the country; while Aeschines received his gold; and besides all this, the city reaped the ill-will of the Thebans and Thessalians, while their gratitude for what had been done went to Philip. 37 To prove that this is so, (to the clerk.) read me both the decree of Callisthenes,[n] and Philip's letter. (To the jury.) These two documents together will make all the facts plain. (To the clerk.) Read.

38 [The decree of Callisthenes is read.]

Were these the hopes, on the strength of which you made the Peace? Was this what this hireling promised you? 39 (To the clerk.) Now read the letter which Philip sent after this.

[Philip's letter is read.]

40 You hear how obviously, in this letter sent to you, Philip is addressing definite information to his own allies. 'I have done these things,' he tells them, 'against the will of the Athenians, and to their annoyance; and so, men of Thebes and Thessaly, if you are wise, you will regard them as enemies, and will trust me.' He does not write in those actual terms, but that is what he intends to indicate. By these means he so carried them away, that they did not foresee or realize any of the consequences, but allowed him to get everything into his own power: and that is why, poor men, they have experienced their present calamities. 41 But the man who helped him to create this confidence, who co-operated with him, who brought home that false report and deluded you, he it is who now bewails the sufferings of the Thebans and enlarges upon their piteousness—he, who is himself the cause both of these and of the misery in Phocis, and of all the other evils which the Hellenes have endured. Yes, it is evident that you are pained at what has come to pass, Aeschines, and that you are sorry for the Thebans, when you have property in Boeotia[n] and are farming the land that was theirs; and that I rejoice at it—I, whose surrender was immediately demanded by the author of the disaster! 42 But I have digressed into subjects of which it will perhaps be more convenient to speak presently. I will return to the proofs which show that it is the crimes of these men that are the cause of our condition to-day.

For when you had been deceived by Philip, through the agency of these men, who while serving as ambassadors had sold themselves and made a report in which there was not a word of truth—when the unhappy Phocians had been deceived and their cities annihilated—what followed? 43 The despicable Thessalians and the slow-witted Thebans regarded Philip as their friend, their benefactor, their saviour. Philip was their all-in-all. They would not even listen to the voice of any one who wished to express a different opinion. You yourselves, though you viewed what had been done with suspicion and vexation, nevertheless kept the Peace; for there was nothing else that you could have done. And the other Hellenes, who, like yourselves, had been deluded and disappointed of their hopes,[n] also kept the Peace, and gladly;[n] since in a sense they also were remotely aimed at by the war. 44 For when Philip was going about and subduing the Illyrians and Triballi and some of the Hellenes as well, and bringing many large forces into his own power, and when some of the members of the several States were taking advantage of the Peace to travel to Macedonia, and were being corrupted—Aeschines among them—at such a time all of those whom Philip had in view in thus making his preparations were really being attacked by him. 45 Whether they failed to realize it is another question, which does not concern me. For I was continually uttering warnings and protests, both in your midst and wherever I was sent. But the cities were stricken with disease: those who were engaged in political and practical affairs were taking bribes and being corrupted by the hope of money; while the mass of private citizens either showed no foresight, or else were caught by the bait of ease and leisure from day to day; and all alike had fallen victims to some such delusive fancy, as that the danger would come upon every one but themselves, and that through the perils of others they would be able to secure their own position as they pleased. 46 And so, I suppose, it has come to pass that the masses have atoned for their great and ill-timed indifference by the loss of their freedom, while the leaders in affairs, who fancied that they were selling everything except themselves, have realized that they had sold themselves first of all. For instead of being called friends and guest-friends, as they were called at the time when they were taking their bribes, they now hear themselves called flatterers, and god-forsaken, and all the other names that they deserve. 47 For no one, men of Athens, spends his money out of a desire to benefit the traitor; nor, when once he has secured the object for which he bargains, does he employ the traitor to advise him with regard to other objects: if it were so, nothing could be happier than a traitor. But it is not so, of course. Far from it! When the aspirant after dominion has gained his object, he is also the master of those who have sold it to him: and because then he knows their villainy, he then hates and mistrusts them, and covers them with insults. 48 For observe— for even if the time of the events is past, the time for realizing truths like these is ever present to wise men. Lasthenes[n] was called his 'friend'; but only until he had betrayed Olynthus. And Timolaus;[n] but only until he had destroyed Thebes. And Eudicus and Simus[n] of Larissa; but only until they had put Thessaly in Philip's power. And now, persecuted as they are, and insulted, and subjected to every kind of

misery, the whole inhabited world has become filled with such men. And what of Aristratus[n] at Sicyon? what of Perillus[n] at Megara? Are they not outcasts? 49 From these instances one can see very clearly, that it is he who best protects his own country and speaks most constantly against such men, that secures for traitors and hirelings like yourselves, Aeschines, the continuance of your opportunities for taking bribes. It is the majority of those who are here, those who resist your will, that you must thank for the fact that you live and draw your pay; for, left to yourselves, you would long ago have perished.

50 There is still much that I might say about the transactions of that time, but I think that even what I have said is more than enough. The blame rests with Aeschines, who has drenched me with the stale dregs[n] of his own villainy and crime, from which I was compelled to clear myself in the eyes of those who are too young to remember the events; though perhaps you who knew, even before I said a single word, of Aeschines' service as a hireling, may have felt some annoyance as you listened. 51 He calls it, forsooth, 'friendship' and 'guest-friendship'; and somewhere in his speech just now he used the expression, 'the man who casts in my teeth my guest-friendship with Alexander.' I cast in your teeth your guest-friendship with Alexander? How did you acquire it? How came you to be thought worthy of it? Never would I call you the guest-friend of Philip or the friend of Alexander—I am not so insane—unless you are to call harvesters and other hired servants the friends and guest-friends of those who have hired them. [But that is not the case, of course. Far from it!] 52 Nay, I call you the hireling, formerly of Philip, and now of Alexander, and so do all who are present. If you disbelieve me, ask them—or rather I will ask them for you. Men of Athens, do you think of Aeschines as the hireling or as the guest-friend of Alexander? You hear what they say.

53 I now wish, without more delay, to make my defence upon the indictment itself, and to go through my past acts, in order that Aeschines may hear (though he knows them well) the grounds on which I claim to have a right both to the gifts which the Council have proposed, and even to far greater than these. (To the clerk..) Now take the indictment and read it.

54, 55 [The indictment is read.]

56 These, men of Athens, are the points in the resolution which the prosecutor assails; and these very points will, I think, afford me my first means of proving to you that the defence which I am about to offer is an absolutely fair one. For I will take the points of the indictment in the very same order as the prosecutor: I will speak of each in succession, and will knowingly pass over nothing. 57 Any decision upon the statement that I 'consistently do and say what is best for the People, and am eager to do whatever good I can', and upon the proposal to vote me thanks for this, depends, I consider, upon my past political career: for it is by an investigation of my career that either the truth and the propriety, or else the falsehood, of these statements which Ctesiphon has made about me will be discovered. 58 Again, the proposal to crown me, without the

addition of the clause 'when he has submitted to his examination', and the order to proclaim the award of the crown in the theatre, must, I imagine, stand or fall with my political career; for the question is whether I deserve the crown and the proclamation before my fellow countrymen or not. At the same time I consider myself further bound to point out to you the laws under which the defendant's proposal could be made. In this honest and straightforward manner, men of Athens, I have determined to make my defence; and now I will proceed to speak of my past actions themselves. 59 And let no one imagine that I am detaching my argument from its connexion with the indictment, if I break into a discussion of international transactions. For it is the prosecutor who, by assailing the clause of the decree which states that I do and say what is best, and by indicting it as false, has rendered the discussion of my whole political career essentially germane to the indictment; and further, out of the many careers which public life offers, it was the department of international affairs that I chose; so that I have a right to derive my proofs also from that department.

60 I will pass over all that Philip snatched from us and secured, in the days before I took part in public life as an orator. None of these losses, I imagine, has anything to do with me. But I will recall to you, and will render you an account of all that, from the day when I entered upon this career, he was prevented from taking, when I have made one remark. 61 Philip, men of Athens, had a great advantage in his favour. For in the midst of the Hellenic peoples—and not of some only, but of all alike—there had sprung up a crop of traitors—corrupt, god-forsaken men—more numerous than they have ever been within the memory of man. These he took to help and co-operate with him; and great as the mutual ill-will and dissensions of the Hellenes already were, he rendered them even worse, by deceiving some, making presents to others, and corrupting others in every way; and at a time when all had in reality but one interest—to prevent his becoming powerful—he divided them into a number of factions. 62 All the Hellenes then being in this condition, still ignorant of the growing and accumulating evil, you have to ask yourselves, men of Athens, what policy and action it was fitting for the city to choose, and to hold me responsible for this; for the person who assumed that responsibility in the State was myself. 63 Should she, Aeschines, have sacrificed her pride and her own dignity? Should she have joined the ranks of the Thessalians and Dolopes,<sup>[n]</sup> and helped Philip to acquire the empire of Hellas, cancelling thereby the noble and righteous deeds of our forefathers? Or, if she should not have done this (for it would have been in very truth an atrocious thing), should she have looked on, while all that she saw would happen, if no one prevented it—all that she realized, it seems, at a distance—was actually taking place? 64 Nay, I should be glad to ask to-day the severest critic of my actions, which party he would have desired the city to join—the party which shares the responsibility for the misery and disgrace which has fallen upon the Hellenes (the party of the Thessalians and their supporters, one may call it), or the party which looked on while these calamities were taking place, in the hope of gaining some advantage for themselves—in which we should place the

Arcadians and Messenians and Argives. 65 But even of these, many–nay, all–have in the end fared worse than we. For if Philip had departed immediately after his victory, and gone his way; if afterwards he had remained at peace, and had given no trouble whatever to any of his own allies or of the other Hellenes; then there would have been some ground for blaming and accusing those who had opposed his plans. But if he has stripped them all alike of their dignity, their paramountcy, and their independence–nay, even of their free constitutions,[n] wherever he could do so–can it be denied that the policy which you adopted on my advice was the most glorious policy possible?

66 But I return to my former point. What was it fitting for the city to do, Aeschines, when she saw Philip establishing for himself a despotic sway over the Hellenes? What language should have been used, what measures proposed, by the adviser of the people at Athens (for that it was at Athens makes the utmost difference), when I knew that from the very first, up to the day when I myself ascended the platform, my country had always contended for pre-eminence, honour, and glory, and in the cause of honour, and for the interests of all, had sacrificed more money and lives than any other Hellenic people had spent for their private ends: 67 when I saw that Philip himself, with whom our conflict lay, for the sake of empire and absolute power, had had his eye knocked out, his collar-bone broken, his hand and his leg maimed, and was ready to resign any part of his body that Fortune chose to take from him, provided that with what remained he might live in honour and glory? 68 And surely no one would dare to say that it was fitting that in one bred at Pella, a place then inglorious and insignificant, there should have grown up so lofty a spirit that he aspired after the empire of Hellas, and conceived such a project in his mind; but that in you, who are Athenians, and who day by day in all that you hear and see behold the memorials of the gallantry of your forefathers, such baseness should be found, that you would yield up your liberty to Philip by your own deliberate offer and deed. 69 No man would say this. One alternative remained, and that, one which you were bound to take–that of a righteous resistance to the whole course of action by which he was doing you injury. You acted thus from the first, quite rightly and properly; while I helped by my proposals and advice during the time of my political activity, and I do not deny it. But what ought I to have done? For the time has come to ask you this, Aeschines, and to dismiss everything else. 70 Amphipolis, Pydna, Poteidaea, Halonnesus–all are blotted from my memory. As for Serrhium, Doriscus, the sack of Peparethus, and all the other injuries inflicted upon the city, I renounce all knowledge of their ever having happened–though you actually said that .I. involved my countrymen in hostility by talking of these things, when the decrees which deal with them were the work of Eubulus and Aristophon[n] and Diopetithes,[n] and not mine at all–so glibly do you assert anything that suits your purpose! 71 But of this too I say nothing at present. I only ask you whether Philip, who was appropriating Euboea,[n] and establishing it as a stronghold to command Attica; who was making an attempt upon Megara, seizing Oreus, razing the walls of Porthmus, setting up Philistides as tyrant at Oreus and Cleitarchus at

Eretria, bringing the Hellespont into his own power, besieging Byzantium, destroying some of the cities of Hellas, and restoring his exiled friends to others—whether he, I say, in acting thus, was guilty of wrong, violating the truce and breaking the Peace, or not? Was it fit that one of the Hellenes should arise to prevent it, or not? 72 If it was not fit— if it was fit that Hellas should become like the Mysian booty[n] in the proverb before men’s eyes, while the Athenians had life and being, then I have lost my labour in speaking upon this theme, and the city has lost its labour in obeying me: then let everything that has been done be counted for a crime and a blunder, and those my own! But if it was right that one should arise to prevent it, for whom could the task be more fitting than for the people of Athens? That then, was the aim of *my* policy; and when I saw Philip reducing all mankind to servitude, I opposed him, and without ceasing warned and exhorted you to make no surrender.

73 But the Peace, Aeschines, was in reality broken by Philip, when he seized the corn-ships, not by Athens. (*To the clerk.*) Bring the decrees themselves, and the letter of Philip, and read them in order. (*To the jury.*) For they will make it clear who is responsible, and for what.

74 [*A decree is read.*]

75 This decree then was proposed by Eubulus, not by me; and the next by Aristophon; he is followed first by Hegesippus, and he by Aristophon again, and then by Philocrates, then by Cephisophon, and then by all of them. But I proposed no decree upon this subject. (*To the clerk.*) Read.

[*Decrees are read.*]

76 As then I point to these decrees, so, Aeschines, do you point to a decree of any kind, proposed by me, which makes me responsible for the war. You cannot do so: for had you been able, there is nothing which you would sooner have produced. Indeed, even Philip himself makes no charge against me as regards the war, though he complains of others. (*To the clerk.*) Read Philip’s letter itself.

77, 78 [*Philip’s letter is read.*]

79 In this letter he has nowhere mentioned the name of Demosthenes, nor made any charge against me. Why is it then that, though he complains of others, he has not mentioned my own actions? Because, if he had written anything about me, he must have mentioned his own acts of wrong; for it was these acts upon which I kept my grip, and these which I opposed. First of all, when he was trying to steal into the Peloponnese, I proposed the embassy to the Peloponnese;[n] then, when he was grasping at Euboea, the embassy to Euboea;[n] then the expedition—not an embassy any more—to Oreus,[n] and that to Eretria, when he had established tyrants in those cities. 80 After that I dispatched all the naval expeditions, in the course of which the Chersonese and Byzantium and all our allies were saved. In consequence of this, the noblest rewards at the hands of those

who had benefited by your action became yours—votes of thanks, glory, honours, crowns, gratitude; while of the victims of his aggression, those who followed your advice at the time secured their own deliverance, and those who neglected it had the memory of your warnings constantly in their minds, and regarded you not merely as their well-wishers, but as men of wisdom and prophetic insight; for all that you foretold has come to pass. 81 And further, that Philistides would have given a large sum to retain Oreus, and Cleitarchus to retain Eretria, and Philip himself, to be able to count upon the use of these places against you, and to escape all exposure of his other proceedings and all investigation, by any one in any place, of his wrongful acts—all this is not unknown to any one, least of all to you, Aeschines. 82 For the envoys sent at that time by Cleitarchus and Philistides lodged at your house, when they came here, and you acted as their patron.[n] Though the city rejected them, as enemies whose proposals were neither just nor expedient, to you they were friends. None of their attempts succeeded, slander me though you may, when you assert that I say nothing when I receive money, but cry out when I spend it. That, certainly, is not *your* way: for you cry out with money in your hands, and will never cease, unless those present cause you to do so by taking away your civil rights[n] to-day. 83 Now on that occasion, gentlemen, you crowned me for my conduct. Aristonicus proposed a decree whose very syllables were identical with those of Ctesiphon's present proposal; the crown was proclaimed in the theatre; and this was already the second proclamation[n] in my honour: and yet Aeschines, though he was there, neither opposed the decree, nor indicted the mover. (To the clerk...) Take this decree also and read it.

84 [The decree of Aristonicus is read.]

85 Now is any of you aware of any discredit that attached itself to the city owing to this decree? Did any mockery or ridicule ensue, such as Aeschines said must follow on the present occasion, if I were crowned? But surely when proceedings are recent and well known to all, then it is that, if they are satisfactory, they meet with gratitude, and if they are otherwise, with punishment. It appears, then, that on that occasion I met with gratitude, not with blame or punishment.

86 Thus the fact that, up to the time when these events took place, I acted throughout as was best for the city, has been acknowledged by the victory of my advice and my proposals in your deliberations, by the successful execution of the measures which I proposed, and the award of crowns in consequence of them to the city and to myself and to all, and by your celebration of sacrifices to the gods, and processions, in thankfulness for these blessings.

87 When Philip had been expelled from Euboea—and while the arms which expelled him were yours, the statesmanship and the decrees (even though some of my opponents may split their sides) were mine—he proceeded to look for some other stronghold from which he could threaten the city. And seeing that we were more dependent than any other people upon imported

corn, and wishing to get our corn-trade into his power, he advanced to Thrace. First, he requested the Byzantines, his own allies, to join him in the war against you; and when they refused and said (with truth) that they had not made their alliance with him for such a purpose, he erected a stockade against the city, brought up his engines, and proceeded to besiege it. 88 I will not ask again what you ought to have done when this was happening; it is manifest to all. But who was it that went to the rescue of the Byzantines, and saved them? Who was it that prevented the Hellespont from falling into other hands at that time? It was you, men of Athens—and when I say 'you', I mean this city. And who was it that spoke and moved resolutions and acted for the city, and gave himself up unsparingly to the business of the State? It was I. 89 But of the immense benefit thus conferred upon all, you no longer need words of mine to tell you, since you have had actual experience of it. For the war which then ensued, apart from the glorious reputation that it brought you, kept you supplied with the necessaries of life in greater plenty and at lower prices than the present Peace, which these worthy men are guarding to their country's detriment, in their hopes of something yet to be realized. May those hopes be disappointed! May they share the fortune which you, who wish for the best, ask of the gods, rather than cause you to share that upon which their own choice is fixed! (—To the clerk—) Read out to the jury the crowns awarded to the city in consequence of her action by the Byzantines and by the Perinthians.

90, 91 [—The decree of the Byzantines is read—]

92 Read out also the crowns awarded by the peoples of the Chersonese.

[—The decree of the peoples of the Chersonese is read—]

93 Thus the policy which I had adopted was not only successful in saving the Chersonese and Byzantium, in preventing the Hellespont from falling at that time into the power of Philip, and in bringing honours to the city in consequence, but it revealed to the whole world the noble gallantry of Athens and the baseness of Philip. For all saw that he, the ally of the Byzantines, was besieging them—what could be more shameful or revolting? 94 and on the other hand, it was seen that you, who might fairly have urged many well-founded complaints against them for their inconsiderate conduct[n] towards you at an earlier period, not only refused to remember your grudge and to abandon the victims of aggression, but actually delivered them; and in consequence of this, you won glory and goodwill on all hands. And further, though every one knows that you have crowned many public men before now, no one can name any but myself—that is to say, any public counsellor and orator—for whose merits the city has received a crown.

95 In order to prove to you, also, that the slanders which he uttered against the Euboeans and Byzantines, as he recalled to you any ill-natured action that they had taken towards you in the past, are disingenuous calumnies, not only because they are false (for this, I think, you may all

be assumed to know), but also because, however true they might be, it was still to your advantage to deal with the political situation as I have done, I desire to describe, and that briefly, one or two of the noble deeds which this city has done in your own time. For an individual and a State should strive always, in their respective spheres, to fashion their future conduct after the highest examples that their past affords. 96 Thus, men of Athens, at a time when the Spartans were masters of land and sea,[n] and were retaining their hold, by means of governors and garrisons, upon the country all round Attica–Euboea, Tanagra, all Boeotia, Megara, Aegina, Ceos, and the other islands—and when Athens possessed neither ships nor walls, you marched forth to Haliartus, and again, not many days later, to Corinth, though the Athenians of that day might have borne a heavy grudge against both the Corinthians and the Thebans for the part they had played in reference to the Deceleian War.[n] 97 But they bore no such grudge. Far from it! And neither of these actions, Aeschines, was taken by them to help benefactors; nor was the prospect before them free from danger. Yet they did not on that account sacrifice those who fled to them for help. For the sake of glory and honour they were willing to expose themselves to the danger; and it was a right and a noble spirit that inspired their counsels. For the life of all men must end in death, though a man shut himself in a chamber and keep watch; but brave men must ever set themselves to do that which is noble, with their joyful hope for their buckler, and whatsoever God gives, must bear it gallantly. 98 Thus did your forefathers, and thus did the elder among yourselves: for, although the Spartans were no friends or benefactors of yours, but had done much grievous wrong to the city, yet, when the Thebans, after their victory at Leuctra, attempted to annihilate them, you prevented it, not terrified by the strength or the reputation which the Thebans then enjoyed, nor reckoning up what the men had done to you, for whom you were to face this peril. 99 And thus, as you know, you revealed to all the Hellenes, that whatever offences may be committed against you, though under all other circumstances you show your resentment of them, yet if any danger to life or freedom overtakes the transgressors, you will bear no grudge and make no reckoning. Nor was it in these instances only that you were thus disposed. For once more, when the Thebans were appropriating Euboea,[n] you did not look on while it was done; you did not call to mind the wrong which had been done to you in the matter of Oropus[n] by Themison and Theodorus: you helped even these; and it was then that the city for the first time had voluntary trierarchs, of whom I was one.[n] But I will not speak of this yet. 100 And although to save the island was itself a noble thing to do, it was a yet nobler thing by far, that when their lives and their cities were absolutely in your power, you gave them back, as it was right to do, to the very men who had offended against you, and made no reckoning, when such trust had been placed in you, of the wrongs which you had suffered. I pass by the innumerable instances which I might still give—battles at sea, expeditions [by land, campaigns] both long ago and now in our day; in all of which the object of the city has been to defend the freedom and safety of the other Hellenic peoples. 101 And so, when in all these striking examples I had beheld the city ever ready to strive in defence of the

interests of others, what was I likely to bid her do, what action was I likely to recommend to her, when the debate to some extent concerned her own interests? 'Why,' you would say, 'to remember her grudge against those who wanted deliverance, and to look for excuses for sacrificing everything!' And who would not have been justified in putting me to death, if I had attempted to bring shame upon the city's high traditions, though it were only by word? The deed itself you would never have done, I know full well; for had you desired to do it, what was there to hinder you? Were you not free so to act? Had you not these men here to propose it?

102 I wish now to return to the next in succession of my political acts; and here again you must ask yourselves, what was the best thing for the city? For, men of Athens, when I saw that your navy was breaking up, and that, while the rich were obtaining exemption on the strength of small payments,[n] citizens of moderate or small means were losing all that they had; and further, that in consequence of these things the city was always missing her opportunities; I enacted a law in accordance with which I compelled the former—the rich—to do their duty fairly; I put an end to the injustice done to the poor, and (what was the greatest service of all to the State) I caused our preparations to be made in time. 103 When I was indicted for this, I appeared before you at the ensuing trial, and was acquitted; the prosecutor failed to obtain the necessary fraction of the votes. But what sums do you think the leaders of the Taxation-Boards, or those who stood second or third, offered me, to induce me, if possible, not to enact the law, or at least to let it drop and lie under sworn notice of prosecution?[n] They offered sums so large, men of Athens, that I should hesitate to mention them to you. It was a natural course for them to take. 104 For under the former laws it was possible for them to divide their obligation between sixteen persons, paying little or nothing themselves, and grinding down their poorer fellow citizens: while by my law each must pay down a sum calculated in proportion to his property; and a man came to be charged with two warships, who had previously been one of sixteen subscribers to a single one (for they used now to call themselves no longer captains of their ships, but subscribers). Thus there was nothing that they were not willing to give, if only the new plan could be brought to nothing, and they could escape being compelled to do their duty fairly. (To the clerk.) 105 Now read me, first, the decree[n] in accordance with which I had to meet the indictment; and then the lists of those liable under the former law, and under my own, respectively. Read.

[The decree is read.]

106 Now produce that noble list.

[A list is read.]

Now produce, for comparison with this, the list under my own law.

[A list is read.]

Was this, think you, but a trifling assistance which I rendered to the poor among you? 107 Would the wealthy have spent but a trifling sum to avoid doing their duty fairly? I am proud not only of having refused all compromise upon the measure, not only of having been acquitted when I was indicted, but also of having enacted a law which was beneficial, and of having given proof of it in practice. For throughout the war the armaments were equipped under my law, and no trierarch ever laid the suppliants' branch[n] before you in token of grievance, nor took sanctuary at Munychia; none was imprisoned by the Admiralty Board; no warship was abandoned at sea and lost to the State, or left behind here as unseaworthy. Under the former laws all these things used to happen; 108 and the reason was that the obligation rested upon the poor, and in consequence there were many cases of inability to discharge it. I transferred the duties of the trierarchy from the poor to the rich; and therefore every duty was properly fulfilled. Aye, and for this very reason I deserve to receive praise—that I always adopted such political measures as brought with them accessions of glory and honour and power to the city. No measure of mine is malicious, harsh, or unprincipled; none is degrading or unworthy of the city. The same spirit will be seen both in my domestic and my international policy. 109 For just as in home affairs I did not set the favour of the rich above the rights of the many, so in international affairs I did not embrace the gifts and the friendship of Philip, in preference to the common interests of all the Hellenes.

It still remains for me, I suppose, to speak about the proclamation, and about my examination. 110 The statement that I acted for the best, and that I am loyal to you throughout and eager to do you good service, I have proved, I think, sufficiently, by what I have said. At the same time I am passing over the most important parts of my political life and actions; for I conceive that I ought first to render to you in their proper order my arguments in regard to the alleged illegality itself: which done, even if I say nothing about the rest of my political acts, I can still rely upon that personal knowledge of them which each of you possesses.

111 Of the arguments which the prosecutor jumbled together in utter confusion with reference to the laws accompanying his indictment,[n] I am quite certain that you could not follow the greater part, nor could I understand them myself; but I will simply address you straightforwardly upon the question of right. So far am I from claiming (as he just now slanderously declared) to be free from the liability to render an account, that I admit a life-long liability to account for every part of my administration and policy. 112 But I do not admit that I am liable for one single day—you hear me, Aeschines?—to account for what I have given to the People as a free-will offering out of my private estate; nor is any one else so liable, not even if he is one of the nine archons. What law is so replete with injustice and churlishness, that when a man has made a present out of his private property and done an act of generosity and munificence, it deprives him of the gratitude due to him, hales him before a court of disingenuous critics, and sets them to audit accounts of sums which he himself has given? There is no such law. If the prosecutor

asserts that there is, let him produce it, and I will resign myself and say no more. 113 But the law does not exist, men of Athens; this is nothing but an informer's trick on the part of Aeschines, who, because I was Controller of the Festival Fund when I made this donation, says, 'Ctesiphon proposed a vote of thanks to him when he was still liable to account.' The vote of thanks was not for any of the things for which I was liable to account; it was for my voluntary gift, and your charge is a misrepresentation. 'Yes,' you say, 'but you were also a Commissioner of Fortifications.' I was, and thanks were rightly accorded me on the very ground that, instead of charging the sums which I spent, I made a present of them. A statement of account, it is true, calls for an audit and scrutineers; but a free gift deserves gratitude and thanks; and that is why the defendant proposed this motion in my favour. 114 That this principle is not merely laid down in the laws, but rooted in your national character, I shall have no difficulty in proving by many instances. Nausicles,[n] to begin with, has often been crowned by you, while general, for sacrifices which he had made from his private funds. Again, when Diotimus[n] gave the shields, and Charidemus[n] afterwards, they were crowned. And again, Neoptolemus here, while still director of many public works, has received honours for his voluntary gifts. It would really be too bad, if any one who held any office must either be debarred thereby from making a present to the State, or else, instead of receiving due gratitude, must submit accounts of the sums given. 115 To prove the truth of my statements, (\_to the clerk\_) take and read the actual decrees which were passed in honour of these persons. Read.

116 [\_Two decrees are read..]

117 Each of these persons, Aeschines, was accountable as regards the office which he held, but not as regards the services for which he was crowned. Nor am I, therefore; for I presume that I have the same rights as others with reference to the same matters. I made a voluntary gift. For this I receive thanks; for I am not liable to account for what I gave. I was holding office. True, and I have rendered an account of my official expenditure, but not of what I gave voluntarily. Ah! but I exercised my office iniquitously! What? and you were there, when the auditors brought me before them, and did not accuse me?

118 Now that the court may see that the prosecutor himself bears me witness that I was crowned for services of which I was not liable to render an account, (\_to the clerk\_) take and read the decree which was proposed in my honour, in its entirety. (\_To the jury\_) The points which he has omitted to indict in the Council's resolution will show that the charges which he does make are deliberate misrepresentations. (\_To the clerk\_) Read.

[\_The decree is read..]

119 My donations then, were these, of which you have not made one the subject of indictment. It is the reward for these, which the Council

states to be my due, that you attack. You admit that it was legal to accept the gifts offered, and you indict as illegal the return of gratitude for them. In Heaven's name, what must the perfect scoundrel, the really heaven-detested, malignant being be like? Must he not be a man like this?

120 But as regards the proclamation in the theatre, I pass by the fact that ten thousand persons have been thus proclaimed on ten thousand different occasions, and that my own name has often been so proclaimed before. But, in Heaven's name, Aeschines, are you so perverse and stupid, that you cannot grasp the fact that the recipient of the crown feels the same pride wherever the crown is proclaimed, and that it is for the benefit of those who confer it that the proclamation is made in the theatre? For those who hear are stimulated to do good service to the State, and commend those who return gratitude for such service even more than they commend the recipient of the crown. That is why the city has enacted this law. (.To the clerk..) Take the law itself and read it.

[.The law is read..]

121 Do you hear, Aeschines, the plain words of the law? 'Except such as the People or the Council shall resolve so to proclaim. But let these be proclaimed.' Why, wretched man, do you lay this dishonest charge? Why do you invent false arguments? Why do you not take hellebore[n] to cure you? What? Are you not ashamed to bring a case founded upon envy, not upon any crime—to alter some of the laws, and to leave out parts of others, when they ought surely, in justice, to be read entire to those who have sworn to give their votes in accordance with the laws? 122 And then, while you act in this way, you enumerate the qualities which should be found in a friend of the People, as if you had contracted for a statue, and discovered on receiving it that it had not the features required by the contract; or as if a friend of the People was known by a definition, and not by his works and his political measures! And you shout out expressions, proper and improper, like a reveller on a cart[n]—expressions which apply to you and your house, not to me. I will add this also, men of Athens. 123 The difference between abuse and accusation is, I imagine, that an accusation is founded upon crimes, for which the penalties are assigned by law; abuse, upon such slanders as their own character leads enemies to utter about one another. And I conceive that our forefathers built these courts of law, not that we might assemble you here and revile one another with improper expressions suggested by our adversary's private life, but that we might convict any one who happens to have committed some crime against the State. 124 Aeschines knew this as well as I; and yet he chose to make a ribald attack instead of an accusation. At the same time, it is not fair that he should go off without getting as much as he gives, even in this respect; and when I have asked him one question, I will at once proceed to the attack. Are we to call you, Aeschines, the enemy of the State, or of myself? Of myself, of course. What? And when you might have exacted the penalty from me, on behalf of your fellow countrymen, according to the laws—at public

examinations, by indictment, by all other forms of trial—did you always omit to do so? 125 And yet to-day, when I am unassailable upon every ground—on the ground of law, of lapse of time, of the statutable limit,[n] of the many previous trials which I have undergone upon every charge, without having once been convicted of any crime against you to this day—and when the city must necessarily share to a greater or smaller degree in the glory of acts which were really acts of the people, have you confronted me upon such an issue as this? Take care lest, while you profess to be *my* enemy, you prove to be the enemy of your fellow countrymen!

126 Since then I have shown you all what is the vote which religion and justice demand of you, I am now obliged, it would seem, by the slanders which he has uttered (though I am no lover of abuse) to reply to his many falsehoods by saying just what is absolutely necessary about himself, and showing who he is, and whence he is sprung, that he so lightly begins to use bad language, pulling to pieces certain expressions of mine, when he has himself used expressions which any respectable man would have shrunk from uttering; 127 for if the accuser were Aeacus or Rhadamanthus or Minos,[n] instead of a scandal-monger,[n] an old hand in the marketplace,[n] a pestilent clerk, I do not believe that he would have spoken thus, or produced such a stock of ponderous phrases, crying aloud, as if he were acting a tragedy, 'O Earth and Sun and Virtue,'[n] and the like; or again, invoking 'Wit and Culture, by which things noble and base are discerned apart'—for, of course, you heard him speaking in this way. 128 Scum of the earth! What have you or yours to do with virtue? How should *you* discern what is noble and what is not? Where and how did you get your qualification to do so? What right have *you* to mention culture anywhere? A man of genuine culture would not only never have asserted such a thing of himself, but would have blushed to hear another do so: and those who, like you, fall far short of it, but are tactless enough to claim it, succeed only in causing distress to their hearers, when they speak—not in seeming to be what they profess.

129 But though I am not at a loss to know what to say about you and yours, I am at a loss to know what to mention first. Shall I tell first[n] how your father Tromes was a slave in the house of Elpias, who kept an elementary school near the temple of Theseus, and how he wore shackles and a wooden halter? Or how your mother, by celebrating her daylight nuptials in her hut near the shrine of the Hero of the Lancet,[n] was enabled to rear you, her beautiful statue, the prince of third-rate actors? But these things are known to all without my telling them. Shall I tell how Phormio, the ship's piper, the slave of Dion of Phrearrii, raised her up out of this noble profession? But, before God and every Heavenly Power, I shudder lest in using expressions which are fitly applied to you, I may be thought to have chosen a subject upon which it ill befits myself to speak. 130 So I will pass this by, and will begin with the acts of his own life; for they were not like any chance actions,[n] but such as the people curses. For only lately—lately, do I say? only yesterday or the day before—did he become at once an Athenian and an orator, and by the addition of two

syllables converted his father from Tromes into Atrometus, and gave his mother the imposing name of Glaucothea,[n] when every one knows that she used to be called Empusa[n]—a name which was obviously given her because there was nothing that she would not do or have done to her; for how else should she have acquired it? 131 Yet, in spite of this, you are of so ungrateful and villainous a nature, that though, thanks to your countrymen, you have risen from slavery to freedom, and from poverty to wealth, far from feeling gratitude to them, you devote your political activity to working against them as a hireling. I will pass over every case in which there is any room for the contention that he has spoken in the interests of the city, and will remind you of the acts which he was manifestly proved to have done for the good of her enemies.

132 Which of you has not heard of Antiphon,[n] who was struck off the list of citizens,[n] and came into the city in pursuance of a promise to Philip that he would burn the dockyards? I found him concealed in the Peiraeus, and brought him before the Assembly; but the malignant Aeschines shouted at the top of his voice, that it was atrocious of me, in a democratic country, to insult a citizen who had met with misfortune, and to go to men's houses without a decree;[n] and he obtained his release. 133 And unless the Council of Areopagus had taken notice of the matter, and, seeing the inopportuneness of the ignorance which you had shown, had made a further search for the man, and arrested him, and brought him before you again, a man of that character would have been snatched out of your hands, and would have evaded punishment, and been sent out of the country by this pompous orator. As it was, you tortured and executed him—and so ought you also to have treated Aeschines. 134 The Council of Areopagus knew the part which he had played in this affair; and for this reason, when, owing to the same ignorance which so often leads you to sacrifice the public interests, you elected him[n] to advocate your claims in regard to the Temple of Delos, the Council (since you had appointed it to assist you and entrusted it with full authority to act in the matter) immediately rejected Aeschines as a traitor, and committed the case to Hypereides. When the Council took this step, the members took their votes from the altar,[n] and not one vote was given for this abominable man. 135 To prove that what I say is true, (\_to the clerk\_) call the witnesses who testify to it.

[\_The witnesses are called\_.]

136 Thus when the Council rejected him from the office of advocate, and committed the case to another, it declared at the same time that he was a traitor, who wished you ill.

Such was one of the public appearances of this fine fellow, and such its character—so like the acts with which he charges me, is it not? Now recall a second. For when Philip sent Python of Byzantium,[n] and with him envoys from all his allies, in the hope of putting the city to shame and showing her to be in the wrong, I would not give way before the torrent of insolent rhetoric which Python poured out upon you, but rose and

contradicted him, and would not betray the city's rights, but proved the iniquity of Philip's actions so manifestly, that even his own allies rose up and admitted it. But Aeschines supported Python; he gave testimony in opposition to his country, and that testimony false.

137 Nor was this sufficient for him; for again after this he was detected going to meet Anaxinus[n] the spy in the house of Thrason. But surely one who met the emissary of the enemy alone and conferred with him, must himself have been already a born spy and an enemy of his country. To prove the truth of what I say, (\_to the clerk\_) call the witnesses to these facts.

[\_The witnesses are called\_.]

138 There are still an infinite number of things which I might relate of him; but I pass them over. For the truth is something like this. I could still point to many instances in which he was found to be serving our enemies during that period, and showing his spite against me. But you do not store such things up in careful remembrance, to visit them with the indignation which they deserve; but, following a bad custom, you have given great freedom to any one who wishes to trip up the proposer of any advantageous measure by dishonest charges—bartering, as you do, the advantage of the State for the pleasure and gratification which you derive from invective; and so it is always easier and safer to be a hireling in the service of the enemy, than a statesman who has chosen to defend your cause.

139 To co-operate with Philip before we were openly at war with him was—I call Earth and Heaven to witness—atrocious enough. How could it be otherwise—against his own country? Nevertheless, concede him this, if you will, concede him this. But when the corn-ships had been openly plundered, and the Chersonese was being ravaged, and the man was on the march against Attica; when the position of affairs was no longer in doubt, and war had begun; what action did this malignant moulder of verses ever do for your good? He can point to none. There is not a single decree, small or great, with reference to the interests of the city, standing in the name of Aeschines. If he asserts that there is, let him produce it in the time allotted to me. But no such decree exists. In that case, however, only two alternatives are possible: either he had no fault to find at the time with my policy, and therefore made no proposal contrary to it; or else he was seeking the advantage of the enemy, and therefore refrained from bringing forward any better policy than mine.

140 Did he then abstain from speaking, as he abstained from proposing any motion, when any mischief was to be done? On the contrary, no one else had a chance of speaking. But though, apparently, the city could endure everything else, and he could do everything else unobserved, there was one final deed which was the culmination of all that he had done before. Upon this he expended all that multitude of words, as he went through the decrees relating to the Amphisseans, in the hope of distorting the truth.

But the truth cannot be distorted. It is impossible. Never will you wash away the stain of your actions there! You will not say enough for that!

141 I call upon all the gods and goddesses who protect this land of Attica, in the presence of you all, men of Athens; and upon Apollo of Pytho, the paternal deity[n] of this city, and I pray to them all, that if I should speak the truth to you—if I spoke it at that very time without delay, in the presence of the people, when first I saw this abominable man setting his hand to this business (for I knew it, I knew it at once),—that then they may give me good fortune and life: but if, to gratify my hatred or any private quarrel, I am now bringing a false accusation against this man, then they may take from me the fruition of every blessing.

142 Why have I uttered this imprecation with such vehemence and earnestness? Because, although I have documents, lying in the public archives, by which I will prove the facts clearly; although I know that you remember what was done; I have still the fear that he may be thought too insignificant a man to have done all the evil which he has wrought—as indeed happened before, when he caused the ruin of the unhappy Phocians by the false report which he brought home. 143 For the war at Amphissa, which was the cause of Philip’s coming to Elateia, and of one being chosen[n] commander of the Amphictyons, who overthrew the fortunes of the Hellenes—he\_ it is who helped to get it up; he, in his sole person, is to blame for disasters to which no equal can be found. I protested at the time, and cried out, before the Assembly, ‘You are bringing war into Attica, Aeschines—an Amphictyonic War.’ But a packed group of his supporters refused to let me speak, while the rest were amazed, and imagined that I was bringing a baseless charge against him, out of personal animosity. 144 But what the true nature of these proceedings was, men of Athens—why this plan was contrived, and how it was executed—you must hear from me to-day, since you were prevented from doing so at the time. You will behold a business cunningly organized; you will advance greatly in your knowledge of public affairs; and you will see what cleverness there was in Philip.

145 Philip had no prospect of seeing the end of the war with you, or ridding himself of it, unless he could make the Thebans and Thessalians enemies of Athens. For although the war was being wretchedly and inefficiently conducted by your generals, he was nevertheless suffering infinite damage from the war itself and from the freebooters. The exportation of the produce of his country and the importation of what he needed were both impossible. 146 Moreover, he was not at that time superior to you at sea, nor could he reach Attica, if the Thessalians would not follow him, or the Thebans give him a passage through their country; and although he was overcoming in the field the generals whom you sent out, such as they were (for of this I say nothing), he found himself suffering from the geographical conditions themselves, and from the nature of the resources[n] which either side possessed. 147 Now if he tried to encourage either the Thessalians or the Thebans to march against you in

order to further his own quarrel, no one, he thought, would pay any attention to him; but if he adopted their own common grounds of action and were chosen commander, he hoped to find it easier to deceive or to persuade them, as the case might be. What then does he do? He attempts (and observe with what skill) to stir up an Amphictyonic War, and a disturbance in connexion with the meeting of the Council. 148 For he thought that they would at once find that they needed his help, to deal with these. Now if one of his own or his allies' representatives on the Council[n] brought the matter forward, he thought that both the Thebans and the Thessalians would regard the proceeding with suspicion, and that all would be on their guard: but if it was an Athenian, sent by you, his adversaries, that did so, he would easily escape detection—as, in fact, happened. 149 How then did he manage this? He hired Aeschines. No one, I suppose, either realized beforehand what was going on or guarded against it—that is how such affairs are usually conducted here; Aeschines was nominated a delegate to the Council; three or four people held up their hands for him, and he was declared elected. But when, bearing with him the prestige of this city, he reached the Amphictyons, he dismissed and closed his eyes to all other considerations, and proceeded to perform the task for which he had been hired. He composed and recited a story, in attractive language, of the way in which the Cirrhaean territory had come to be dedicated; 150 and with this he persuaded the members of the Council, who were unused to rhetoric and did not foresee what was about to happen, that they should resolve to make the circuit of the territory,[n] which the Amphisseans said they were cultivating because it was their own, while he alleged that it was part of the consecrated land. The Locrians were not bringing any suit against us, or taking any such action as (in order to justify himself) he now falsely alleges. You may know this from the following consideration. It was clearly impossible[n] for the Locrians to bring a suit against Athens to an actual issue, without summoning us. Who then served the summons upon us? Before what authority was it served? Tell us who knows: point to him. You cannot do so. It was a hollow and a false pretext of which you thus made a wrongful use. 151 While the Amphictyons were making the circuit of the territory in accordance with Aeschines' suggestion, the Locrians fell upon them and came near to shooting them all down with their spears; some of the members of the Council they even carried off with them. And now that complaints and hostilities had been stirred up against the Amphisseans, in consequence of these proceedings, the command was first held by Cottyphus, and his force was drawn from the Amphictyonic Powers alone. But since some did not come, and those who came did nothing, the men who had been suborned for the purpose—villains of long standing, chosen from the Thessalians and from the traitors in other States—took steps with a view to entrusting the affair to Philip, as commander, at the next meeting of the Council. 152 They had adopted arguments of a persuasive kind. Either, they said, the Amphictyons must themselves contribute funds, maintain mercenaries, and fine those who refused to do so; or they must elect Philip. To make a long story short, the result was that Philip was appointed. And immediately afterwards, having collected a force and crossed the Pass, ostensibly on his way to the territory of Cirrha, he bids a long farewell to the

Cirrhaeans and Locrians, and seizes Elateia. 153 Now if the Thebans had not changed their policy at once, upon seeing this, and joined us, the trouble would have descended upon the city in full force, like a torrent in winter. As it was, the Thebans checked him for the moment; chiefly, men of Athens, through the goodwill of some Heavenly Power towards us; but secondarily, so far as it lay in one man's power, through me also. (To the clerk.) Now give me the decrees in question, and the dates of each proceeding; (to the jury.) that you may know what trouble this abominable creature stirred up, unpunished. (To the clerk.) Read me the decrees.

154 [The decrees of the Amphictyons are read.]

155 (To the clerk.) Now read the dates of these proceedings. (To the jury.) They are the dates at which Aeschines was delegate to the Council. (To the clerk.) Read.

[The dates are read.]

156 Now give me the letter which Philip sent to his allies in the Peloponnese, when the Thebans failed to obey his summons. For from this, too, you may clearly see that he concealed the real reason for his action—the fact that he was taking measures against Hellas and the Thebans and yourselves—and pretended to represent the common cause and the will of the Amphictyons. And the man who provided him with all these occasions and pretexts was Aeschines. (To the clerk.) Read.

157 [Philip's letter is read.]

158 You see that he avoids the mention of his own reasons for action, and takes refuge in those provided by the Amphictyons. Who was it that helped him to prepare such a case? Who put such pretexts at his disposal? Who is most to blame for the disasters that have taken place? Is it not Aeschines? And so, men of Athens, you must not go about saying that Hellas has suffered such things as these at the hands of one man.[n] I call Earth and Heaven to witness, that it was at the hands, not of one man, but of many villains in each State. 159 And of these Aeschines is one; and, had I to speak the truth without any reserve, I should not hesitate to describe him as the incarnate curse of all alike—men, regions or cities—that have been ruined since then. For he who supplied the seed is responsible for the crop. I wonder that you did not turn away your eyes at the very sight of him: but a cloud of darkness seems to hang between you and the truth.

160 I find that in dealing with the measures taken by Aeschines for the injury of his country, I have reached the time when I must speak of my own statesmanship in opposition to these measures; and it is fair that you should listen to this, for many reasons, but above all because it will be a shameful thing, if, when I have faced the actual realities of hard work for you, you will not even suffer the story of them to be told. 161 For when I saw the Thebans, and (I may almost say) yourselves as well, being

led by the corrupt partisans of Philip in either State to overlook, without taking a single precaution against it, the thing which was really dangerous to both peoples and needed their utmost watchfulness—the unhindered growth of Philip’s power; while, on the contrary, you were quite ready to entertain ill-feeling and to quarrel with one another; I kept unceasing watch to prevent this. Nor did I rely only on my own judgement in thinking that this was what your interest required. 162 I knew that Aristophon, and afterwards Eubulus, always wished to bring about this friendly union, and that, often as they opposed one another in other matters, they always agreed in this. Cunning fox! While they lived, you hung about them and flattered them; yet now that they are dead, you do not see that you are attacking them. For your censure of my policy in regard to Thebes is far more a denunciation of them than of me, since they were before me in approving of that alliance. 163 But I return to my previous point—that it was when Aeschines had brought about the war at Amphissa, and the others, his accomplices, had effectually helped him to create the ill-feeling against the Thebans, that Philip marched against us. For it was to render this possible that their attempt to throw the two cities into collision was made; and had we not roused ourselves a little before it was too late, we should never have been able to regain the lost ground; to such a length had these men carried matters. What the relations between the two peoples already were, you will know when you have heard these decrees and replies. (\_To the clerk..) Take these and read them.

164, 165 [\_The decrees are read..]

166 (\_To the clerk..) Now read the replies.

167 [\_The replies are read..]

168 Having established such relations between the cities, through the agency of these men, and being elated by these decrees and replies, Philip came with his army and seized Elateia, thinking that under no circumstances whatever should we and the Thebans join in unison after this. And though the commotion which followed in the city is known to you all, let me relate to you briefly just the bare facts.

169 It was evening, and one had come to the Prytanes[n] with the news that Elateia had been taken. Upon this they rose up from supper without delay; some of them drove the occupants out of the booths in the market-place and set fire to the wicker-work;[n] others sent for the generals and summoned the trumpeter; and the city was full of commotion. On the morrow, at break of day, the Prytanes summoned the Council to the Council-Chamber, while you made your way to the Assembly; and before the Council had transacted its business and passed its draft-resolution,[n] the whole people was seated on the hill-side.[n] 170 And now, when the Council had arrived, and the Prytanes had reported the intelligence which they had received, and had brought forward the messenger, and he had made his statement, the herald proceeded to ask, ‘Who wishes to speak?’ But no one came forward; and though the herald repeated the question many times,

still no one rose, though all the generals were present, and all the orators, and the voice of their country was calling for some one to speak for her deliverance. For the voice of the herald, uttered in accordance with the laws, is rightly to be regarded as the common voice of our country. 171 And yet, if it was for those to come forward who wished for the deliverance of the city, all of you and all the other Athenians would have risen, and proceeded to the platform, for I am certain that you all wished for her deliverance. If it was for the wealthiest, the Three Hundred[n] would have risen; and if it was for those who had both these qualifications—loyalty to the city and wealth—then those would have risen, who subsequently made those large donations; for it was loyalty and wealth that led them so to do. 172 But that crisis and that day called, it seems, not merely for a man of loyalty and wealth, but for one who had also followed the course of events closely from the first, and had come to a true conclusion as to the motive and the aim with which Philip was acting as he was. For no one who was unacquainted with these, and had not scrutinized them from an early period, was any the more likely, for all his loyalty and wealth, to know what should be done, or to be able to advise you. 173 The man who was needed was found that day in me. I came forward and addressed you in words which I ask you to listen to with attention, for two reasons—first, because I would have you realize that I was the only orator or politician who did not desert his post as a loyal citizen in the hour of danger, but was found there, speaking and proposing what your need required, in the midst of the terror; and secondly, because by the expenditure of a small amount of time, you will be far better qualified for the future in the whole art of political administration. 174 My words then were these: 'Those who are unduly disturbed by the idea that Philip can count upon the support of Thebes do not, I think, understand the present situation. For I am quite sure that, if this were so, we should have heard of his being, not at Elateia, but on our own borders. At the same time, I understand quite well, that he has come to prepare the way for himself at Thebes. 175 Listen,' I said, 'while I tell you the true state of affairs. Philip already has at his disposal all the Thebans whom he could win over either by bribery or by deception; and those who have resisted him from the first and are opposing him now, he has no chance of winning. What then is his design and object in seizing Elateia? He wishes, by making a display of force in their neighbourhood and bringing up his army, to encourage and embolden his own friends, and to strike terror into his enemies, that so they may either concede out of terror what they now refuse, or may be compelled. 176 Now,' I said, 'if we make up our minds at the present moment to remember any ill-natured action which the Thebans may have done us, and to distrust them on the assumption that they are on the side of our enemies, we shall be doing, in the first place, just what Philip would pray for: and further, I am afraid that his present opponents may then welcome him, that all may philippize[n] with one consent, and that he and they may march to Attica together. If, however, you follow my advice, and give your minds to the problem before us, instead of to contentious criticism of anything that I may say, I believe that I shall be able to win your approval for my proposals, and to dispel the danger which threatens the city. 177 What

then must you do? You must first moderate your present alarm, and then change your attitude, and be alarmed, all of you, for the Thebans. They are far more within the reach of disaster than we: it is they whom the danger threatens first. Secondly, those who are of military age, with the cavalry, must march to Eleusis,[n] and let every one see that you yourselves are in arms; in order that those who sympathize with you in Thebes may be enabled to speak in defence of the right, with the same freedom that their opponents enjoy, when they see that, just as those who are trying to sell their country to Philip have a force ready to help them at Elateia, so those who would struggle for freedom have you ready at hand to help them, and to go to their aid, if any one attacks them. 178 Next I bid you elect ten envoys, and give them full authority, with the generals, to decide the time of their own journey to Thebes, and to order the march of the troops. But when the envoys arrive in Thebes, how do I advise that they should handle the matter? I ask your special attention to this. They must require nothing of the Thebans—to do so at such a moment would be shameful; but they must undertake that we will go to their aid, if they bid us do so, on the ground that they are in extreme peril, and that we foresee the future better than they; in order that, if they accept our offer and take our advice, we may have secured our object, and our action may wear an aspect worthy of this city; or, if after all we are unsuccessful, the Thebans may have themselves to blame for any mistakes which they now make, while we shall have done nothing disgraceful or ignoble.’ 179 When I had spoken these words, and others in the same strain, I left the platform. All joined in commending these proposals; no one said a word in opposition; and I did not speak thus, and then fail to move a motion; nor move a motion, and then fail to serve as envoy; nor serve as envoy, and then fail to persuade the Thebans. I carried the matter through in person from beginning to end, and gave myself up unreservedly to meet the dangers which encompassed the city. (To the clerk.) Bring me the resolution which was then passed.

180 But now, Aeschines, how would you have me describe your part, and how mine, that day? Shall I call myself, as you would call me by way of abuse and disparagement, ‘Battalus?’[n] and you, no ordinary hero even, but a real stage-hero, ‘Cresphontes’ or ‘Creon’,[n] or—the character which you cruelly murdered at Collytus[n]—‘Oenomaus.’ Then I, Battalus of Paeania, proved myself of more value to my country in that crisis than Oenomaus of Cothocidae. In fact you were of no service on any occasion, while I played the part which became a good citizen throughout. (To the clerk.) Read this decree.

181-7 [The decree of Demosthenes is read.]

188 This was the first step towards our new relations with Thebes, and the beginning of a settlement. Up to this time the cities had been inveigled into mutual hostility, hatred, and mistrust by these men. But this decree caused the peril that encompassed the city to pass away like a cloud. It was for an honest citizen, if he had any better plan than mine, to make it public at the time, instead of attacking me now. 189 The true

counsellor and the dishonest accuser, unlike as they are in everything, differ most of all in this: the one declares his opinion before the event, and freely surrenders himself as responsible, to those who follow his advice, to Fortune, to circumstances, to any one.[n] The other is silent when he ought to speak, and then carps at anything untoward that may happen. 190 That crisis, as I have said, was the opportunity for a man who cared for his country, the opportunity for honest speaking. But so much further than I need will I go, that if any one can *now* point to any better course—or any course at all except that which I chose—I admit my guilt. If any one has discovered any course to-day, which would have been for our advantage, had we followed it at the time, I admit that it ought not to have escaped me. But if there neither is nor was such a possibility; if even now, even to-day, no one can mention any such course, what was the counsellor of the people to do? Had he not to choose the best of the plans which suggested themselves and were feasible? 191 This I did. For the herald asked the question, Aeschines, 'Who wishes to speak?' not 'Who wishes to bring accusations about the past?' nor 'Who wishes to guarantee the future?' And while you sat speechless in the Assembly throughout that period, I came forward and spoke. Since, however, you did not do so then, at least inform us now, and tell us what words, which should have been upon my lips, were left unspoken, what precious opportunity, offered to the city, was left unused, by me? What alliance was there, what course of action, to which I ought, by preference, to have guided my countrymen?

192 But with all mankind the past is always dismissed from consideration, and no one under any circumstances proposes to deliberate about it. It is the future or the present that make their call upon a statesman's duty. Now at that time the danger was partly in the future, and partly already present; and instead of cavilling disingenuously at the results, consider the principle of my policy under such circumstances. For in everything the final issue falls out as Heaven wills; but the principle which he follows itself reveals the mind of the statesman. 193 Do not, therefore, count it a crime on my part, that Philip proved victorious in the battle. The issue of that event lay with God, not with me. But show me that I did not adopt every expedient that was possible, so far as human reason could calculate; that I did not carry out my plan honestly and diligently, with exertions greater than my strength could bear; or that the policy which I initiated was not honourable, and worthy of Athens, and indeed necessary: and then denounce me, but not before. 194 But if the thunderbolt [or the storm] which fell has proved too mighty, not only for us, but for all the other Hellenes, what are we to do? It is as though a ship-owner, who had done all that he could to ensure safety, and had equipped the ship with all that he thought would enable her to escape destruction, and had then met with a tempest in which the tackling had been strained or even broken to pieces, were to be held responsible for the wreck of the vessel. 'Why,' he would say, 'I was not steering the ship'—just as I was not the general[n]—'I had no power over Fortune: she had power over everything.' But consider and observe this point. 195 If it was fated that we should fare as we did, even when we had the Thebans

to help us in the struggle, what must we have expected, if we had not had even them for our allies, but they had joined Philip?—and this was the object for which Philip employed[n] every tone that he could command. And if, when the battle took place, as it did, three days' march from Attica, the city was encompassed by such peril and terror, what should we have had to expect, if this same disaster had occurred anywhere within the borders of our own country? Do you realize that, as it was, a single day, and a second, and a third gave us the power to rally, to collect our forces, to take breath, to do much that made for the deliverance of the city: but that had it been otherwise—it is not well, however, to speak of things which we have not had to experience, thanks to the goodwill of one of the gods, and to the protection which the city obtained for herself in this alliance, which you denounce.

196 The whole of this long argument, gentlemen of the jury, is addressed to yourselves and to the circle of listeners outside the bar; for to this despicable man it would have been enough to address a short, plain sentence. If to you alone, Aeschines, the future was clear, before it came, you should have given warning, when the city was deliberating upon the subject; but if you had no such foreknowledge, you have the same ignorance to answer for as others. Why then should you make these charges against me, any more than I against you? 197 For I have been a better citizen than you with regard to this very matter of which I am speaking—I am not as yet talking of anything else—just in so far as I gave myself up to the policy which all thought expedient, neither shrinking from nor regarding any personal risk; while you neither offered any better proposals than mine (for then they would not have followed mine), nor yet made yourself useful in advancing mine in any way. What the most worthless of men, the bitterest enemy of the city, would do, you are found to have done, when all was over; and at the same time as the irreconcilable enemies of the city, Aristratus in Naxos, and Aristoleos in Thasos, are bringing the friends of Athens to trial, Aeschines, in Athens itself, is accusing Demosthenes. 198 But surely one who treasured up[n] the misfortunes of the Hellenes, that he might win glory from them for himself, deserved to perish rather than to stand as the accuser of another; and one who has profited by the very same crisis as the enemies of the city cannot possibly be loyal to his country. You prove it, moreover, by the life you live, the actions you do, the measures you take—and the measures, too, that you do not take. Is anything being done which seems advantageous to the city? Aeschines is speechless. Has any obstruction, any untoward event occurred? There you find Aeschines, like a rupture or a sprain, which wakes into life, so soon as any trouble overtakes the body.

199 But since he bears so hardly upon the results, I desire to say what may even be a paradox; and let no one, in the name of Heaven, be amazed at the length to which I go, but give a kindly consideration to what I say. Even if what was to come was plain to all beforehand; even if all foreknew it; even if you, Aeschines, had been crying with a loud voice in warning and protestation—you who uttered not so much as a sound; even then, I

say, it was not right for the city to abandon her course, if she had any regard for her fame, or for our forefathers, or for the ages to come. 200 As it is, she is thought, no doubt, to have failed to secure her object—as happens to all alike, whenever God wills it: but then, by abandoning in favour of Philip her claim to take the lead of others, she must have incurred the blame of having betrayed them all. Had she surrendered without a struggle those claims in defence of which our forefathers faced every imaginable peril, who would not have cast scorn upon you, Aeschines—upon you, I say; not, I trust, upon Athens nor upon me? 201 In God’s name, with what faces should we have looked upon those who came to visit the city, if events had come round to the same conclusion as they now have—if Philip had been chosen as commander and lord of all, and we had stood apart, while others carried on the struggle to prevent these things; and that, although the city had never yet in time past preferred an inglorious security to the hazardous vindication of a noble cause? 202 What Hellene, what foreigner, does not know, that the Thebans, and the Spartans, who were powerful still earlier, and the Persian king would all gratefully and gladly have allowed Athens to take what she liked and keep all that was her own, if she would do the bidding of another, and let another take the first place in Hellas? 203 But this was not, it appears, the tradition of the Athenians; it was not tolerable; it was not in their nature. From the beginning of time no one had ever yet succeeded in persuading the city to throw in her lot with those who were strong, but unrighteous in their dealings, and to enjoy the security of servitude. Throughout all time she has maintained her perilous struggle for pre-eminence, honour, and glory. 204 And this policy you look upon as so lofty, so proper to your own national character, that, of your forefathers also, it is those who have acted thus that you praise most highly. And naturally. For who would not admire the courage of those men, who did not fear to leave their land[n] and their city, and to embark upon their ships, that they might not do the bidding of another; who chose for their general Themistocles (who had counselled them thus), and stoned Cysilus to death, when he gave his voice for submission to a master’s orders—and not him alone, for your wives stoned his wife also to death. 205 For the Athenians of that day did not look for an orator or a general who would enable them to live in happy servitude; they cared not to live at all, unless they might live in freedom. For every one of them felt that he had come into being, not for his father and his mother alone, but also for his country. And wherein lies the difference? He who thinks he was born for his parents alone awaits the death which destiny assigns him in the course of nature: but he who thinks he was born for his country also will be willing to die, that he may not see her in bondage, and will look upon the outrages and the indignities that he must needs bear in a city that is in bondage as more to be dreaded than death.

206 Now were I attempting to argue that *I* had induced you to show a spirit worthy of your forefathers, there is not a man who might not rebuke me with good reason. But in fact, I am declaring that such principles as these are your own; I am showing that *before* my time the city displayed this spirit, though I claim that I, too, have had some share, as your

servant, in carrying out your policy in detail. 207 But in denouncing the policy as a whole, in bidding you be harsh with me, as one who has brought terrors and dangers upon the city, the prosecutor, in his eagerness to deprive me of my distinction at the present moment, is trying to rob you of praises that will last throughout all time. For if you condemn the defendant on the ground that my policy was not for the best, men will think that your own judgement has been wrong, and that it was not through the unkindness of fortune that you suffered what befell you. 208 But it cannot,[n] it cannot be that you were wrong, men of Athens, when you took upon you the struggle for freedom and deliverance. No! by those who at Marathon bore the brunt of the peril—our forefathers. No! by those who at Plataeae drew up their battle-line, by those who at Salamis, by those who off Artemisium fought the fight at sea, by the many who lie in the sepulchres where the People laid them, brave men, all alike deemed worthy by their country, Aeschines, of the same honour and the same obsequies—not the successful or the victorious alone! And she acted justly. For all these have done that which it was the duty of brave men to do; but their fortune has been that which Heaven assigned to each. 209 Accursed, poring pedant![n] if you, in your anxiety to deprive me of the honour and the kindness shown to me by my countrymen, recounted trophies and battles and deeds of long ago—and of which of them did this present trial demand the mention?—what spirit was I to take upon me, when I mounted the platform, I who came forward to advise the city how she should maintain her pre-eminence? Tell me, third-rate actor! The spirit of one who would propose things unworthy of this people? 210 I should indeed have deserved to die! For you too, men of Athens, ought not to judge private suits and public in the same spirit. The business transactions of everyday life must be viewed in the light of the special law and practice associated with each; but the public policy of statesmen must be judged by the principles that your forefathers set before them. And if you believe that you should act worthily of them, then, whenever you come into court to try a public suit, each of you must imagine that with his staff[n] and his ticket there is entrusted to him also the spirit of his country.

211 But I have entered upon the subject of your forefathers' achievements, and have passed over certain decrees and transactions. I desire, therefore, to return to the point from which I digressed.

When we came to Thebes, we found envoys there from Philip, and from the Thessalians and his other allies—our friends in terror, his full of confidence. And to show you that I am not saying this now to suit my own purpose, read the letter which we, your envoys, dispatched without delay. 212 The prosecutor, however, has exercised the art of misrepresentation to so extravagant a degree, that he attributes to circumstances, not to me, any satisfactory result that was achieved; but for everything that fell out otherwise, he lays the blame upon me and the fortune that attends me. In his eyes, apparently, I, the counsellor and orator, have no share in the credit for what was accomplished as the result of oratory and debate; while I must bear the blame alone for the misfortunes which we suffered in arms, and as a result of generalship. What more brutal, more

damnable misrepresentation can be conceived? (To the clerk.) Read the letter.

[The letter is read.]

213 When they had convened the Assembly, they gave audience to the other side first, on the ground that they occupied the position of allies; and these came forward and delivered harangues full of the praises of Philip and of accusations against yourselves, recalling everything that you had ever done in opposition to the Thebans. The sum of it all was that they required the Thebans to show their gratitude for the benefits which they had received from Philip, and to exact the penalty for the injuries they had received from you, in whichever way they preferred—either by letting them march through their country against you, or by joining them in the invasion of Attica; and they showed (as they thought) that the result of the course which they advised would be that the herds and slaves and other valuables of Attica would find their way into Boeotia; while the result of what (as they alleged) you were about to propose would be that those of Boeotia would be plundered in consequence of the war. 214 They said much more, but all tending to the same effect. As for our reply, I would give my whole life to tell it you in detail; but I fear lest, now that those times have gone by, you may feel as if a very deluge[n] had overwhelmed all, and may regard anything that is said on the subject as vanity and vexation. But hear at least what we persuaded them to do, and their answer to us. (To the clerk.) Take this and read it.

[The answer of the Thebans is read.]

215 After this they invited and summoned you; you marched; you went to their aid; and (to pass over the events which intervened) they received you in so friendly a spirit that while their infantry and cavalry were encamped outside the walls,[n] they welcomed your troops into their houses, within the city, among their children and wives, and all that was most precious to them. Three eulogies did the Thebans pronounce upon you before the world that day, and those of the most honourable kind—the first upon your courage, the second upon your righteousness, the third upon your self-control. For when they chose to side with you in the struggle, rather than against you, they judged that your courage was greater, and your requests more righteous, than Philip's; and when they placed in your power what they and all men guard most jealously, their children and wives, they showed their confidence in your self-control. 216 In all these points, men of Athens, your conduct proved that their judgement had been correct. For the force came into the city; but no one made a single complaint—not even an unfounded complaint—against you; so virtuously did you conduct yourselves. And twice you fought by their side, in the earliest battles—the battle by the river[n] and the winter-battle[n]—and showed yourselves, not only irreproachable, but even admirable, in your discipline, your equipment, and your enthusiasm. These things called forth expressions of thanks to you from other states, and sacrifices and processions to the gods from yourselves. 217 And I should

like to ask Aeschines whether, when all this was happening, and the city was full of pride and joy and thanksgiving, he joined in the sacrifices and the rejoicing of the multitude, or whether he sat at home grieving and groaning and angry at the good fortune of his country. If he was present, and was seen in his place with the rest, surely his present action is atrocious—nay, even impious—when he asks you, who have taken an oath by the gods, to vote to-day that those very things were not excellent, of whose excellence he himself on that day made the gods his witnesses. If he was not present, then surely he deserves to die many times, for grieving at the sight of the things which brought rejoicing to others. (.To the clerk..) Now read these decrees also.

[.The decrees ordering sacrifices are read..]

218 Thus we were occupied at that time with sacrifices, while the Thebans were reflecting how they had been saved by our help; and those who, in consequence of my opponents' proceedings, had expected that they would themselves stand in need of help, found themselves, after all, helping others, in consequence of the action they took upon my advice. But what the tone of Philip's utterance was, and how greatly he was confounded by what had happened, you can learn from his letter, which he sent to the Peloponnese. (.To the clerk..) Take these and read them: (.to the jury..) that you may know what was effected by my perseverance, by my travels, by the hardships I endured, by all those decrees of which Aeschines spoke so disparagingly just now.

219 You have had, as you know, many great and famous orators, men of Athens, before my time—Callistratus himself, Aristophon, Cephalus, Thrasybulus, and a vast number of others. Yet not one of these ever gave himself up entirely to the State for any purpose: the mover of a decree would not serve as ambassador, the ambassador would not move the decree. Each left himself, at one and the same time, some respite from work, and somewhere to lay the blame,[n] in case of accidents. 220 'Well,' some one may say, 'did \_you\_ so excel them in force and boldness, as to do everything yourself?' I do not say that. But so strong was my conviction of the seriousness of the danger that had overtaken the city, that I felt that I ought not to give my personal safety any place whatever in my thoughts; it was enough for a man to do his duty and to leave nothing undone. 221 And I was convinced with regard to myself—foolishly perhaps, but still convinced—that no mover would make a better proposal, no agent would execute it better, no ambassador would be more eager or more honest in his mission, than I. For these reasons, I assigned every one of these offices to myself. (.To the clerk..) Read Philip's letters.

[.Philip's letters are read..]

222 To this condition, Aeschines, was Philip reduced by my statesmanship. This was the tone of his utterances, though before this he used to threaten the city with many a bold word. For this I was deservedly crowned by those here assembled, and though you were present, you offered

no opposition; while Diondas, who indicted the proposer, did not obtain the necessary fraction of the votes. (To the clerk.) Read me these decrees, (to the jury) which escaped condemnation, and which Aeschines did not even indict.

[The decrees are read.]

223 These decrees, men of Athens, contain the very same syllables, the very same words, as those which Aristonicus previously employed in his proposal, and which Ctesiphon, the defendant, has employed now; and Aeschines neither prosecuted the proposer of them himself, nor supported the person who indicted him. Yet surely, if the charges which he is bringing against me to-day are true, he would have had better reason than for prosecuting Demomeles (the proposer of the decree) and Hypereides, than he has for prosecuting Ctesiphon. And why? 224 Because Ctesiphon can refer you to them—to the decision of the courts, to the fact that Aeschines himself did not accuse them, though they had moved exactly what he has moved now, to the prohibition by law of further prosecution in such cases, and to many other facts: whereas then the case would have been tried on its merits, before the defendant had got the advantage of any such precedent. 225 But of course it was impossible then for Aeschines to act as he has acted now—to select out of many periods of time long past, and many decrees, matters which no one either knew or thought would be mentioned to-day; to misrepresent them, to change the dates, to put false reasons for the actions taken in place of the true, and so appear to have a case. 226 At the time this was impossible. Every word spoken then must have been spoken with the truth in view, at no distance of time from the events, while you still remembered all the facts and had them practically at your fingers' ends. For that reason he evaded all investigation at the time; and he has come before you now, in the belief (I fancy) that you will make this a contest of oratory, instead of an inquiry into our political careers, and that it is upon our eloquence, not upon the interests of the city, that you will decide.

227 Yes, and he ingeniously suggests that you ought to disregard the opinion which you had of each of us when you left your homes and came into court; and that just as, when you draw up an account in the belief that some one has a balance, you nevertheless give way when you find that the counters all disappear[n] and leave nothing over, so now you should give your adhesion to the conclusion which emerges from the argument. Now observe how inherently rotten everything that springs from dishonesty seems to be. 228 By his very use of this ingenious illustration he has confessed that to-day, at all events, our respective characters are well established—that I am known to speak for my country's good, and he to speak for Philip. For unless that were your present conception of each of us, he would not have sought to change your view. 229 And further, I shall easily show you that it is not fair of him to ask you to alter this opinion—not by the use of counters—that is not how a political reckoning is made—but by briefly recalling each point to you, and treating you who hear me both as auditors of my account and witnesses to the facts. For

that policy of mine which he denounces caused the Thebans, instead of joining Philip, as all expected them to do, in the invasion of our country, to range themselves by our side and stay his progress. 230 It caused the war to take place not in Attica, but on the confines of Boeotia, eighty miles from the city. Instead of our being harried and plundered by freebooters from Euboea, it gave peace to Attica from the side of the sea throughout the war. Instead of Philip's taking Byzantium and becoming master of the Hellespont, it caused the Byzantines to join us in the war against him. 231 Can such achievements, think you, be reckoned up like counters? Are we to cancel them out,[n] rather than provide that they shall be remembered for all time? I need not now add that it fell to others to taste the barbarity which is to be seen in every case in which Philip got any one finally into his power; while you reaped (and quite rightly) the fruits of the generosity which he feigned while he was bringing within his grasp all that remained. But I pass this over.

232 Nay, I will not even hesitate to say, that one who wished to review an orator's career straightforwardly and without misrepresentation, would not have included in his charges such matters as you just now spoke of—making up illustrations, and mimicking words and gestures. Of course the fortune which befell the Hellenes—surely you see this?—was entirely due to my using this word instead of that, or waving my hand in one direction rather than the other! 233 He would have inquired, by reference to the actual facts, what resources and what forces the city had at her command when I entered political life; what I subsequently collected for her when I took control; and what was the condition of our adversaries. Then if I had diminished our forces, he would have proved that the fault lay at my door; but if I had greatly increased them, he would have abstained from deliberate misrepresentation. But since you have avoided such an inquiry, I will undertake it; and do you, gentlemen, observe whether my argument is just.

234 The military resources of the city included the islanders—and not all, but only the weakest. For neither Chios nor Rhodes nor Corcyra was with us. Their contribution in money came to 45 talents, and these had been collected in advance.[n] Infantry and cavalry, besides our own, we had none. But the circumstance which was most alarming to us and most favourable to our enemies was that these men had contrived that all our neighbours should be more inclined to enmity than to friendship—the Megareans, the Thebans, and the Euboeans. 235 Such was the position of the city at the time; and what I say admits of no contradiction. Now consider the position of Philip, with whom our conflict lay. In the first place, he held absolute sway over his followers—and this for purposes of war is the greatest of all advantages. Next, his followers had their weapons in their hands always. Then he was well off for money, and did whatever he resolved to do, without giving warning of it by decrees, or debating about it in public, or being put on trial by dishonest accusers, or defending himself against indictments for illegality, or being bound to render an account to any one. He was himself absolute master, commander, and lord of all. 236 But I who was set to oppose him—for this inquiry

too it is just to make—what had I under my control? Nothing! For, to begin with, the very right to address you—the only right I had—you extended to Philip’s hirelings in the same measure as to me; and as often as they defeated me—and this frequently happened, whatever the reason on each occasion—so often you went away leaving a resolution recorded in favour of the enemy. 237 But in spite of all these disadvantages, I won for you the alliance of the Euboeans, Achaeans, Corinthians, Thebans, Megareans, Leucadians, and Corcyreans, from whom were collected—apart from their citizen-troops—15,000 mercenaries and 2,000 cavalry. 238 And I instituted a money-contribution, on as large a scale as I could. But if you refer,[n] Aeschines, to what was fair as between ourselves and the Thebans or the Byzantines or the Euboeans—if at this time you talk to us of equal shares—you must be ignorant, in the first place, of the fact that in former days also, out of those ships of war, three hundred [n] in all, which fought for the Hellenes, Athens provided two hundred, and did not think herself unfairly used, or let herself be seen arraigning those who had counselled her action, or taking offence at the arrangement. It would have been shameful. No! men saw her rendering thanks to Heaven, because when a common peril beset the Hellenes, she had provided double as much as all the rest to secure the deliverance of all. 239 Moreover, it is but a hollow benefit that you are conferring upon your countrymen by your dishonest charges against me. Why do you tell them *now*, what course they ought to have taken? Why did you not propose such a course at the time (for you were in Athens, and were present) if it was possible in the midst of those critical times, when we had to accept, not what we chose, but what circumstances allowed; since there was one at hand, bidding against us, and ready to welcome those whom we rejected, and to pay them into the bargain.

240 But if I am accused to-day, for what I have actually done, what if at the time I had haggled over these details, and the other states had gone off and joined Philip, and he had become master at once of Euboea and Thebes and Byzantium? What do you think these impious men would then have done? 241 What would they have said? Would they not have declared that the states had been surrendered? that they had been driven away, when they wished to be on your side? ‘See,’ they would have said (would they not?), ‘he has obtained through the Byzantines the command of the Hellespont and the control of the corn trade of Hellas; and through the Thebans a trying border war has been brought into Attica; and owing to the pirates who sail from Euboea, the sea has become unnavigable,’ and much more in addition. 242 A villainous thing, men of Athens, is the dishonest accuser always—villainous, and in every way malignant and fault-finding! Aye, and this miserable creature is a fox by nature, that has never done anything honest or gentlemanly—a very tragical ape, a clodhopping Oenomaus, a counterfeit orator! 243 Where is the profit to your country from your cleverness? Do you instruct us now about things that are past? It is as though a doctor, when he was paying his visits to the sick, were to give them no advice or instructions to enable them to become free from their illness, but, when one of his patients died and the customary offerings[n] were being paid

him, were to explain, as he followed to the tomb, 'if this man had done such and such things, he would not have died.' Crazy fool! Do you tell us this *\_now\_*?

244 Nor again will you find that the defeat—if you exult at it, when you ought to groan, accursed man!—was determined by anything that was within my control. Consider the question thus. In no place to which I was sent by you as ambassador, did I ever come away defeated by the ambassadors of Philip—not from Thessaly nor from Ambracia, not from the Illyrians nor from the Thracian princes, not from Byzantium nor from any other place, nor yet, on the last occasion, from Thebes. But every place in which his ambassadors were defeated in argument, he proceeded to attack and subdue by force of arms. 245 Do you then require those places at *\_my\_* hands? Are you not ashamed to jeer at a man as a coward, and in the same breath to require him to prove superior, by his own unaided efforts, to the army of Philip—and that with no weapons to use but words? For what else was at my disposal? I could not control the spirit of each soldier, or the fortune of the combatants, or the generalship displayed, of which, in your perversity, you demand an account from me. 246 No; but every investigation that can be made as regards those duties for which an orator should be held responsible, I bid you make. I crave no mercy. And what are those duties? To discern events in their beginnings, to foresee what is coming, and to forewarn others. These things I have done. Again, it is his duty to reduce to the smallest possible compass, wherever he finds them, the slowness, the hesitation, the ignorance, the contentiousness, which are the errors inseparably connected with the constitution of all city-states; while, on the other hand, he must stimulate men to unity, friendship, and eagerness to perform their duty. All these things I have done, and no one can discover any dereliction of duty on my part at any time. 247 If one were to ask any person whatever, by what means Philip had accomplished the majority of his successes, every one would reply that it was by means of his army, and by giving presents and corrupting those in charge of affairs. Now I had no control or command of the forces: neither, then, does the responsibility for anything that was done in that sphere concern me. And further, in the matter of being or not being corrupted by bribes, I have defeated Philip. For just as the bidder has conquered one who accepts his money, if he effects his purchase, so one who refuses to accept it [and is not corrupted] has conquered the bidder. In all, therefore, in which I am concerned, the city has suffered no defeat.

248 The justification, then, with which I furnished the defendant for such a motion as he proposed with regard to me, consisted (along with many other points) of the facts which I have described, and others like them. I will now proceed to that justification which all of you supplied. For immediately after the battle, the People, who knew and had seen all that I did, and now stood in the very midst of the peril and terror, at a moment when it would not have been surprising if the majority had shown some harshness towards me—the People, I say, in the first place carried my proposals for ensuring the safety of the city; and all the measures

undertaken for its protection—the disposition of the garrisons, the entrenchments, the funds for the fortifications—were all provided for by decrees which I proposed. And, in the second place, when the People chose a corn-commissioner, out of all Athens they elected me. 249 Subsequently all those who were interested in injuring me combined, and assailed me with indictments, prosecutions after audit, impeachments, and all such proceedings—not in their own names at first, but through the agency of men behind whom, they thought, they would best be screened against recognition. For you doubtless know and remember that during the early part of that period I was brought to trial every day; and neither the desperation of Sosicles, nor the dishonest misrepresentations of Philocrates,[n] nor the frenzy of Diondas and Melantus, nor any other expedient, was left untried by them against me. And in all these trials, thanks to the gods above all, but secondarily to you and the rest of the Athenians, I was acquitted—and justly; for such a decision is in accordance both with truth and with the credit of jurors who have taken their oath, and given a verdict in conformity with it. 250 So whenever I was impeached, and you absolved me and did not give the prosecutor the necessary fraction of the votes, you were voting that my policy was the best. Whenever I was acquitted upon an indictment, it was a proof that my motion and proposals were according to law. Whenever you set your seal to my accounts at an audit, you confessed in addition that I had acted throughout with uprightness and integrity. And this being so, what epithet was it fitting or just that Ctesiphon should apply to my actions? Was it not that which he saw applied by the People, and by juries on their oath, and ratified by Truth in the judgement of all men?

251 'Yes,' he replies, 'but Cephalus'[n] boast was a noble one—that he had never been indicted at all.' True, and a happy thing also it was for him. But why should one who has often been tried, but has never been convicted of crime, deserve to incur criticism any the more on that account? Yet in truth, men of Athens, so far as Aeschines is concerned, I too can make this noble boast that Cephalus made. For he has never yet preferred or prosecuted any indictment against me; so that by you at least, Aeschines, I am admitted to be no worse a citizen than Cephalus.

252 His want of feeling and his malignity may be seen in many ways, and not least in the remarks which he made about fortune. For my part, I think that, as a rule, when one human being reproaches another with his fortune, he is a fool. For when he who thinks himself most prosperous and fancies his fortune most excellent, does not know whether it will remain so until the evening, how can it be right to speak of one's fortune, or to taunt another with his? But since Aeschines adopts a tone of lofty superiority upon this as upon many other subjects, observe, men of Athens, how much more truthful and more becoming in a human being my own remarks upon Aeschines' fortune will be. 253 I believe that the fortune of this city is good; and I see that the God of Dodona also declares this to you through his oracle. But I think that the prevailing fortune of mankind as a whole to-day is grievous and terrible. For what man, Hellene or foreigner, has not tasted abundance of evil at this present time? 254

Now the fact that we chose the noblest course, and that we are actually better off than those Hellenes who expected to live in prosperity if they sacrificed us, I ascribe to the good fortune of the city. But in so far as we failed, in so far as everything did not fall out in accordance with our wishes, I consider that the city has received the share which was due to us of the fortune of mankind in general. 255 But my personal fortune, and that of every individual among us, ought, I think, in fairness to be examined with reference to our personal circumstances. That is my judgement with regard to fortune, and I believe (as I think you also do) that my judgement is correct and just. But Aeschines asserts that my personal fortune has more influence than the fortune of the city as a community—the insignificant and evil more than the good and important! How can this be?

256 If, however, you determine at all costs to scrutinize my fortune, Aeschines, then compare it with your own; and if you find that mine is better than yours, then cease to revile it. Examine it, then, from the very beginning. And, in Heaven's name, let no one condemn me for any want of good taste. For I neither regard one who speaks insultingly of poverty, nor one who prides himself on having been brought up in affluence, as a man of sense. But the slanders and misrepresentations of this unfeeling man oblige me to enter upon a discussion of this sort; and I will conduct it with as much moderation as the facts allow.

257 I then, Aeschines, had the advantage as a boy of attending the schools which became my position, and of possessing as much as one who is to do nothing ignoble owing to poverty must possess. When I passed out of boyhood, my life corresponded with my upbringing—I provided choruses and equipped warships; I paid the war-tax; I neglected none of the paths to distinction in public or private life, but gave my services both to my country and my friends; and when I thought fit to enter public life, the measures which I decided to adopt were of such a character that I have been crowned many times both by my country and by many other Hellenic peoples, while not even you, my enemies, attempt to say that my choice was not at least an honourable one. 258 Such is the fortune which has accompanied my life, and though I might say much more about it, I refrain from doing so, in my anxiety not to annoy any one by the expression of my pride. And you—the lofty personage, the despiser of others—what has been your fortune when compared with this?—the fortune, thanks to which you were brought up as a boy in the depths of indigence, in close attendance upon the school along with your father, pounding up the ink, sponging down the forms, sweeping the attendants' room,[n] occupying the position of a menial, not of a free-born boy! 259 Then, when you became a man, you used to read out the books[n] to your mother at her initiations, and help her in the rest of the hocus-pocus, by night dressing the initiated[n] in fawnskins, drenching them from the bowl, purifying them and wiping them down with the clay and the bran, and (when they were purified) bidding them stand up and say, 'The ill is done, the good begun,' priding yourself upon raising the shout of joy more loudly than any one had ever done before—and I can believe it, for, when his voice is so loud, you dare not

imagine that his shout is anything but superlatively fine. 260 But by day you used to lead those noble companies through the streets, men crowned with fennel and white poplar,[n] throttling the puff-adders and waving them over your head, crying out 'Euoë, Saboë,'[n] and dancing to the tune of 'Hyes Attes, Attes Hyes'—addressed by the old hags as leader, captain, ivy-bearer, fan-bearer, and so on; and as the reward of your services getting sops and twists and barley-bannocks! Who would not congratulate himself with good reason on such things, and bless his own fortune? 261 But when you were enrolled among your fellow parishioners,[n] by whatever means (for of that I say nothing)—when, I say, you were enrolled, you at once selected the noblest of occupations, that of a clerk and servant to petty magistrates. 262 And when at length you escaped from this condition also, after yourself doing all that you impute to others, you in no way—Heaven knows!—disgraced your previous record by the life which you subsequently lived; for you hired yourself out to the actors Simylus and Socrates—the Roarers, they were nicknamed—and played as a third-rate actor, collecting figs[n] and bunches of grapes and olives, like a fruiterer gathering from other peoples' farms, and getting more out of this than out of the dramatic competitions in which you were competing for your lives; for there was war without truce or herald between yourselves and the spectators; and the many wounds you received from them make it natural for you to jeer at the cowardice of those who have had no such experiences. 263 But I will pass over all that might be accounted for by your poverty, and proceed to my charges against your character itself. For you chose a line of political action (when at length it occurred to you to take up politics too), in pursuance of which, when your country's fortune was good, you lived the life of a hare, in fear and trembling, always expecting a thrashing for the crimes which lay on your conscience; whereas all have seen your boldness amid the misfortunes of others. 264 But when a man plucks up courage at the death of a thousand of his fellow citizens, what does he deserve to suffer at the hands of the living? I have much more to say about him, but I will leave it unsaid. It is not for me, I think, to mention lightly all the infamy and disgrace which I could prove to be connected with him, but only so much as it is not discreditable to myself to speak of.

265 And now review the history of your life and of mine, side by side—good temperedly, Aeschines, not unkindly: and then ask these gentlemen which fortune, of the two, each of them would choose. You taught letters; I attended school. You conducted initiations; I was initiated. You were a clerk; I a member of the Assembly: you, a third-rate actor, I a spectator of the play. You used to be driven from the stage, while I hissed. Your political life has all been lived for the good of our enemies, mine for the good of my country. 266 To pass over all besides, even on this very day, I am being examined with regard to my qualification for a crown—it is already admitted that I am clear of all crimes; while you have already the reputation of a dishonest informer, and for you the issue at stake is whether you are to continue such practices, or to be stopped once for all, through failing to obtain a fifth part of the votes. A good fortune indeed—can you not see?—is that which has accompanied your life, that

you should denounce mine!

267 And now let me read to you the evidence of the public burdens which I have undertaken; and side by side with them, do you, Aeschines, read the speeches which you used to murder—

'I leave the abyss of death and gates of gloom,'[n]

and

'Know that I am not fain ill-news to bring';

and 'evil in evil wise',[n] may you be brought to perdition, by the gods above all, and then by all those here present, villainous citizen, villainous third-rate actor that you are. (—To the clerk—) Read the evidence.

[—The evidence is read—.]

268 Such was I in my relation to the State. And as to my private life, unless you all know that I was open-hearted and generous and at the disposal of all who had need of me, I am silent; I prefer to tell you nothing, and to produce no evidence whatever, to show whether I ransomed some from the enemy, or helped others to give their daughters in marriage, or rendered any such services. 269 For my principle may perhaps be expressed thus. I think that one who has received a kindness ought to remember it all his life; but that the doer of the kindness should forget it once for all; if the former is to behave like a good man, the latter like one free from all meanness. To be always recalling and speaking of one's own benefactions is almost like upbraiding the recipients of them. I will do nothing of the kind, and will not be led into doing so. Whatever be the opinion that has been formed of me in these respects, with that I am content.

270 But I desire to be rid of personal topics, and to say a little more to you about public affairs. For if, Aeschines, you can mention one of all those who dwell beneath the sun above us, Hellene or foreigner, who has not suffered under the absolute sway, first of Philip, and now of Alexander, so be it! I concede that it is my fortune or misfortune, whichever you are pleased to call it, that has been to blame for everything. 271 But if many of those who have never once even seen me or heard my voice have suffered much and terribly—and not individuals alone, but whole cities and nations—how much more just and truthful it is to regard the common fortune (as it seems to be) of all mankind, and a certain stubborn drift of events in the wrong direction, as the cause of these sufferings. 272 Such considerations, however, you discard. You impute the blame to me, whose political life has been lived among my own fellow countrymen—and that, though you know that your slander falls in part (if not entirely) upon all of them, and above all upon yourself. For if, when I took part in the discussion of public affairs, I had had

absolute power, it would have been possible for all of you, the other orators, to lay the blame on me. 273 But if you were present at every meeting of the Assembly; if the city always brought forward questions of policy for public consideration; if at the time my policy appeared the best to every one, and above all to you (for it was certainly from no goodwill that you relinquished to me the hopes, the admiration, the honours, which all attached themselves to my policy at that time, but obviously because the truth was too strong for you, and you had nothing better to propose); then surely you are guilty of monstrous iniquity, in finding fault to-day with a policy, than which, at the time, you could propose nothing better. 274 Among all the rest of mankind, I observe that some such principles as the following have been, as it were, determined and ordained. If a man commits a deliberate crime, indignation and punishment are ordained against him. If he commits an involuntary mistake, instead of punishment, he is to receive pardon. If, without crime or mistake, one who has given himself up wholly to that which seems to be for the advantage of all has, in company with all, failed to achieve success, then it is just, not to reproach or revile such a man, but to sympathize with him. 275 Moreover, it will be seen that all these principles are not so ordained in the laws alone. Nature herself has laid them down in her unwritten law, and in the moral consciousness of mankind. Aeschines, then, has so far surpassed all mankind in brutality and in the art of misrepresentation, that he actually denounces me for things which he himself mentioned under the name of misfortunes.

276 In addition to everything else, as though he had himself always spoken straightforwardly and in loyalty, he bade you keep your eyes on me carefully, and make sure that I did not mislead or deceive you. He called me 'a clever speaker', 'a wizard', 'a sophist', and so on: just as if it followed that when a man had the first word and attributed his own qualities to another, the truth was really as he stated, and his hearers would not inquire further who he himself was, that said such things. But I am sure that you all know this man, and are aware that these qualities belong to him far more than to me. And again, 277 I am quite sure that my cleverness—yes, let the word pass; though I observe that the influence of a speaker depends for the most part on his audience; for in proportion to the welcome and the goodwill which you accord to each speaker is the credit which he obtains for wisdom;—I am sure, I say, that if I too possess any such skill, you will all find it constantly fighting on your behalf in affairs of State, never in opposition to you, never for private ends; while the skill of Aeschines, on the contrary, is employed, not only in upholding the cause of the enemy, but in attacking any one who has annoyed him or come into collision with him anywhere. He neither employs it uprightly, nor to promote the interests of the city. 278 For a good and honourable citizen ought not to require from a jury, who have come into court to represent the interests of the community, that they shall give their sanction to his anger, or his enmity, or any other such passion; nor ought he to come before you to gratify such feelings. It were best that he had no such passions in his nature at all; but if they are really inevitable, then he should keep them tame and subdued. Under what

circumstances, then, should a politician and an orator show passion? 279  
 When any of the vital interests of his country are at stake; when it is  
 with its enemies that the People has to deal: those are the circumstances.  
 For then is the opportunity of a loyal and gallant citizen. But that when  
 he has never to this day demanded my punishment, either in the name of the  
 city or in his own, for any public—nor, I will add, for any private—  
 crime, he should have come here with a trumped-up charge against the grant  
 of a crown and a vote of thanks, and should have spent so many words upon  
 it—that is a sign of personal enmity and jealousy and meanness, not of  
 any good quality. 280 And that he should further have discarded every  
 form of lawsuit against myself, and should have come here to-day to attack  
 the defendant, is the very extremity of baseness. It shows, I think,  
 Aeschines, that your motive in undertaking this suit was your desire, not  
 to exact vengeance for any crime, but to give a display of rhetoric and  
 elocution. Yet it is not his language, Aeschines, that deserves our esteem  
 in an orator, nor the pitch of his voice, but his choice of the aims which  
 the people chooses, his hatred or love of those whom his country loves or  
 hates. 281 He whose heart is so disposed will always speak with loyal  
 intent; but he who serves those from whom the city foresees danger to  
 herself, does not ride at the same anchor as the People, and therefore  
 does not look for safety to the same quarter. But I do, mark you! For I  
 have made the interests of my countrymen my own, and have counted nothing  
 as reserved for my own private advantage. What? 282 You have not done so  
 either? How can that be, when immediately after the battle you went your  
 way as an ambassador to Philip, the author of the calamities which befell  
 your country at that time; and that, despite the fact that until then you  
 always denied this intimacy[n] with him, as every one knows? But what is  
 meant by a deceiver of the city? Is it not one who does not say what he  
 thinks? Upon whom does the herald justly pronounce the curse? Is it not  
 upon such a man as this? With what greater crime can one charge a man who  
 is an orator, than that of saying one thing and thinking another? Such a  
 man you have been found to be. 283 And after this do you open your  
 mouth, or dare to look this audience in the face? Do you imagine that they  
 do not know who you are? or that the slumber of forgetfulness has taken  
 such hold upon them all, that they do not remember the speeches which you  
 used to deliver during the war, when you declared with imprecations and  
 oaths that you had nothing to do with Philip, and that I was bringing this  
 accusation against you, when it was not true, to satisfy my personal  
 enmity? 284 But so soon as the news of the battle had come, you thought  
 no more of all this, but at once avowed and professed that you stood on a  
 footing of friendship and guest-friendship with him; though these were  
 nothing but your hireling-service under other names; for upon what honest  
 or equal basis could Aeschines, the son of Glaucothea the tambourine-  
 player,[n] enjoy the guest-friendship, or the friendship, or the  
 acquaintance of Philip? I cannot see. In fact, you had been hired by him  
 to ruin the interests of these your countrymen. And yet, though your own  
 treason has been so plainly detected—though you have been an informer  
 against yourself after the event—you still revile me, and reproach me  
 with crimes of which, you will find, any one is more guilty than I.

285 Many a great and noble enterprise, Aeschines, did this city undertake and succeed in, inspired by me; and she did not forget them. It is a proof of this, that when, immediately after the event, the People had to elect one who should pronounce the oration over the dead, and you were nominated, they did not elect you, for all your fine voice, nor Demades, who had just negotiated the Peace, nor Hegemon,[n] nor any other member of your party: they elected me. And when you and Pythocles[n] came forward in a brutal and shameless fashion, God knows! and made the same charges against me as you are making again to-day, and abused me, the People elected me even more decidedly. 286 And the reason you know well; but I will tell it you nevertheless. They knew for themselves both the loyalty and zeal which inspired my conduct of affairs, and the iniquity of yourself and your friends. For what you denied with oaths when our cause was prosperous, you admitted in the hour of the city's failure; and those, accordingly, who were only enabled by the misfortunes of their country to express their views without fear, they decided to have been enemies of their own for a long while, though only then did they stand revealed.287 And further, they thought that one who was to pronounce an oration over the dead, and to adorn their valour, should not have come beneath the same roof, nor shared the same libation,[n] as those who were arrayed against them; that he should not there join with those who with their own hands had slain them, in the revel[n] and the triumph-song over the calamities of the Hellenes, and then come home and receive honour—that he should not play the mourner over their fate with his voice, but should grieve for them in his heart. What they required they saw in themselves and in me, but not in you; and this was why they appointed me, and not any of you. 288 Nor, when the people acted thus, did the fathers and brothers of the slain, who were then publicly appointed to conduct the funeral, act otherwise. For since (in accordance with the ordinary custom) they had to hold the funeral-feast in the house of the nearest of kin, as it were, to the slain, they held it at my house, and with reason; for though by birth each was more nearly akin to his dead than I, yet none stood nearer to them all in common. For he who had their life and their success most at heart, had also, when they had suffered what I would they had not, the greatest share of sorrow for them all.

(To the clerk .) 289 Read him the epitaph which the city resolved to inscribe above them at the public cost; (to Aeschines.) that even by these very lines, Aeschines, you may know that you are a man destitute of feeling, a dishonest accuser, an abominable wretch!

—The Inscription—. [n]

These for their country, fighting side by side,  
 By deeds of arms dispelled the foemen's pride.  
 heir lives they saved not, bidding Death make clear—  
 Impartial Judge!—their courage or their fear.  
 For Greece they fought, lest, 'neath the yoke brought low,  
 In thralldom she th' oppressor's scorn should know.  
 Now in the bosom of their fatherland

After their toil they rest—'tis God's command.  
'Tis God's alone from failure free to live;[n]  
Escape from Fate to no man doth He give.

290 Do you hear, Aeschines [in these very lines], 'Tis God's alone from failure free to live'? Not to the statesman has he ascribed the power to secure success for those who strive, but to the gods. Why then, accursed man, do you revile *me*, for our failure, in words which I pray the gods to turn upon the heads of you and yours?

291 But, even after all the other lying accusations which he has brought against me, the thing which amazed me most of all, men of Athens, was that when he mentioned what had befallen the city, he did not think of it as a loyal and upright citizen would have thought. He shed no tears; he felt no emotion of sorrow in his heart: he lifted up his voice, he exulted, he strained his throat, evidently in the belief that he was accusing me, though in truth he was giving us an illustration, to his own discredit, of the utter difference between his feelings and those of others, at the painful events which had taken place. 292 But surely one who professes, as Aeschines professes now, to care for the laws and the constitution, ought to show, if nothing else, at least that he feels the same griefs and the same joys as the People, and has not, by his political profession, ranged himself on the side of their opponents. That you have done the latter is manifest today, when you pretend that the blame for everything is mine, and that it is through me that the city was plunged in trouble: though it was not through my statesmanship or my policy, gentlemen, 293 that you began to help the Hellenes: for were you to grant me this—that it was through me that you had resisted the dominion which was being established over the Hellenes—you would have granted me a testimonial which all those that you have given to others together could not equal. But neither would I make such an assertion; for it would be unjust to you; nor, I am sure, would you concede its truth: and if Aeschines were acting honestly, he would not have been trying to deface and misrepresent the greatest of your glories, in order to satisfy his hatred towards me.

294 But why do I rebuke him for this, when he has made other lying charges against me, which are more outrageous by far? For when a man charges me—I call Heaven and Earth to witness!—with philippizing, what will he not say? By Heracles and all the gods, if one had to inquire truthfully, setting aside all calumny and all expression of animosity, who are in reality the men upon whose heads all would naturally and justly lay the blame for what has taken place, you would find that it was those in each city who resemble Aeschines, not those who resemble me. 295 For they, when Philip's power was weak and quite insignificant—when we repeatedly warned and exhorted you and showed you what was best—they, to satisfy their own avarice, sacrificed the interests of the community, each group deceiving and corrupting their own fellow citizens, until they brought them into bondage. Thus the Thessalians were treated by Daochus, Cineas, and Thrasydaeus; the Arcadians by Cercidas, Hieronymus and Eucampidas; the Argives by Myrtis, Teledamus, and Mnaseas; the Eleans by

Euxitheus, Cleotimus and Aristaechmus; the Messenians by the sons of the godforsaken Philiadas–Neon and Thrasylochus; the Sicymians by Aristratus and Epichares; the Corinthians by Deinarchus and Demaretus; the Megareans by Ptoeodorus, Helixus and Perillus; the Thebans by Timolaus, Theogeiton, and Anemoetas; the Euboeans by Hipparchus and Sosistratus. 296 Daylight will fail me before the list of the traitors is complete. All these, men of Athens, are men who pursue the same designs in their own cities, as my opponents pursue among you–abominable men, flatterers, evil spirits, who have hacked the limbs each of his own fatherland, and like boon companions have pledged away their freedom, first to Philip and now to Alexander; men whose measure of happiness is their belly, and their lowest instincts; while as for freedom, and the refusal to acknowledge any man as lord–the standard and rule of good to the Hellenes of old–they have flung it to the ground.

297 Of this shameful and notorious conspiracy and wickedness–or rather (to speak with all earnestness, men of Athens), of this treason against the freedom of the Hellenes–Athens has been guiltless in the eyes of all men, in consequence of my statesmanship, as I have been guiltless in your eyes. And do you then ask me for what merits I count myself worthy to receive honour? I tell you that at a time when every politician in Hellas had been corrupted–beginning with yourself–[firstly by Philip, and now by Alexander], 298 no opportunity that offered, no generous language, no grand promises, no hopes, no fears, nor any other motive, tempted or induced me to betray one jot of what I believed to be the rights and interests of the city; nor, of all the counsel that I have given to my fellow countrymen, up to this day, has any ever been given (as it has by you) with the scales of the mind inclining to the side of gain, but all out of an upright, honest, uncorrupted soul. I have taken the lead in greater affairs than any man of my own time, and my administration has been sound and honest throughout all. 299 That is why I count myself worthy of honour. But as for the fortifications and entrenchments, for which you ridiculed me, I judge them to be deserving, indeed, of gratitude and commendation–assuredly they are so–but I set them far below my own political services. Not with stones, nor with bricks, did I fortify this city. Not such are the works upon which I pride myself most. But would you inquire honestly wherein my fortifications consist? You will find them in munitions of war, in cities, in countries, in harbours, in ships, in horses, and in men ready to defend my fellow countrymen. 300 These are the defences I have set to protect Attica, so far as by human calculation it could be done; and with these I have fortified our whole territory–not the circuit of the Peiraeus or of the city alone. Nor in fact, did I prove inferior to Philip in calculations–far from it!–or in preparations for war; but the generals of the confederacy,[n] and their forces, proved inferior to him in fortune. Where are the proofs of these things? They are clear and manifest. I bid you consider them.

301 What was the duty of a loyal citizen–one who was acting with all forethought and zeal and uprightness for his country’s good? Was it not to make Euboea the bulwark of Attica on the side of the sea, and Boeotia on

that of the mainland, and on that of the regions towards the Peloponnese, our neighbours[n] in that direction? Was it not to provide for the corn-trade, and to ensure that it should pass along a continuously friendly coast all the way to the Peiraeus? 302 Was it not to preserve the places which were ours—Proconnesus, the Chersonese, Tenedos—by dispatching expeditions to aid them, and proposing and moving resolutions accordingly; and to secure the friendship and alliance of the rest—Byzantium, Tenedos, Euboea? Was it not to take away the greatest of the resources which the enemy possessed, and to add what was lacking to those of the city? 303 All this has been accomplished by my decrees and by the measures which I have taken; and all these measures, men of Athens, will be found by any one who will examine them without jealousy, to have been correctly planned, and executed with entire honesty: the opportunity for each step was not, you will find, neglected or left unrecognized or thrown away by me, and nothing was left undone, which it was within the power and the reasoning capacity of a single man to effect. But if the might of some Divine Power, or the inferiority of our generals, or the wickedness of those who were betraying your cities, or all these things together, continuously injured our whole cause, until they effected its overthrow, how is Demosthenes at fault? 304 Had there been in each of the cities of Hellas one man, such as I was, as I stood at my own post in your midst—nay, if all Thessaly and all Arcadia had each had but one man animated by the same spirit as myself—not one Hellenic people, either beyond or on this side of Thermopylae, would have experienced the evils which they now suffer. 305 All would have been dwelling in liberty and independence, free from all fears, secure and prosperous, each in their own land, rendering thanks for all these great blessings to you and the rest of the Athenian people, through me. But that you may know that in my anxiety to avoid jealousy, I am using language which is far from adequate to the actual facts, (\_to the clerk\_) read me this; and take and recite the list of the expeditions sent out in accordance with my decrees.

[\_The list of expeditions is read\_]—

306 These measures, and others like them, Aeschines, were the measures which it was the duty of a loyal and gallant citizen to take. If they were successful, it was certain that we should be indisputably the strongest power, and that with justice as well as in fact: and now that they have resulted otherwise, we are left with at least an honourable name. No man casts reproach either upon the city, or upon the choice which she made: they do but upbraid Fortune, who decided the issue thus. 307 It was not, God knows, a citizen's duty to abandon his country's interests, to sell his services to her opponents, and cherish the opportunities of the enemy instead of those of his country. Nor was it, on the one hand, to show his malice against the man who had faced the task of proposing and moving measures worthy of the city, and persisting in that intention; while, on the other hand, he remembered and kept his eyes fixed upon any private annoyance which another had caused him: nor was it to maintain a wicked and festering inactivity, as you so often do. 308 Assuredly there is an inactivity that is honest and brings good to the State—the inactivity

which you,[n] the majority of the citizens, observe in all sincerity. But that is not the inactivity of Aeschines. Far from it! He, on the contrary, retires just when he chooses, from public life (and he often chooses to do so), that he may watch for the moment when you will be sated with the continual speeches of the same adviser, or when fortune has thrown some obstacle in your path, or some other disagreeable event has happened (for in the life of man many things are possible); and then, when such an opportunity comes, suddenly, like a gale of wind, out of his retirement he comes forth an orator, with his voice in training, and his phrases and his sentences collected; and these he strings together lucidly, without pausing for breath, though they bring with them no profit, no accession of anything good, but only calamity to one or another of his fellow citizens, and shame to all alike. 309 Surely, Aeschines, if all this practice and study sprang from an honest heart, resolved to pursue the interests of your country, the fruits of it should have been noble and honourable and profitable to all—alliances of cities, supplies of funds, opening of ports,[n] enactment of beneficial laws, acts of opposition to our proved enemies. 310 It was for all such services that men looked in bygone days; and the past has offered, to any loyal and gallant citizen, abundant opportunities of displaying them: but nowhere in the ranks of such men will you ever be found to have stood—not first, nor second, nor third, nor fourth, nor fifth, nor sixth, nor in any position whatsoever; at least, not in any matters whereby your country stood to gain. 311 For what alliance has the city gained by negotiations of yours? What assistance, what fresh access of goodwill or fame? What diplomatic or administrative action of yours has brought new dignity to the city? What department of our home affairs, or our relations with Hellenic and foreign states, over which you have presided, has shown any improvement? Where are your ships? Where are your munitions of war? Where are your dockyards? Where are the walls that you have repaired? Where are your cavalry? Where in the world \_is\_ your sphere of usefulness? What pecuniary assistance have you ever given, as a good and generous fellow citizen,[n] either to rich or poor? 312 'But, my good sir, 'you say, 'if I have done none of these things, I have at least given my loyalty and goodwill.' Where? When? Why, even at a time when all who ever opened their lips upon the platform contributed voluntarily to save the city, till, last of all, Aristonicus gave what he had collected to enable him to regain his civil rights—even then, most iniquitous of men! you never came forward or made any contribution whatever: and assuredly it was not from poverty, when you had inherited more than five talents out of the estate of your father-in-law Philo, and had received two talents subscribed by the leaders of the Naval Boards,[n] for your damaging attack upon my Naval Law.[n] 313 But I will say no more about this, lest by passing from subject to subject I should break away from the matter in hand. It is at least plain that your failure to contribute was not due to your poverty, but to your anxiety to do nothing in opposition to those whose interest is the guide of your whole public life. On what occasions, then, do your spirit and your brilliancy show themselves? When something must be done to injure your fellow countrymen—then your voice is most glorious, your memory most perfect; then you are a prince of actors, a Theocrines[n] on the tragic stage!

314 Again, you have recalled the gallant men of old, and you do well to do so. Yet it is not just, men of Athens, to take advantage of the good feeling which you may be relied upon to entertain towards the dead, in order to examine me before you by their standard, and compare me, who am still living amongst you, with them. 315 Who in all the world does not know that against the living there is always more or less of secret jealousy, while none, not even their enemies, hate the dead any more? And am I, in spite of this law of nature, to be judged and examined to-day by the standard of those who were before me? By no means! It would be neither just nor fair, Aeschines. But let me be compared with yourself, or with any of those who have adopted the same policy as yourself, and are still alive. 316 And consider this also. Which of these alternatives is the more honourable? Which is better for the city?—that the good services done by men of former times—tremendous, nay even beyond all description though they may be—should be made an excuse for exposing to ingratitude and contumely those that are rendered to the present generation? or that all who act in loyalty should have a share in the honours and the kindness which our fellow citizens dispense? 317 Aye, and (if I must say this after all) the policy and the principles which I have adopted will be found, if rightly viewed, to resemble and to have the same aims as those of the men who in that age received praise; while yours resemble those of the dishonest assailants of such persons in those days. For in their time also there were obviously persons who disparaged the living and praised the men of old, acting in the same malicious way as yourself. 318 Do you say then, that I am in no way like them? But are you like them, Aeschines? or your brother? or any other orator of the present day? For my part, I should say, 'None.' Nay, my good sir—to use no other epithet—compare the living with the living, their contemporaries, as men do in every other matter, whether they are comparing poets or choruses or competitors in the games. 319 Because Philammon was not so powerful as Glaucus of Carystus[n] and some other athletes of former times, he did not leave Olympia uncrowned: but because he fought better than all who entered against him, he was crowned and proclaimed victor. Do you likewise examine me beside the orators of the day—beside yourself, beside any one in the world that you choose. 320 I fear no man's rivalry. For, while the city was still free to choose the best course, and all alike could compete with one another in loyalty to their country, I was found the best adviser of them all. It was by my laws, by my decrees, by my diplomacy, that all was effected. Not one of your party appeared anywhere, unless some insult was to be offered to your fellow countrymen. But when there happened, what I would had never happened—when it was not statesmen that were called to the front, but those who would do the bidding of a master, those who were anxious to earn wages by injuring their country, and to flatter a stranger—then, along with every member of your party, you were found at your post, the grand and resplendent owner of a stud;[n] while I was weak, I confess, yet more loyal to my fellow countrymen than you. 321 Two characteristics, men of Athens, a citizen of a respectable character (for this is perhaps the least invidious phrase that I can apply to myself) must be able to show: when he enjoys authority, he must maintain to the

end the policy whose aims are noble action and the pre-eminence of his country: and at all times and in every phase of fortune he must remain loyal. For this depends upon his own nature; while his power and his influence are determined by external causes. And in me, you will find, this loyalty has persisted unalloyed. For mark this. 322 Not when my surrender was demanded, not when I was called to account before the Amphictyons, not in face either of threats or of promises, not when these accursed men were hounded on against me like wild beasts, have I ever been false to my loyalty towards you. For from the very first, I chose the straight and honest path in public life: I chose to foster the honour, the supremacy, the good name of my country, to seek to enhance them, and to stand or fall with them. 323 I do not walk through the market, cheerful and exultant over the success of strangers, holding out my hand and giving the good tidings to any whom I expect to report my conduct yonder, but shuddering, groaning, bowing myself to the earth, when I hear of the city's good fortune, as do these impious men, who make a mock of the city—not remembering that in so doing they are mocking themselves—while they direct their gaze abroad, and, whenever another has gained success through the failure of the Hellenes, belaud that state of things, and declare that we must see that it endures for all time.

324 Never, O all ye gods, may any of you consent to their desire! If it can be, may you implant even in these men a better mind and heart. But if they are verily beyond all cure, then bring them and them alone to utter and early destruction, by land and sea. And to us who remain, grant the speediest release from the fears that hang over us, and safety that naught can shake!

#### FOOTNOTES

[1] Some writers suppose that it was at the meeting in the spring of 339. The evidence is not conclusive, but appears to point to the date given here.

#### NOTES

##### ON THE NAVAL BOARDS

1. \_who praise your forefathers\_. The advocates of war with Persia had doubtless appealed to the memory of Marathon and Salamis, and the old position of Athens as the champion of Greece against Persia.

10, 11. The argument is this: 'If a war with Persia needed a special kind of force, we could not prepare for it without being detected: but as all wars need the same kind of force, our preparations need rouse no suspicion in Persia particularly.'

\_acknowledged foes\_: i.e. probably Thebes, or the revolted allies of Athens, with whom a disadvantageous peace had, perhaps, just been made. It is not, however, impossible that Philip also is in the orator's mind; for

though at the time he was probably engaged in war with the Illyrians and Paeonians, his quarrel with Athens in regard to Amphipolis had not been settled. The Olynthians may also be thought of. (See *Introd. to Phil. I* and *Olynthiacs.*)

12. *rhapsodies.* The rhapsodes who went about Greece reciting Homer and other poets had lost the distinction they once enjoyed, and 'rhapsody' became a synonym for idle declamation.

14. *a bold speech.*: i.e. a demand for instant war, helped out by rhetorical praises of the men of old.

16. *unmarried heiresses and orphans.* These would be incapable of discharging the duties of the trierarchy, though their estates were liable for the war-tax. Partners were probably exempted, when none of them possessed so large a share in the common property as would render him liable for trierarchy.

*property outside Attica.* According to the terms made by Athens with her allies when the 'Second Delian League' was formed in 378, Athens undertook that no Athenian should hold property in an allied State. But this condition had been broken, and the multiplication of Athenian estates [Greek: *κλήρουχια*] in allied territories had been one of the causes of the war with the allies.

*unable to contribute.*: e. g. owing to no longer possessing the estate which he had when the assessment was made.

17. *to associate, &c.* The sections which contained a very rich man were to have poor men included in it, so that the total wealth of every section might be the same, and the distribution of the burden between the sections fair.

18. *the first hundred, &c.* Demosthenes thinks of the fleet as composed, according to need, of 100, 200, or 300 vessels, and treats each hundred as a separate squadron, to be separately divided among the Boards.

*by lot.* In this and other clauses of his proposal, Demosthenes stipulates for the use of the lot ([Greek: *συνκλήρουσαι*], [Greek: *ἐπικλήρουσαι*]) to avoid all unfair selection. It is only in the distribution of duties among the smaller sections within each Board that assignment by arrangement ([Greek: *ἀποδουναι*], a word suggesting distribution according to fitness or convenience) is to be allowed.

19. *taxable capital.* ([Greek: *τιμῆμα*]). The war-tax and the trierarchic burdens were assessed on a valuation of the contributor's property. Upon this valuation of his taxable capital he paid the percentage required. (The old view that he was taxed not upon his capital, as valued, but upon a fraction of it varying with his wealth, rests upon

an interpretation of passages in the Speeches against Aphobus, which is open to grave question.) The total amount of the single valuations was the 'estimated taxable capital of the country' ([Greek: *timēma tēs chōras*]). This, in the case of the trierarchy, would be the aggregate amount of the valuations of the 1,200 wealthiest men, viz. 6,000 talents. (Of course the capital taxable for the war-tax would be considerably larger. Even at a time when the prosperity of Attica was much lower, in 378-377 B.C., it was nearly 6,000 talents, according to Polybius, ii. 62. 6.)

20. A tabular statement will make this plain:—

Persons	Total capital taxable	Ships responsible for each ship
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100	12 60 tal.	
200	6 30 "	
300	4 20 "	

The percentage payable on the taxable capital was of course higher, the larger the number of ships required. Each ship appears to have cost on the average a talent to equip. The percentages in the three cases contained in the table would therefore be 1-2/3, 3-1/3, and 5, respectively. (Compare 27.)

21.  *fittings ... in arrear*. Apparently former trierarchs had not always given back the fittings of their vessels, which had either been provided at the expense of the State, or lent to the trierarchs by the State.

23. *wards* ([Greek: *trittyes*]). The trittys or ward was one-third of a tribe.

25. *you see ... city*. The Assembly met on the Pnyx, whence there was a view of the Acropolis and of the greater part of the ancient city.

*prophets*. The Athenian populace seems always to have been liable to the influence of soothsayers, who professed to utter oracles from the gods, particularly when war was threatening. This was so (e. g.) at the time of the Peloponnesian War (Thucyd. ii. 8, v. 26), and the soothsayer is delightfully caricatured by Aristophanes in the *Birds* and elsewhere.

29. *two hundred ships ... one hundred were Athenian*. In the Speech on the Crown, 238, Demosthenes gives the numbers as 300 and 200. Perhaps a transcriber at an early stage in the history of the text accidentally wrote HH (the symbol for 200) instead of HHH, in the case of the first number, and a later scribe then 'corrected' the second number into H instead of HH. The numbers given by Herodotus are 378 and 180, and, for the Persian ships, 1,207.

31. *against Egypt*, which was now in rebellion against Artaxerxes. Orontas, Satrap of Mysia, was more or less constantly in revolt during this period.

32. *even more certainly* [Greek: *palai*]: lit. 'long ago'. The transition from temporal to logical priority is paralleled in certain uses of other temporal adverbs, e.g. [Greek: *euthys*] (Aristotle, *Poet.* v), and [Greek: *scholē*] (of which, as Weil notes, [Greek: *palai*] is the exact opposite).

34. *sins against Hellas*. This refers to the support given to the Persian invaders by Thebes in the Persian Wars (Herod. viii. 34).

#### FOR THE MEGALOPOLITANS

4. *Plataeae* (which had been overthrown by the enemies of Athens in the course of the Peloponnesian War, but rebuilt, with the aid of Sparta, in 378) was destroyed by Thebes in 373-372. About the same time Thebes destroyed Thespieae, which, like Plataeae, was well-disposed towards Athens; and in 370 the Thebans massacred the male population of Orchomenus, and sold the women and children into slavery.

11. *Oropus* had sometimes belonged to Thebes and sometimes to Athens. In 366 it was taken from Athens by Themison, tyrant of Eretria (exactly opposite Oropus, on the coast of Euboea), and placed in the hands of Thebes until the ownership should be decided. Thebes retained it until it was restored to Athens by Philip in 338.

12. *when all the Peloponnesians, &c.* The reference seems to be to the year 370, shortly after the battle of Leuctra, when the Peloponnesian States sought the protection of Athens against Sparta, and, being refused, became allies of Thebes (Diodorus xv. 62). In 369 Athens made an alliance with Sparta.

14. *saved the Spartans*. See last note. Athens also assisted the Spartans at Mantinea in 362.

*the Thebans*. In 378 and the following years Athens assisted Thebes against the Spartans under Agesilaus and Cleombrotus.

*the Euboeans*. In 358 or 357 Euboea succeeded in obtaining freedom from the domination of Thebes by the aid of Athenian troops under Timotheus.

16. *Triphylia*, a district between Elis and Messenia, was the subject of a long-standing dispute between the Eleans and the Arcadians, and seems to have been in the hands of the latter since (about) 368.

*Tricaranum*, a fortress in the territory of Phlius, had been seized by the Argives in 369, and used as a centre from which incursions were made

into Phliasian territory.

20. *allies of Thebes*: in order to preserve the balance of power between Thebes and Sparta.

21. *the Theban confederacy*.. The reference is particularly to the Arcadian allies of Thebes, but the wider expression perhaps suggests a general policy of a more ambitious kind.

22. *you, I think, know*.. He refers to the older members of the Assembly, who would remember the tyrannical conduct of Sparta during the period of her supremacy (the first quarter of the fourth century B.C.).

27. *pillars*.. The terms of an alliance were usually recorded upon pillars erected by each State on some site fixed by agreement or custom.

28. *in the war*.: i.e. the 'Sacred War', against the Phocians.

#### FOR THE FREEDOM OF THE RHODIANS

3. *now it will be seen*.: i.e. if you come to a right decision, and help the Rhodians.

5. *the Egyptians*.. See Speech on Naval Boards, 31 n.

6. *to advise you*.: i.e. in the Speech on the Naval Boards (see especially 10, 11 of that Speech).

9. *Ariobarzanes*., Satrap of the Hellespont, joined in the general revolt of the princes of Asia Minor against Persia in 362, at first secretly (as though making war against other satraps) but afterwards openly. Timotheus was sent to help him, on the understanding that he must not break the Peace of Antalcidas (378 B.C.), according to which the Greek cities in Asia were to belong to the king, but the rest were to be independent (except that Athens was to retain Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros). When Ariobarzanes broke out in open revolt, Timotheus could not help him without breaking the first provision; but the Persian occupation of Samos was itself a violation of the second, and he was therefore justified in relieving the town.

11. *while he is in her neighbourhood*.. Artaxerxes almost certainly went in person to Egypt about this time. (That he went before 346 is proved by Isocrates, *Philippus*., 101; and he was no doubt expected to go, even before he went.) The alternative rendering, 'since he is still to be a neighbouring power to herself,' is less good, since he would be this, whether he conquered Egypt or not.

14. *Rhodians who are now in possession*.: i.e. the oligarchs, who held the town with the help of Caria.

\_some of their fellow-citizens\_: i.e. some of the democratic party.

15. \_official patron\_ ([Greek: \_proxenos\_]). The 'official patron' of another State in Athens was necessarily an Athenian, and so differed from the modern consul, whom he otherwise resembled in many ways (cf. Phillipson, *International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome*., vol. i, pp. 147-56).

17. \_publicly provided\_: i.e. in treaties between the States.

22. \_when our democracy\_, &c.: i.e. in 404, when, at the conclusion of the Peloponnesian War, the tyranny of the Thirty was established, and a very large number of democratic citizens were driven into exile. The Argives refused the Spartan demand for the surrender of some of these to the Thirty (Diodorus xiv. 6).

23. \_one who is a barbarian-eye, and a woman\_ ([Greek: \_barbaron anthr\_pon kai tauta gynaika\_]). This has been taken to refer (1) to Artaxerxes and Artemisia. But [Greek: \_kai tauta\_] cannot be simply [Greek: \_pros tont\_o\_], and [Greek: \_kai tauta gynaika\_] must refer to the same person as [Greek: \_barbaron anthr\_pon\_]; (2) to Artaxerxes alone, the words [Greek: \_kai tauta gynaika\_] being a gratuitous insult such as it was customary for Athenians to level at any Persian; (3) to Artemisia alone, [Greek: anthr\_pon] being feminine here as often. It is not possible to decide certainly between (2) and (3). Artemisia is more prominent in the speech than the king, but it is the king who is referred to in the next sentence.

24. \_rendered Athens weak\_. The success of Sparta in the Peloponnesian War was rendered possible, to a great extent, by the supply of funds from Persia. In 401 Cyrus made his famous expedition against Artaxerxes II, and Clearchus (with other generals) commanded the Greek troops which assisted him. The death of Cyrus in the battle of Cunaxa in 401 put an end to his rebellion.

25. \_rights of the rest of the world\_. Weil suggests that it may have been argued that to intervene in Rhodian affairs would be to break the treaty made with the allies in 355 (about), at the end of the Social War, whereby their independence was guaranteed.

26. \_Chalcedon\_ was on the Asiatic shore of the Bosphorus, and therefore by the Peace of Antalcidas belonged to the king (see n. on 9). By the same treaty, Selymbria, on the north coast of the Propontis, ought to have been independent. The Byzantines, who had obtained their independence of Athens in the Social War, were extending their influence greatly at this time.

27. \_the treaty\_: again the Peace of Antalcidas.

\_even if there actually are such advisers\_: or, 'even if any one actually

asserts the existence of such persons.'

29. *two treaties*.. The first must be the Peace of Callias (444 B.C.), the terms of which are given in the Speech on the Embassy, 273. The second was the Peace of Antalcidas.

30. *the knowledge of what is right*.. The parallel passage in 1 seems to confirm this rendering, rather than the alternative, 'the intention to do what is right.'

33. *oligarchical*.. This expression is partly directed at those who, in opposing the exiled democrats, supported the oligarchs of Rhodes; and it may be partly explained by the fact that the policy of Eubulus, who wished to avoid all interferences which might lead to war, was particularly satisfactory to the wealthier classes in Athens. But it was a common practice to accuse an opponent of anti-democratic sentiments, and of trying to get the better of the people by illegitimate means (cf. Speech on Embassy, 314, &c.).

35. Cf. Speech on Naval Boards, 41.

#### THE FIRST PHILIPPIC

3. *the war with Sparta*.. Probably the Boeotian War (378-371 B.C.), when Athens supported Thebes against Sparta.

*in defence of the right*.. The attempt of the Spartans to conquer Boeotia was a violation of the Peace of Antalcidas (see n. on Speech for Rhodians, 6). But Demosthenes' expression may be quite general in its meaning.

4. *tribes*.. Probably refers especially to the Thracians (see Introd. to the Speech). The Paeonian and Illyrian chieftains also made alliance with Athens in 356.

17. *to Euboea*.. See Speech for Megalopolitans, 14 n.

*to Haliartus*.: in 395, when Athens sent a force to aid the Thebans against the Spartans under Lysander. (For other allusions see Introd. to the Speech.)

19. *paper-armies* ([Greek: *epistolimaious ... dunameis*]): lit. 'armies existing in dispatches.'

24. *Athens once maintained*., &c. The reference is to the Corinthian war of 394-387 B.C. The Athenian general Iphicrates organized a mercenary force of peltasts in support of Corinth, and did great damage to Sparta; he was succeeded in the command by Chabrias. Nothing more is certainly known of Polystratus than is told us here, though he may be referred to in the Speech against Leptines, 84, as receiving honours from Athens.

to Artabazus. In 356 Chares was sent to oppose the revolted allies of Athens, but being short of funds, assisted Artabazus in his rebellion against Persia, and was richly rewarded. (See Introd. to Speech on Naval Boards.)

25. spectators of these mysteries of generalship. ([Greek: epoptai t\_on ] [Greek: \_strat\_egoumen\_on\_]). The word [Greek: \_epopt.es\_] is chiefly used of spectators of the mysteries, and is here applied sarcastically to the citizens whom Demosthenes desires to see what has hitherto been a hidden thing from them—the conduct of their generals.

26. ten captains and generals, &c.. There was one general ([Greek: \_strat\_egos\_]) and one captain ([Greek: \_taxiarchos\_]) of infantry, and one general of cavalry ([Greek: \_phylarchos\_]), for each of the ten tribes. There were two regular masters of the horse ([Greek: \_hipparchoi\_]), and a third appointed for the special command of the Athenian troops in Lemnos. The generals ([Greek: \_strat\_egoi\_]) had various civil duties, among them the organization of the military processions at the Panathenaea and other great festivals.

27. Menelaus. Either a Macedonian chieftain, who had assisted the Athenian commander Timotheus against Poteidaea in 364, and probably received Athenian citizenship; or else Philip's half-brother Menelaus. But there is no evidence that the latter ever served in the Athenian forces, and probably the former is meant.

31. Etesian winds. These blow strongly from the north over the Aegean from July to September.

33. the whole force in its entirety. So with Butcher's punctuation. But it is perhaps better to place a comma after [Greek: \_dynamin\_], and translate, 'after making ready ... soldiers, ships, cavalry—the entire force complete—you bind them,' &c.

34. See Introd. to the Speech. Geraestus was the southernmost most point of Euboea. The 'sacred trireme', the Paralus, when conveying the Athenian deputation to the Festival of Delos, put in on its way at Marathon, where there was an altar of the Delian Apollo, to offer sacrifice.

35. The festival of the Panathenaea was managed by the Athlothetae, who were appointed by lot, and consequently could not be specially qualified; whereas the stewards ([Greek: \_epimel\_etai\_]) who assisted the Archon in the management of the Dionysia, were at this time elected, presumably on the ground of their fitness.

an amount of trouble. ([Greek: \_ochlon\_]). Possibly 'a larger crowd'. But there is no point in mentioning the crowd; the point lies in the pains taken; and Thucyd. vi. 24 ([Greek: \_upo tou ochl\_odous t\_es parhaskeu.es\_]) confirms the rendering given.

36. The choregus paid the expenses of a chorus at the Dionysiac (and certain other) festivals. The gymnasiarchs, or stewards of the games, managed the games and torch-races which formed part of the Panathenaea and many other festivals. The offices were imposed by law upon men who possessed a certain estate, but any one who felt that another could bear the burden better might challenge him either to perform the duty or to exchange property with him. (See Appendix to Goodwin's edition of Demosthenes' Speech against Meidias.)

\_independent freedmen\_: lit. 'dwellers apart,' i.e. freedmen who no longer lived with the master whose slaves they had been.

43. \_empty ships\_. If these are the ships referred to in Olynth. III, Section 4, the date of the First Philippic must be later than October 351 B.C.

46. \_promises\_. The 'promises of Chares' became almost proverbial.

47. \_examination\_, or 'audit'. A general, like every other responsible official, had to report his proceedings, at the end of his term of office, to a Board of Auditors, and might be prosecuted before a jury by any one who was dissatisfied with his report.

48. \_negotiating with Sparta, &c\_. As a matter of fact, Philip had evidently come to an understanding with Thebes by this time; but he may have caused some such rumours to be spread, in order to get rid of any possible opposition from Sparta. The 'breaking-up of the free states' probably refers to the desire of Sparta to destroy Megalopolis, which was in alliance with Thebes.

\_sent ambassadors to the king\_. Arrian, ii. 14, mentions a letter of Darius to Alexander, recalling how Philip had been in friendship and alliance with Artaxerxes Ochus. It is possible, therefore, that the rumour to which Demosthenes alludes had some foundation.

#### THE FIRST OLYNTHIAC

(\_Note\_.—Most of the allusions in the Olynthiacs are explained by the

## Introduction to the First Philippic.)

4. \_power over everything, open or secret\_. The translation generally approved, 'power to publish or conceal his designs,' is hardly possible. The [Greek: kai] in the phrase [Greek: rh\_eta kai aporr\_eta] (or [Greek: arr\_eta]) cannot be taken disjunctively here, when it is always conjunctive in this phrase elsewhere, the whole phrase being virtually

equivalent to 'everything whatever'.

5. *How he treated, &c.* The scholiast says that Philip killed the traitors at Amphipolis first, saying that if they had not been faithful to their own countrymen, they were not likely to be faithful to himself; and that the traitors at Pydna, finding that they were not likely to be spared, took sanctuary, and having been persuaded to surrender themselves on promise of their lives, were executed nevertheless. Neither story is confirmed by other evidence.

8. *In aid of the Euboeans:* in 358 or 357. See Speech for Megalopolitans, 14 n.

13. *Magnesia.* There seems to have been a town of the same name as the district.

*Attacked the Olynthians.* This refers to the short invasion of 351 (see vol. i, p. 70), not to that which is the subject of the Olynthiacs.

*Arybbas* was King of the Molossi, and uncle of Philip's wife, Olympias. Nothing is known of this expedition against him. He was deposed by Philip in 343. (See vol. ii, p. 3.)

17. *These towns:* the towns of the Chalcidic peninsula, over which Olynthus had acquired influence. This sentence shows that Olynthus itself had not yet been attacked.

26. *But, my good Sir, &c.* This must be the objection of an imaginary opponent. It can hardly be taken (as seems to be intended by Butcher) as Demosthenes' reply to the question, 'Or some other power?' ('But, my good Sir, the other power will not want to help him.') There is, however, much to be said for Sandys's punctuation, [Greek: *ean m\_e bo\_eth\_es\_eth\_umeis\_e allos tis*], 'unless you or some other power go to their aid.' After the death of Onomarchus in 352, the Phocians were incapable of withstanding invasion without help.

#### THE SECOND OLYNTHIAC

14. *Timotheus, &c.* In 364 an Athenian force under Timotheus invaded the territory of the Olynthian League, and took Torone, Poteidaea, and other towns, with the help of Perdiccas, King of Macedonia.

*ruling dynasty:* i.e. the dynasty of Lycophron and Peitholaus at Pherae. (See *Introd. to First Philippic.*)

28. *this war:* i.e. the war with Philip generally. The reference is supposed to be to the conduct of Chares in 356 (cf. *Phil. I, Section 24 ii.*), though in fact it was against the revolted allies, not against Philip, that he had been sent. Sigeum was a favourite resort of Chares, and it is conjectured that he may have obtained possession of Lampsacus

and Sigeum (both on the Asiatic shore of the Hellespont) in 356. The explanation of the conduct of the generals is to be found in the fact that in Asia Minor they could freely appropriate prizes of war and plunder, since under the terms of the Peace of Antalcidas, Athens could claim nothing in Asia for her own.

29. *\_taxes by Boards\_*. Each of the Boards constituted in 378-377 for the collection of the war-tax (see vol. i, p. 31) had a leader or chairman ([Greek: *\_hegem\_on\_*]), one of the 300 richest men in Athens, whose duty it was to advance the sums required by the State, recovering them afterwards from the other members of the Boards. Probably the Three Hundred were divided equally among the 100 Boards, a leader, a 'second', and a 'third' (Speech on Crown, 103) being assigned to each. The 'general' here perhaps corresponds to the 'second'.

### THE THIRD OLYNTHIAC

4. *\_two or three years ago\_* (lit. 'this is the third or fourth year since). It was in November 352 B.C. If the present Speech was delivered before November 349, not quite three years would have elapsed. (The Greek words, [Greek: *triton he tetarton etos touti*], must, on the analogy of the Speech against Meidias, 13, against Stephanus, II. 13, and against Aphobus, I. 24, &c., mean 'two or three', not 'three or four years ago'). The vagueness of the expression is more likely to be due to the date of the Third Olynthiac being not far short of three years from that of the siege of Heraeon Teichos, than to the double-dating (on the one hand by actual lapse of time, and on the other by archon-years—from July to July—or by military campaigning seasons) which most commentators assume to be intended here, but which seems to me over-subtle and unlike Demosthenes.

*\_that year\_*: i.e. the archonship of Aristodemus, which ran from July 352 B.C. to July 351.

5. *\_the mysteries\_*. These were celebrated from the 14th to the 27th of Boedromion (late in September).

*\_Charidemus\_*, of Oreus in Euboea, was a mercenary leader who had served many masters at different times—Athens, Olynthus, Cotys, and Cersobleptes—and had played most of them false at some time or other. But he was given the citizenship in 357 for the part which he had taken in effecting the cession of the Chersonese to Athens, and was a favourite with the people. He was sent on the occasion here referred to with ten ships, for which he was to find mercenary soldiers.

6. *\_with might ... power\_*. A quotation, probably from the text of the treaty of alliance between Athens and Olynthus.

8. *\_funds of the Phocians are exhausted\_*. The Phocian leader Phalaecus had been using the temple-treasures of Delphi, but they were now

exhausted.

10. *\_a Legislative Commission\_*: i.e. a Special Commission on the model of the regular Commission which was appointed annually from the jurors for the year (if the Assembly so decreed), and before which those who wished to make or to oppose changes in the laws appeared, the proceedings taking the form of a prosecution and defence of the laws in question. The Assembly itself did not legislate, though it passed decrees, which had to be consistent with the existing laws. As regards legislation, it merely decided whether in any given year alterations in the laws should or should not be allowed.

11. *\_malingerers\_*. The scholiast says that the choregi were persuaded to choose persons as members of their choruses, in order to enable them to escape military service, choreutae being legally exempted. Other exemptions also existed.

12. *\_persons who proposed them\_*. This can only refer to Eubulus and his party.

20. *\_Corinthians and Megareans\_*. From the pseudo-Demosthenic Speech on the Constitution ([Greek: *\_pe\_ri\_suntaxe\_os\_*]) and from Philochorus (quoted in the Scholia of Didymus upon that Speech) it appears that the Athenians had in 350 invaded Megara, under the general Ephialtes, and forced the Megareans to agree to a delimitation of certain land sacred to the two goddesses of Eleusis, which the Megareans had violated, perhaps for some years past (see Speech against Aristocrates, 212). A scholiast also refers to the omission by Corinth to invite the Athenians to the Isthmian games, in consequence of which the Athenians sent an armed force to attend the games. Probably this was also a recent occurrence, and due to an understanding between Corinth and Megara.

21. *\_my own namesake\_*: i.e. Demosthenes, who was a distinguished general during the Peloponnesian War, and perished in the Sicilian expedition.

24. *\_for forty-five years\_*: i.e. between the Persian and Peloponnesian Wars, 476-431 B.C.

*\_the king\_*: i.e. Perdiccas II, who, however, took the side of Sparta shortly after the beginning of the Peloponnesian War. He died in 413. (The date of the beginning of his reign is unknown, but he did not become sole king of the whole of Macedonia until 436.)

27. *\_Spartans had been ruined\_*: sc. by the battles of Leuctra (in 371) and Mantinea (in 362).

*\_Thebans had their hands full\_*, owing to the war with the Phocians, from 356 onwards.

28. *in the war*., when Athens joined Thebes against Sparta (in 378). 'The allies' are those members of the Second Delian League (formed in 378) who had been lost in the Social War which ended in or about 355, when Athens was at peace with Thebes and Sparta. (See Introduction, vol. i, p. 9.)

31. *procession at the Boedromia*.. The Boedromia was a festival held in September in honour of Apollo and Artemis Agrotera, Probably a procession was not a regular part of the festival at this time. The importance which the populace attached to such processions is illustrated by the Speech against Timocrates, 161.

34. *is it then paid service, &c.*.: almost, 'do you then suggest that we should *earn* our money?'

35. *adding or subtracting*.: sc. from the sums dispensed by the State to the citizens.

*somebody's mercenaries*.. The reference is probably to the successes of Charidemus when first sent (see Introd. to Olynthiacs).

#### ON THE PEACE

5. *disturbances in Euboea*.. Plutarchus of Eretria applied for Athenian aid against Callias of Chalcis, who was attacking him with the aid of Macedonian troops. Demosthenes was strongly opposed to granting the request, but it was supported by Eubulus and Meidias, and a force was sent under Phocion, probably early in 348 (though the chronology has been much debated, and some place the expedition in 350 or 349). Owing to the premature action or the treachery of Plutarchus at Tamynae (where the Athenian army was attacked), Phocion had some difficulty in winning a victory. Plutarchus afterwards seized a number of Athenian soldiers, and Athens had actually to ransom them. Phocion's successor, Molossus, was unsuccessful. When peace was made in the summer of 348, the Euboeans became for the most part independent of Athens, and were regarded with ill-feeling by Athens for some years. There is no proof that the proposers of the expedition were bribed, as Demosthenes alleges.

6. *Neoptolemus*.. See Speech on Embassy, 12, 315.

8. *public service*.: i.e. as trierarch or choregus or gymnasiarch, &c. See n. on Phil. I. 36.

10. *there were some* : i.e. Aeschines and his colleagues. (See Introd.)

*Thespieae and Plataeae*.. See Speech for Megalopolitans, Section 4 n.

14. *self-styled Amphictyons*.. The Amphictyonic Council represented the ancient Amphictyonic League of Hellenic tribes (now differing widely in importance, but equally represented on the Council), and was supreme in

all matters affecting the Temple of Apollo at Delphi. (See n. on Speech on Crown, 148.) The Council summoned by Philip was open to criticism (1) because only certain members of it were present, of whom the Thebans and Thessalians were the chief, (2) because Philip had been given the vote of the dispossessed Phocians.

15. *however stupid, &c.* It had been conventional for over a century to apply this adjective to the Boeotians, and therefore to the Thebans. For a more favourable view, see W. Rhys Roberts, *Ancient Boeotians*, chap. i.

16. *Oropus*. See Speech for Megalopolitans, ii n.

18. *Argives, &c.* See Speech for Megalopolitans throughout (with *Introd.*).

*those whom they have exiled*: especially the refugees from Orchomenus and Coroneia. See vol. i, p. 124.

*Phocian fugitives*. The Amphictyonic Council had recently declared that these had been guilty of sacrilege, and might be seized wherever they might be.

20. *all that they themselves had toiled for*: i.e. the conquest of the Phocians in the Sacred War.

22. *some persons*: i.e. Aeschines and others who tried to excuse Philip's treatment of the Phocians to the Athenian people.

23. *admission ... Delphi*. The Phocians had formerly contrived their exclusion from the Amphictyonic meeting and from the temple and oracle of Delphi. The Council now restored them, and excluded the Phocians.

24. *refuse to submit*: reading [Greek: (*oud*) *otioun upomeinai*.] The insertion of [Greek: *oude*.] (after Cobet) seems necessary, [Greek: *otioun upomeinai*.] alone would mean 'face any risk', but this would be contradicted by the next clause. To translate, 'who think that we should face any risk, but do not see that the risk would be one of war,' is to narrow the meaning of [Greek: *otioun*.] unduly.

25. *Treaty of Peace*: i.e. the Peace of Philocrates.

*Cardians*. The Athenians claimed Cardia (the key of the Chersonese on the Thracian side) as an ally, though in fact it was expressly excluded from the towns ceded to Athens by Cersobleptes in 357, and had made alliance with Philip in 352.

*prince of Caria*. See Speech for Rhodians (with *Introd.*).

\_drive our vessels to shore\_: a regular form of ancient piracy (see Speech on Chersonese, 28). The Byzantines drove the Athenian corn-ships into their own harbour. The victims were relieved of their money or their corn.

\_shadow at Delphi\_: i.e. the empty privilege (as Demosthenes here chooses to represent it) of membership of the Amphictyonic League and Council, now claimed by Philip.

## THE SECOND PHILIPPIC

1. \_sympathetic\_: i.e. towards other Greek states, desirous of securing independence.

2. \_Alexander\_, &c. Alexander of Macedon was sent by Mardonius, the Persian commander, to offer Athens alliance with Persia on favourable terms. Demosthenes has confused the order of events, and speaks as if this message was brought before the battle of Salamis. The Athenians left the city twice, before the battle of Salamis and before that of Plataeae; it was after Salamis that Alexander was sent (Herod. viii. 140, &c.).

14. \_fortify Elateia\_. This would be a menace to Thebes (cf. Speech on the Crown, 174, 175). Elateia commands the road from Thermopylae to Thebes.

19. \_well-balanced\_ ([Greek: \_s\_ophronousi\_]), or 'free from passion', i.e. not liable to be carried away by ambition or cupidity as the Thebans were. This is different from mere 'good sense' ([Greek: \_syphronein\_, noun echea\_]). For Theban 'stupidity', see Speech on Peace, 15 (and n.).

22. \_Council of Ten\_ ([Greek: \_dekadarchian\_]). It is clear that some sort of oligarchical government, nominated by Philip, is referred to; but the relation of this to the tetrarchies mentioned in the Speech on the Chersonese, 26, as established by Philip, is uncertain. These corresponded to the four tribes or divisions of Thessaly (Thessaliothis, Phthiotis, Pelasgiotis, Histiaeotis); and this is confirmed by a statement in Theopompus' forty-fourth book, to which Harpocration (s.v. [Greek: \_dekadarchia\_]) refers. Harpocration states that Philip did not establish a decarchy in Thessaly; and if he is right, then either (a) Demosthenes purposely used an inaccurate word, in order to suggest to the Messenians the idea of a government like that of the Councils of Ten established some sixty years before by Sparta in the towns subject to her; or (b) the text is wrong, and [Greek: \_dekadarchian\_] is a misreading of [Greek: DARCHIAN], in which [Greek: D] was the numeral (= 4), and the whole stood for [Greek: \_tetrarchian\_]. As to (a), it is difficult to suppose that the Messenians would not know what had happened in Thessaly so well that the innuendo would fall flat. There is no evidence that 'decarchy' could be used simply as a synonym for 'oligarchy'. As to (b), the supposed corruption is possible; but then we are left with [Greek: \_tetrarchian\_] where we should expect [Greek: \_tetrarchias\_]: for there is no parallel to [Greek: \_tetrarchia\_] (sing.) in the sense of 'a system of tetrarchies'.

It is, however, quite possible that Demosthenes was thinking especially of the Thessalians of Pherae, and of the particular tetrarchy established over them: and this seems on the whole the best solution. If, on the other hand, Harpocraton is wrong, the reference here may be to a Council of Ten, either established previously to the tetrarchies, and superseded by them, or else coexistent with and superior to them; in either case, since the singular is used, this decadarchy must have been a single government over the whole of Thessaly (or perhaps of the district about Pherae only), not a number of Councils, one in each city or division of Thessaly. (Theopompus' forty-fourth book probably dealt with 342 B.C., two years after the present speech, though before the Speech on the Chersonese; but we are not told that he assigned the establishment of the tetrarchies to that year.)

25. *\_find yourselves slaves\_:* lit. 'find your master.'

28. *\_by yourselves\_:* i.e. in the absence of the ambassadors from Philip and other States.

*\_who conveyed the promises\_:* i.e. Ctesiphon, Aristodemus, and Neoptolemus (see Speech on Embassy, 12, 94, 315, &c.): but Demosthenes has probably Aeschines also in view.

30. *\_water-drinker\_:* See Speech on Embassy, 46.

32. *\_secure myself as good a hearing\_:* Most editions accept this rendering of [Greek: *\_emaut\_o logon poi\_es-o\_*]. But though [Greek: *\_logon didonai\_*] = 'grant a hearing,' and [Greek: *\_logon tychein\_*] = 'get a hearing,' [Greek: *\_logon eaut\_o poiein\_*] is strange for 'secure oneself a hearing', and the passage regularly quoted from the Speech against Aristocrates, 81, is not parallel, since [Greek: *\_tout\_o\_*] in that passage is not a reflexive pronoun, and [Greek: *\_logon pepoi\_eke\_*] almost = [Greek: *\_logon ded\_oki\_*]. Possibly the text is corrupt, and we should either read [Greek: *\_psogon\_*] (with H. Richards) or [Greek: *\_emautou\_*] ('make you take as much account of me as of my opponents').

*\_further claim\_:* since an attack on the part of Demosthenes would incite them to make out a plausible case for Philip once more, and so earn his gratitude.

#### ON THE EMBASSY

[The literal translation of the title is 'On the misconduct as ambassador'.]

1. *\_drawing your lots\_:* The jurors who were to serve in each trial were selected by lot out of the total number of jurors for the year.

2. *\_one of those\_*: i.e. Timarchus (see *Introd.*).

*\_supremacy\_*. The sovereignty of the people was exercised to a great extent through the law-courts, the jury being always large enough to be fairly representative of popular opinion, though probably there was generally a rather disproportionate preponderance of poorer men among the jurors, the payment being insufficient to attract others. (See *Introduction*, vol. i, pp. 18, 19, 23.)

11. *\_the Ten Thousand\_*: the General Assembly of the Arcadians at Megalopolis.

13. *\_he came to me\_, &c.* Aeschines denies this, saying that it would have been absurd, when he knew that Demosthenes and Philocrates had acted together throughout (see *Introd.*).

16. *\_in the very presence\_, &c.*: contrast *Speech on the Crown*,

23 (and see n. there). Aeschines states that he was in fact replying to inflammatory speeches made by orators who pointed to the Propylaea, and appealed to the memory of ancestral exploits; and that he simply urged that it was possible for the Athenians to copy the wisdom of their forefathers without giving way to an unseasonable passion for strife.

17. *\_had again acted\_*: i.e. as on the First Embassy, if the reading is correct (or perhaps, 'had committed a fresh series of wrongful acts'). But possibly [*Greek: \_peprhakot\_on\_*] is right, 'had sold fresh concessions' to Philip.

20. Aeschines replies that every one expected Philip to turn against Thebes; and that for the rest, he was only reporting the gossip of the Macedonian camp, where the representatives of many states were gathered together, and not making promises at all. It is noteworthy, however, that in the *Speech on the Peace*, 10, shortly after the events in question, when the speeches made would be fresh in every one's memory, Demosthenes gives the same account of his opponent's assertions; and Aeschines probably said something very like what is attributed to him.

21. *\_debt due to the god\_*: i.e. the value of the Temple-treasure of Delphi, which the Phocians had plundered.

30. *\_for however contemptible\_, &c.* The argument seems to be this. 'You must not say that a man like Aeschines could not have brought about such vast results. Athens may employ inferior men, but any one who represents Athens has to deal with great affairs, and so his acts may have great consequences. And again, although it may have been Philip who actually ruined the Phocians, and although Aeschines could never have done it alone, still he did his best to help.'

31. *\_the Town Hall\_, or Prytaneum, where the Prytanes (the acting*

Committee of the Council) met, and other magistrates had their offices.

\_Timagoras\_ was accused (according to Xenophon) by his colleague Leon of having conspired with Pelopidas of Thebes against the interests of Athens, when on a mission to the court of Artaxerxes in 357. In 137 Demosthenes also states that he received large sums of money from Artaxerxes.

36. Aeschines denies that he wrote the letter for Philip, and his denial is fairly convincing.

40. \_a talent\_. According to Aristotle (\_Eth. Nic\_. v. 7) the conventional amount payable as ransom was one mina per head. But from 169 it appears that the Macedonians sometimes asked for more than this.

\_laudable ambition\_: i.e. to get credit for having thought of the ransom of the prisoners.

47. \_handed in\_: either to the Clerk or to the Proedroi (the committee of Chairmen of the Assembly).

51. Aeschines states that Philip's invitation was declined because it was suggested that Philip would keep the soldiers sent as hostages.

65. \_on our way to Delphi\_. Demosthenes had been one of the Athenian representatives at the meeting of the Amphictyonic Council at Delphi this year.

\_gave its vote\_, &c. After the battle of Aegospotami at the end of the Peloponnesian War, the representative of Thebes proposed to the Spartans and their allies that Athens should be destroyed and its inhabitants sold into slavery.

70. \_read this law over\_: i.e. that the herald might proclaim it after him.

72. For the Spartans see 76. The Phocians had treated the Athenians badly when Proxenus was sent to Thermopylae (see Introd. to Speech on Peace). Hegesippus may have opposed the acceptance of Philip's invitation to the Athenians to join him. Aeschines (on the Embassy, 137, 138) mentions no names in connexion with the refusal, but represents it as the sacrifice of a unique opportunity of saving the Phocians (cf. 51 n.).

76. \_deceit and cunning, and of nothing else\_ ([Greek: \_pasa apat.e\_]). The argument is, 'Aeschines will try to allege wrongful acts on the part of the Phocians; but there was no time for such acts in the five days; and this proves that there were no such acts to justify their ruin, and that their overthrow was due to nothing but trickery.' This is better than to translate 'every kind of deceit and trickery was concocted for the ruin of the Phocians'; for this is not the point, nor is it what would be inferred from the fact that there was only a five-days' interval between

the speech of Aeschines and the capitulation of the Phocians. There is no need to emend to [Greek: *h.e pasa apat.e*].

*on account of the Peace*: i.e. of the negotiations for the Peace, before it was finally arranged.

*all that they wished*: viz. the restoration of the Temple of Delphi to their kinsmen, the Dorians of Mount Parnassus.

78. *four whole months*: in reality, three months and a few days.

81. *Phocian people*: i.e. those who were left in Phocis, as distinct from the exiles just referred to.

86. *of Diophantus*. In 352, when Philip had been repulsed by Onomarchus, Diophantus proposed that public thanksgivings should be held (see *Introd. to First Philippic*).

*of Callisthenes*: in 346, after the Phocians had surrendered to Philip.

*the sacrifice to Heracles*: perhaps one of the two festivals which were respectively held at Marathon and at Cynosarges.

99. *constitutional*: lit. 'an excuse for a citizen,' under a constitution by which no one was compelled to enter public life, and any one who did so without the requisite capacity had to take the responsibility for his errors.

103. *impeached*. An impeachment was brought before the Council (or, more rarely, the Assembly). The procedure was only applied to cases of extraordinary gravity, and particularly to what would now be called cases of treason.

114. *by torture*. The evidence of slaves might be given under torture, in response to a challenge from one or other of the parties to a suit. The most diverse opinions as to the value of such evidence are expressed by the orators, according to the requirements of their case. The consent of both sides was necessary; and in a very large number of cases, one side or the other appears to have refused to allow evidence to be taken in this way.

*was going*: i.e. to Philip.

118. *accept his discharge*. There seems to be a play on two senses of the verb [Greek: *aphienai*], viz. 'to discharge from the obligations of a contract', and 'to acquit'.

120. *Why, this is the finest*, &c. The expression ([Greek: *touto gar esti to lamprhon*]) recurs in 279, a closely parallel passage, and need not be regarded as an interpolation in either case. The interpretation

given seems slightly preferable, and is approved by Weil. It is almost equally possible to translate the Greek by 'such is the brilliant defence which he offers'; but perhaps this does not suit 279 so well.

\_stand up\_. Apparently Aeschines declined the invitation, which was quite within the custom of the Athenian courts. Either of the principal parties could ask the other questions, and have the answers taken down as evidence.

\_cases that have all\_, &c. The reference is to the prosecution of Timarchus, when advanced in age, for offences committed in early youth. There may also be an allusion to Aeschines' early career as an actor.

122. \_declined on oath\_. An elected official could refuse to serve, if he took an oath that there was some good reason (such as illness) for excusing him.

126. \_though not elected\_. Aeschines (on the Embassy, 94) replies that in fact the commission was renewed at a second meeting of the Assembly, and that he was then well enough to go and was elected. (That there was a second election of ambassadors is confirmed by Demosthenes' own statement in 172 of the present speech, that he himself was twice elected and twice refused to serve.)

128. \_Thesmothetae\_: the six archons who did not hold the special offices of archon eponymus, polemarch, or king archon.

\_Aeschines went\_, &c. To have refused to be present would really have been to make a political demonstration against Thebes, which would have had perilous results. Aeschines defends himself on the ground that in his view the Peace was no disadvantage to Athens, so that he might well join in the honours paid to the Gods.

129. \_Metroon\_. The temple of the Great Mother (Cybele), which was the Athenian record-office.

\_the name of Aeschines\_: i.e. its removal from the list of ambassadors.

131. \_in their interest\_. If the words are not corrupt, the meaning is probably 'in the interest of Philip and the Thebans'; or possibly, 'in reference to these matters.'

136. \_as his informant\_. The text is possibly corrupt, though as it stands it might perhaps bear the meaning given, if [Greek: hyparchei] were understood with [Greek: autos]. Others (with or without emendation) take the sense to be 'to manage his business ... just as he would manage it in person'.

137. For Timagoras see 31 n.

144. *\_summon Philip's envoys\_:* i.e. in order to report the decision of the Assembly, and so close the matter.

147. *\_ask him whether\_, &c.* The argument seems to be this 'if Aeschines was the ambassador of a city which had been victorious against Philip, the latter would naturally wish to buy easy terms of peace; and Aeschines might undertake to procure such terms, without committing a particularly heinous offence, since he would only be getting some advantage for himself out of the general good fortune of his country. But to secure advantages for himself at his country's expense, when his country was already suffering disaster, would be far worse. And as Aeschines complains that the generals had incurred disaster, he convicts himself of the worse offence.'

148. The *\_Tilphossaeum\_* was apparently a mountain near Lake Copais in Boeotia. The town which Strabo calls Tilphusium may have been on the mountain. Neones, or Neon, was a Phocian village; Hedyleion, a mountain in Boeotia.

149. *\_Ah! he will say\_, &c.* Either the words are interpolated, or there is a lacuna. The objection is nowhere refuted.

156. Doriscus, &c. The places mentioned did not really belong to Athens, but to Cersobleptes, who was being assisted by Athenian troops, so that, strictly speaking, Philip was within his rights; and in fact (according to Aeschines), Cersobleptes and the Sacred Mountain were taken by Philip the day before the Athenians and their allies swore to the Peace at Athens.

162. *\_Eucleides\_* had been sent to protest against Philip's attack upon Cersobleptes in 346 (see vol. i, p. 122). Philip replied that he had not yet been officially informed by the Athenian ambassadors of the conclusion of the Peace, and was therefore not yet bound by it.

166. *\_procure their ransom\_:* i.e. from the various Macedonians who had captured them, or to whom they had been given or sold.

176. *\_committed to writing\_, &c.* Formal evidence (as distinct from the mere assertions of a speaker) was written down, and the witness was asked to swear to it. A witness who was called upon might swear that he had no knowledge of the matter in question ([Greek: *\_exomnysthai\_*]). By writing down his evidence and swearing to it, Demosthenes took the risk of prosecution for perjury.

180. *\_might be proved in countless ways\_:* or 'would need a speech of infinite length'. But as [Greek: *\_kai\_*] and not [Greek: *\_de\_*] follows, I slightly prefer the former rendering. (The latter is supported by the Third Philippic, 60, but there the next clause is connected by [Greek: *\_de\_*].)

*\_Ergophilus\_* was heavily fined in 362 (see Speech against Aristocrates,

104); Cephisodotus in 358 (ibid. 167, and Aeschines against Ctesiphon, 52); Timomachus went into exile in 360 to escape condemnation (against Aristocrates, 115, &c.). Ergocles was perhaps the friend of Thrasybulas (see Lysias, Orations xxviii, xxix), and may have been condemned for his conduct in Thrace, as well as for malversation at Halicarnassus. Dionysius is unknown.

187. *has got beyond*, &c.: an ironical way of saying that he has so much overdone his application to himself of the title of (prospective) 'benefactor' of Athens, that another word (e.g. 'deceiver') would be more appropriate. The word [Greek: *psychrhon*] is (at least by Greek literary critics) applied to strong expressions out of place, and here also, probably, of an exaggerated phrase which falls flat. This is perhaps the best interpretation of a very difficult passage.

191. For Timagoras, see 31 n. Tharrex and Smicythus are unknown. Adeimantus was one of the generals at Aegospotami, the only Athenian prisoner spared by Lysander, and on that account suspected of treason by the Athenians, and prosecuted by Conon (called 'the elder', to distinguish him from his grandson, who was a contemporary of Demosthenes).

194. *guest-friend*. The term ([Greek: *xenos*]) was applied to the relationship (more formal than that of simple friendship) between citizens of different states, who were bound together by ties of hospitality and mutual goodwill.

196. *the Thirty*: i.e. the 'Thirty Tyrants' who ruled Athens (with the support of Sparta) for a few months in 403. See n. on 277.

198. Aeschines warmly denies this story. He says that Demosthenes tried to bribe Aristophanes of Olynthus to swear that it was true, and that the woman was his own wife. He adds that the jury, on an appeal from Eubulus, refused to let Demosthenes complete the story.

199. *initiations*: see Speech on Crown, 259 ff., with notes.

200. *played the rogue*. The scholiast says that clerks were sometimes bribed to alter the laws and decrees which they read to the Court; and a magistrates' clerk had doubtless plenty of opportunities for conniving at petty frauds.

204. *should not have been sworn to*. This is out of chronological order as it stands, and emendations have been proposed, but unnecessarily.

209. *would not have him for your representative*: in the question about Athenian rights at Delos. See Introduction to the Speech.

213. *I have no further time, &c*: lit. 'no one will pour water for me' into the water-clock, by which all trials were regulated.

221. *consider*, &c. There is an anacoluthon in the Greek, which may be literally translated, 'Consider, if, where I who am absolutely guiltless was afraid of being ruined by them—what ought these men themselves, the actual criminals, to suffer?'

222. *get money out of you*: i.e. to be bought off.

230. *choregus and trierarch*: see *Introd. to Speech on Naval Boards*, and n. on *Philippic I.* 36.

231. *all was well* ([Greek: *eupenespai*]). The reading is almost certainly wrong. Weil rightly demands some word contrasting with [Greek: *agnoein*] ('did not understand his country') in the corresponding clause.

237. *vase-cases*: i.e. boxes to contain bottles of oil or perfume for toilet use.

245. *the cock-pit*. That this is the meaning seems to be proved by the words of Aeschines (against Timarchus, 53); otherwise the natural translation would be 'to the bird-market'. Cocks were no doubt sold in the bird-market; but Aeschines refers directly to cock-fighting, not to the purchase of the birds.

246. *hack-writers*: lit. 'speech-writers,' who composed speeches for litigants, and no doubt padded them out with quotations from poets, as well as with rhetorical commonplaces. Demosthenes taunts Aeschines particularly with ransacking unfamiliar plays, instead of those he knew well.

249. *reared up... greatness*: or possibly, 'reared up all these sons of hers.'

*Hero-Physician*. See *Speech on the Crown*, 129 n.

*Round Chamber*, in the Prytaneum or Town Hall (see 31 n.).

252. *at the risk of his own life*. He tried to avoid the risk by feigning madness. Salamis was in the hands of the Megareans, and the Athenians had become so weary of their unsuccessful attempts to recover it, that they decreed the penalty of death upon any one who proposed to make a fresh attempt. The verses, however, which are quoted in the text, are probably derived not from the poem which Solon composed for this purpose, but from another of his political poems.

255. *with a cap on your head*. Plutarch (Solon 82 c) says that 'Solon burst into the market-place suddenly, with a cap on his head'. The cap was intended to suggest that he had just returned from Salamis, since it was the custom to wear a cap only when on a journey, or in case of illness (of. Plato, *Republic*, iii. 406 d.). There may possibly be an allusion also to Aeschines' own alleged sickness (136 above), but this is very

doubtful. The words more probably mean, 'however closely you copy Solon' (as you copied his attitude in speaking), 'when you run about declaiming against me.'

257. *accepted the challenge.*. At the examination before the Board of Auditors (Logistae) the question was almost certainly put, whether any one present wished to challenge the report of the ambassador under examination.

259. *claim* ([Greek: *axioumenoi*]): or, 'are thought worthy'; but the first sense is much better in the parallel passage in 295, and this 'middle' use seems to be sufficiently attested, though the active voice is used in the same sense in 338.

260. *paramount position.*: i.e. among the tribes of North Greece (Magnetes, Perrhaebi, &c.).

264. *concluded the war, &c.*. In 383 B.C. In fact, however, they only obtained peace by joining the Spartan alliance.

271. *Arthmius.*: see Philippic III. 42 (and note).

273. *Callias.*, in 444 B.C. Cf. Speech for the Rhodians, 29. The Chelidonian Islands lay off the south coast of Lycia, the Cyanean rocks at the northern mouth of the Bosphorus.

277. *Epicrates* was sent as ambassador to Persia early in the fourth century, and received large presents. According to Plutarch he escaped condemnation; but he may have been tried more than once. The comic poets make fun of his long beard.

*who brought the people back from the Peiraeus.* Thrasybulus occupied the Peiraeus in 403, secured the expulsion of the Thirty Tyrants from Athens, and restored the democracy.

278. *the decree.*: i.e. the decree by which Epicrates and his colleagues were condemned.

279. *for this is the splendid thing.*: cf. 120 n.

280. *exiled* and *punished*. We should perhaps (with Weil) read [Greek: *.e*] ('or') for [Greek: *kai*] ('and').

*descendant of Harmodius.*: i.e. Proxenus, who had been only recently condemned, and is therefore not named.

281. *another priestess.* According to the scholiast, the reference is to Ninus, a priestess of Sabazios, who was prosecuted by Meneclis for making love-potions for young men. The connexion of this offence with the

meetings of the initiated is left to be understood.

282. *the burden undertaken.* Such burdens as the duties of choregus, trierarch, &c., might be voluntarily undertaken, as they were by Demosthenes (see n. on Philippic I. 36).

287. *Cyrebion.*, or 'Light-as-Chaff', was the nickname of Epicrates, Aeschines' brother-in-law (not the Epicrates of 277). *as a reveller.*, no doubt in some Dionysiac revel, in which it was not considered decent to take part without a mask. (The original purpose of masks, however, was not to conceal one's identity from motives of shame, though Demosthenes suggests it as a motive here.)

*were water flowing upstream.* A half-proverbial expression implying that the world was being turned upside-down, when such a person could prosecute for such offences.

290. *Hegesilaus.* was one of the generals sent to Euboea to help Plutarchus; cf. Speech on the Peace, 5 n. He was accused of abetting Plutarchus in the deception which he practised upon Athens. For Thrasybulus, cf. 277.

*the primary question.*: i.e. of the guilt or innocence of the defendant. If he was pronounced guilty, the question of sentence (or damages) had to be argued and decided separately.

295. *claim to be.*: cf. n. on 259.

*churning the butter.* ([Greek: etyrheue]): i.e. concocting the plot. (For the metaphor cf. Aristophanes, *Knights* 479.)

299. *Zeus and Dione.* These names show that the oracles referred to were probably given at Dodona.

303. *oath of the young soldiers.* When the young Athenian came of age, he received a shield and spear in the temple of Aglaurus, and swore to defend his country and to uphold its constitution (cf. Lycurgus, *Against Leocrates.*, 76).

314. *keeping step with Pythocles.*, who was a tall man, while Aeschines was short.

326. *Drymus and Panactum.* were on the border between Boeotia and Attica. Nothing else is known of the expedition.

332. *Chares.* See nn. on Philippic I. 24, 46; Olynthiac II. 28, and Introductions.

333. *of one of whom.*, &c.: i.e. of Philip (see 111 ff., and Introd. to Speech on the Peace).

342. *Euthykrates*.. See *Introd. to Olynthiacs*.

#### ON THE CHERSONESE

9. The argument is, 'if Philip is not committing hostilities so long as he keeps away from Attica, Diopieithes is not doing so, so long as he keeps away from Macedonia, and only operates in Thrace.'

*drive the vessels*., &c. See *Speech on the Peace*, 25 n.

14. *passing the time*.: i.e. until a convenient season for an attack arrives.

*those who are on the spot*.: i.e. in Thrace, and who had doubtless sent messages to Athens. Others think that the words mean 'those who are here from Thrace'.

*Etesian winds*.. See *First Philippic*, 31 n.

*infatuation*.: i.e. hostility to Athens.

16. *punish the settlers*.: i.e. those who were sent with Diopieithes and demanded admission to Cardia.

18. *Chalcis*., in Euboea (see *Introd.*).

21. *keep our hands ... revenues*.: a reference to the distributions of Festival-Money (see *Third Olynthiac*, with *Introduction and notes*).

*contributions of the allies*.. This interpretation seems on the whole better warranted than 'contributions promised to Diopieithes'.

24. *I consent to any penalty*.: lit. 'I assess my own penalty at anything'—a metaphor from the practice of the law-courts, which allowed a convicted prisoner to propose an alternative penalty to that suggested by the prosecutor.

*Erythraeans*.: Erythrae was on the coast of Asia Minor, opposite Chios.

25. *benevolences*.: the same word as was used of the forced contributions levied by English kings.

27. *surrendering*.: i.e. to his soldiers, to be plundered (if the phrase is meant to convey anything but a vague accusation).

28. *wax-tablet*.: i.e. a summons.

*so many ships*.. The critics of Diopieithes must have proposed the sending of a definite force to control him.

29. *\_a dispatch-boat\_*: lit. 'the *\_Paralus\_*'. This ship, and the *\_Salaminia\_*, were the two vessels regularly employed on public errands.

*\_spitefulness\_*: i.e. towards Diopieithes.

30. *\_Chares\_*: see references in n. on *Speech on Embassy*, 332.

*\_Aristophon\_*. The reference may be to his conduct as general in the early days of the war with Philip about Amphipolis. His activity as a statesman began as far back as 403, and he was one of the most influential politicians in Athens from about 361 to 354.

31. *\_losing something\_*: *\_sc\_*. a scapegoat whom you could punish.

40. *\_Euthykrates\_*, &c. See *Introd. to Olynthiacs*.

44. *\_wretched hamlets\_* ([Greek: *kak.on*]): lit. 'evils' or 'miseries'; but the word is possibly corrupt. (The original reading may possibly have been [Greek: *kalyb.on*].) According to the scholiast, *Drongilum* and *Cabyle* are near Amphipolis and the *Strymon*; but others assign different localities to them. *Masteira* is quite unknown.

45. *\_pit of destruction\_* ([Greek: *barhathrh.o*]). This was literally the pit into which the bodies of condemned criminals were thrown at Athens.

*\_silos\_*: underground store-houses for grain, such as were found in *Ceos* not many years ago, and may still be in use.

46. *\_irremediable\_* ([Greek: *an.ekeston*]). The reading of two good manuscripts [Greek: *aneikaston*] (otherwise only known as a late Greek word) may be correct. If so, it may mean 'unparalleled', or 'inexplicable'.

57. The meaning is, that by denouncing those who propose active measures now, they are preparing the way in order to prosecute them so soon as you find the war burdensome; whereas they should themselves be prosecuted for letting things go as far as they have gone.

59. *\_Oreus\_*. See *Introd.*

*\_Pheraeans\_*, in 344. See *Introd. to Second Philippic*; and cf. *Third Philippic*, 12.

*\_compromise\_*. Slavery seems to be ironically regarded as a compromise between activity and quiescence.

63. *\_robbed of at an earlier period\_*. The sense must either be this, or else 'all that you have lost in open war'. In either case emendation is

required.

70. *trierarch and choregus*.. Demosthenes was choregus in 348, and trierarch in 363, 359, and 357.

74. *Timotheus*.. in 358, when Athens liberated Euboea from the Thebans. Cf. First Philippic, 17, First Olynthiac, 8. The effect of Timotheus' speech was such that the expedition started within three days. (Speech against Androtion, 14.)

75. *best counsel that he can*.. The text is probably corrupt; but this was probably the sense of the original.

### THE THIRD PHILIPPIC

2. *actively at work*..: the reference is to Diopieithes (see Speech on Chersonese, 57).

4, 5. Passages are repeated from the Speech on the Chersonese, 4, and First Philippic, 2.

8. *not to defraud us*..: i.e. by making statements which he is not prepared to act upon.

11. *as though visiting his allies*.. This is not true, though envoys from the Phocians, as from most other Greek states of importance, were in Philip's camp. With the whole passage, cf. Speech on Embassy, 20 ff.

12. *Pherae*.. See Speech on Chersonese, 59 n. For Oreus see Introd. to Speech on Chersonese, and 33 and 59 ff. of this Speech.

15. *Serrhium, &c*.. See Introd. to Speech on Peace.

*he had sworn to a Peace*.. This is untrue; see Speech on Embassy, 156, where it is part of the charge against Aeschines' party, that they had enabled Philip to take these places *before* he had sworn to the Peace.

16. *religion*..: with special reference here to the sanctity of the oath.

*into the Chersonese*..: i.e. to help Cardia. The claim of Athens to Cardia was not good, and it appears from the Speech of Hegesippus against Halonnesus, 2, that the Athenians had recognized the independence of the town.

18. *if anything should happen*..: e.g. the outbreak of open war, or (more probably) a defeat.

23. *seventy-three years*..: i.e. 476-404 B. c.

\_thirty years save one\_: i.e. 404-376 B.C. (in the latter year Chabrias defeated the Spartans off Naxos).

\_battle of Leucira\_: in 371 B.C.

24. \_disturb the established order\_: i.e. by establishing oligarchical governments in place of democracy.

26. \_in the Thracian region\_: strictly, in Chalcidice and the neighbourhood. See Introd. to Olynthiacs.

\_robbed their very cities of their governments\_. This is preferable to the (grammatically) equally possible rendering, 'robbed them of their constitutions and their cities,' as it suits the facts better. Philip seems to have substituted tetrarchies for separate city-states. (See Speech on Chersonese, 26, and Second Philippic, 22 n.)

27. \_Ambracia\_. See Introd. to Speech on Chersonese. \_Elis\_: Introd. to Speech on Embassy. \_Megara\_: Speech on Embassy, 294, 295.

32. \_Pythian games\_. See Introd. to Speech on Peace. In 342 Philip sent a deputy to preside in his name.

33, 34. See Introd. to Speech on Chersonese. Echinus was a Theban colony in Thessaly, on the north coast of the Malian Gulf.

42. \_Arthmius\_, &c. (cf. Speech on Embassy, 271). Zeleia was in the Troad, near Cyzicus. Arthmius was apparently proxenus of Athens at Zeleia, and as such had probably certain rights at Athens, of which the decree deprived him; so that Demosthenes' remarks at the beginning of 44 are slightly misleading.

46. At the end of this section two versions are imperfectly blended, and it does not appear what were the contents of the document. Some suppose that the insertion 'He reads from the document' is an early conjectural interpolation.

49. \_because he leads\_, &c. Philip did, in fact, bring the Macedonian heavy infantry to great perfection for the purposes of a pitched battle, though the decisive action was generally that of the cavalry. But the other troops which Demosthenes names would enable him to execute rapid movements with success. The use of light-armed troops had already been developed by the Athenian general, Iphicrates.

50. \_with such advantages\_: lit. 'under these conditions' (\_not\_ 'to crown all', nor 'at the head of these troops').

52. Contrast Speech on Naval Boards, Section 9.

57 ff. See Introd. to Speech on Embassy.

59. Euphraeus had been a disciple of Plato, and an adviser of Perdiccas, Philip's elder brother. It was he who recommended Perdiccas to entrust the government of part of Macedonia to Philip, whom he afterwards so strongly opposed.

72. *\_embassies\_*. See Introd. to Speech on Chersonese.

#### ON THE CROWN

1. *\_to take counsel\_*, &c. Aeschines had asked the jury to refuse Demosthenes a hearing, or at least to require him to follow the same order of treatment as himself.

3. *\_unpleasant\_*. Many render [Greek: *duocheres*] 'inauspicious', 'ill-omened'; but as we do not know exactly what was in Demosthenes' mind, it is better not to give the word a meaning which it does not bear elsewhere. It may, however, mean 'vexatious'.

11. *\_knave as you are\_*, &c. The assonance of the original might perhaps be partly reproduced by rendering 'evil-minded as you are, it was yet a very simple-minded idea that your mind conceived', &c.

12. *\_it does not enable the State\_*: lit. 'it is not possible for the State.' The point is that the prosecution of Ctesiphon, while expressing the malice of Aeschines towards Demosthenes, does not enable the State to punish Demosthenes himself for his alleged offences, since any penalty inflicted would fall on Ctesiphon.

13. *\_to debar another\_*, &c. This probably refers to the attempt to deprive Demosthenes of a hearing, not (as some have thought) to the attempt to get so heavy a fine inflicted upon Ctesiphon that he would be unable to pay it, and would therefore lose his rights as a citizen.

17. *\_ascribed to me\_*, &c. Aeschines was anxious, in view of the existing state of feeling at Athens, to disown his part in connexion with the Peace of Philocrates; while Demosthenes undoubtedly assisted Philocrates in the earlier of the negotiations and discussions which led to the Peace.

*\_appropriate\_*. 'The recapitulation of the history is not a mere argumentative necessity, but has a moral fitness also; in fact, the whole defence of Demosthenes resolves itself into a proof that he only acted in the spirit of Athenian history' (Simcox).

18. *\_When the Phocian war had broken out\_*: i.e. in 356-5. Demosthenes made his first speech in the Assembly in 354.

*\_those who detested the Spartans\_*: i.e. the Messenians and Arcadians.

\_those who had previously governed\_, &c.: e.g. the oligarchies which had governed with the help of Sparta in Phlius and Mantinea, and were overthrown after the battle of Leuctra.

19. \_would be forced\_, &c. This is a misrepresentation, since Philip and the Thebans had been in alliance for some time, and Thebes had no such grounds for apprehending evil from Philip, as would make her apply to Athens.

21. \_Aristodemus\_, &c. See Introd. to Speech on the Peace. As a matter of fact, Demosthenes acted with Philocrates at least down to the return of the First Embassy, and himself proposed to crown Aristodemus for his services (Aeschines, On the Embassy, 15-17).

23. \_the Hellenes bad all\_, &c. It is not easy to reconcile this passage with 16 of the Speech on the Embassy, from which it appears that representatives of other states were present in Athens; but these so-called envoys may have been private visitors, and in any case there was no real hope of uniting Greece against Philip.

24. \_Eurybatus\_ is said to have been sent as an envoy by Croesus to Cyrus, and to have turned traitor. The name came to be proverbial.

27. \_those strongholds\_. See Introd. to Speech on the Peace.

28. \_But they would have watched\_, &c. The passage has been taken in several ways: (1) 'They would have had to watch,' &c., and this would have been discreditable to Athens; (2) 'They would have watched,' &c., i.e. they would not have been excluded, as you desired, in any case; (3) 'But, you say, they would have paid two obols apiece,' and the city would have gained this. The sentence which follows favours (3), but perhaps (2) is best. The petty interests of the city would include (from the point of view assumed by Aeschines) the abstention from showing civility to the enemy's envoys. The two-obol (threepenny) seats were the cheapest.

30. \_three whole months\_. In fact the ambassadors were only absent from Athens about ten weeks altogether.

\_equally well\_. The reading ([Greek: homoios]) is probably wrong; but if it is right, this must be the meaning.

32. \_as you did before\_, in 352. See Introd. to First Philippic.

36. \_decree of Callisthenes\_. This ordered the bringing in of effects from the country. See Speech on Embassy, 86, 125.

41. \_property in Boeotia\_. See Speech on Embassy, 145.

43. \_their hopes\_: sc. of the humiliation of Thebes.

\_and gladly\_: i.e. they were glad to be free from a danger which (though remotely) threatened themselves, as the next sentence explains. I can see no good reason for taking the participle [Greek: polemoumenoi] as concessive ('\_although\_ they also,' &c.).

48. For Lasthenes see Introd. to Olynthiacs. Timolaus probably contrived the surrender of Thebes after the battle of Chaeroneia. Eudicus is unknown. Simus invoked Philip's aid against the tyrants at Pherae in 352 (see Introd. to First Philippic). Aristratus was tyrant of Sicyon, and made alliance with Philip in 338. For Perillus, see Speech on Embassy, Section 295.

50. \_stale dregs\_: strictly the remains, and especially the wine left in the cups, from the previous night's feast; here the long-admitted responsibility of Aeschines for the Peace of 346.

63. \_Dolopes\_: a small tribe living to the south-west of Thessaly.

65. \_free constitutions\_. This refers especially to the Thessalians, who had been placed under tetrarchies (see Philippic III. 26).

70. \_Aristophon\_. See Speech on Chersonese, 30 n. Diopieithes is perhaps Diopieithes of Sphettus (mentioned by Hypereides, Speech against Euxenippus, 39), not the general sent by Athens to the Chersonese.

71. For the events mentioned in this section, see Introd. to Speech on the Embassy.

72. \_Mysian booty\_. A proverbial expression derived from the helpless condition of Mysia (according to legend) in the absence of its king, Telephus.

79. \_to the Peloponnese\_, in 344 (see Introd. to Second Philippic): \_to Euboea\_ in 343-2 (see Introd. to Speech on Embassy); \_to Oreus\_, &c., in 341 (see Introd. to this Speech).

82. \_as their patron\_, i.e. as consul (or official patron) of Oreus in Athens. See n. on Speech for Rhodians, 15. civil rights. See vol. i, p. 52.

83. \_this was already the second proclamation\_: i.e. the proclamation in accordance with the decree of Aristonicus. It is indeed just possible that the reference is to the proposal of Ctesiphon, 'for this is now the second proclamation,' &c. If so, we should have to assume that the proclamation under the decree of Demomeles in 338 was prevented by the disaster of Chaeroneia. But the first sentence of 120 is against this (see Goodwin's edition \_ad loc\_.).

94. \_inconsiderate conduct\_: i.e. in joining the revolt of the Athenian allies in 356.

96. *when the Spartans*, &c. The section refers to the events of 395.

*Deceleian War*: i.e. the last part of the Peloponnesian War (413-404 B.C.), when Deceleia (in Attica) was occupied by the Spartans.

99. *Thebans*... *Euboea*: in 358 or 357. See *Speech for Megalopolitans*, 14 n.

100. *Oropus*.. See *Speech for Megalopolitans*, Section 11 n.

*I was one*.. Demosthenes was, in fact, co-trierarch with Philinus (*Speech against Meidias*, 161).

102. See *Speech on Naval Boards* (with *Introd.* and notes), and n. on *Olynthiac II*, 29.

*obtaining exemption*.. The undertaking of the trierarchy conferred exemption from other burdens for the year, and (conversely) no one responsible for another public burden need be trierarch. The leaders of the Taxation Boards referred to in 103 are probably not (as generally supposed) the richest men in the *Naval* Boards [Footnote: They may indeed have been so, but it was in virtue of their function as leading members of the Hundred Boards (for collecting the war tax) that they were grouped together as the Three Hundred.] (responsible for trierarchy), but those in the Hundred Boards responsible for the war tax. In each of these Boards there was a leader, a 'second', and a 'third', and these, all together, are almost certainly identical with the 'Three Hundred' responsible for advancing the sum due. When these were already advancing the war tax, they became exempt from trierarchy, and their poorer colleagues in the Naval Boards (to which of course they also belonged) had to bear the burden without them. But under Demosthenes' law the trierarchic payment was required from all alike, in strict proportion to their valuation as entered for the purposes of the war tax; and the Three Hundred (the leaders, seconds, and thirds) were no longer exempted. (This explains their anxiety to get the law shelved.) Even in years when they were not exempt, before Demosthenes' law was passed, they only paid a very small share in proportion to their wealth, since all the members of each Naval Board paid the same sum. It appears, however, that (though the Three Hundred as such cannot be shown to have had any office in connexion with the trierarchy) the richer men in the Naval Boards arranged the contracts for the work of equipment, and that when they had contracted that the work should be done (e.g.) for a talent, they sometimes recovered the whole talent from their poorer colleagues. (*Speech against Meidias*, 155.)

103. *lie under sworn notice*., &c. ([Greek: *en hupomosia*]). One who intended to indict the proposer of a law for illegality had probably to give sworn notice of his intention, and the suggestion made to Demosthenes was that when such notice had been given, he should let the law drop.

105. *the decree, &c.*: i.e. either a decree suspending the law until the indictment should be heard, or one ordering the trial on the indictment to be held.

107. *no trierarch, &c.* A trierarch who thought the burden too heavy for him could appeal against it by laying a branch on the altar in the Pnyx, or by taking sanctuary in the Temple of Artemis at Munychia. A dilatory or recalcitrant trierarch could be arrested by order of the ten commissioners ([Greek: apostuleis]) who constituted a sort of Admiralty Board.

111. *the laws, &c.* The laws alleged to have been violated were copied out, and accompanied the indictment. With regard to the laws in the present case, see Goodwin's edition, pp. 313-6.

114. *Nausides* was sent to oppose Philip at Thermopylae in 352 (see *Introd. to First Philippic*). Diotimus had a command at sea in 338, and his surrender was demanded by Alexander in 335, as was also that of Charidernus (see n. on *Olynthiac III*, 5), who had now been a regular Athenian general for many years, and had been sent to assist Byzantium in 340 (see *Speech against Aristocrates, passim*).

121. *hellebore*: supposed in antiquity to cure madness.

122. *reveller on a cart, e.g. on the second day of the Anthesteria*, when masked revellers rode in wagons and assailed the bystanders with abusive language. Such ceremonial abuse was perhaps originally supposed to have power to avert evil, and occurs in primitive ritual all over the world.

125. *the statutable limit*. There was a limit of time (differing according to the alleged offence) after which no action could be brought. Demosthenes could not now be prosecuted for any of the offences with which Aeschines charged him.

127. *Aeacus, &c.*: the judges of the dead in Hades, according to popular legend.

*scandal-monger*. The Greek word ([Greek: spermologos]) is used primarily of a small bird that pecks up seeds, and hence of a person who picks up petty gossip. (In *Acts xvii. 18* it is the word which is applied to St. Paul, and translated 'this babbler'.)

*an old band in the market-place*: i.e. a rogue. A clerk would perhaps often be found in the offices about the market-place; or the reference may be to the market-place as a centre of gossip.

*O Earth, &c.* Demosthenes quotes from the peroration of Aeschines' speech.

129. The stories which Demosthenes retails in these sections deal with a time which must have been forty or fifty years before the date of this speech, and probably contain little truth, beyond the facts that Aeschines' father was a schoolmaster (not a slave), and was assisted by Aeschines himself; and that his mother was priestess of a 'thiasos' or voluntary association of worshippers of Dionysus-Sabazios, among whose ceremonies was doubtless one symbolizing a marriage or mystical union between the god and his worshippers. (Whether the form of 'sacred marriage' which was originally intended to promote the fertility of the ground by 'sympathetic magic' entered into the ritual of Sabazios is doubtful.) Such a rite, though probably in fact quite innocent, gave rise to suspicions, of which Demosthenes takes full advantage; and the fact that well-known courtesans (such as Phryne and perhaps Ninus) sometimes organized such 'mysteries' would lend colour to the suspicions.

\_Hero of the Lancet\_ ([Greek: to kalamit\_e aer\_oī]). The interpretation is very uncertain (see Goodwin, pp. 339 ff.); and, according as [Greek: kalamos] is taken in the sense of 'lancet', 'splints', or 'bow', editors render the phrase 'hero of the lancet', 'hero of the splints', 'archer-hero' (identified by some with Toxaris, the Scythian physician, whose arrival in Athens in Solon's time is described in Lucian's [Greek: Skuth\_es ae Proxenos]). That the Hero was a physician is shown by the *Speech on the Embassy*, 249.

130. \_for they were not like\_, &c. ([Greek: ouge gar h\_onetuchen \_en, all ois hu daemos kataratai]). The meaning is quite uncertain. The most likely interpretations are: (1) that given in the text, [Greek: a bebioken] being understood as the subject of [Greek: \_en], and [Greek: \_on etuchen] as = [Greek: tout\_on a etuchen], i.e. 'not belonging to the class of acts which were such as chance made them,' but acts of a quite definite kind, viz. the kind which the People curses (through the mouth of the herald at each meeting of the Assembly); (2) 'for he was not of ordinary parents, but of such as the People curses'; the subject of [Greek: \_en] being Aeschines. But there is the difficulty that, with this subject for [Greek: \_en, \_on etuchen] can only represent [Greek: tout\_on \_on etuchen \_on], whereas the sense required is [Greek: tout\_on oi etuchon], or (the regular idiom) [Greek: t\_on tuchunt\_on]; and the sense is not so good, for the context [Greek: opse gar]) shows that the clause ought to refer to the \_acts\_ of Aeschines about which he is going to speak, not to his parentage, which the orator has done with.

\_Glaucothea\_. Her real name is said to have been Glaucis. Glaucothea was the name of a sea-nymph. The change of the father's name Tromes ('Trembler') to Atrometus ('Dauntless') would also betoken a rise in the world.

\_Empusa\_, or 'The Foul Phantom': a female demon capable of assuming any shape. Obscene ideas were sometimes associated with her.

132. For Antiphon, see *Introd. to Speech on the Embassy*.

\_struck off the list\_: at the revision of the lists in 346. (Each deme revised the list of its own members, subject to an appeal to the courts.)

\_without a decree\_: i.e. a decree authorizing a domiciliary visit.

134. \_when ... you elected him\_. See Introd. to Speech on the Embassy.

\_from the altar\_: a peculiarly solemn form of voting; it is mentioned in the Speech against Macartatus, 14.

136. \_when Philip sent\_, &c. See Introd. to Speech on the Embassy.

137. The ostensible purpose of Anaxinus' visit was to make purchases for Olympias, Philip's wife. Aeschines states that Anaxinus had once been Demosthenes' own host at Oreus.

141. \_paternal deity\_: as father of Ion, the legendary ancestor of the Ionians, and so of the Athenians.

143. \_and of one\_, &c. I have followed the general consensus of recent editors; but I do not feel at all sure that the antecedent of [Greek: us] is not [Greek: polemos]. In that case we should translate, 'which led to Philip's coming to Elateia and being chosen commander of the Amphictyons, and which overthrew,' &c.

146. \_nature of the resources\_, &c.: i.e. especially the possession by Athens of a strong fleet.

148. \_representatives on the Council\_. The Amphictyonic Council was composed of two representatives (Hieromnemones) from each of twelve primitive tribes, of which the Thessalians, the Boeotians, the Ionians (one of whose members was appointed by Athens), and the Dorians (one member appointed by Sparta) were the chief, while some of the tribes were now very obscure. There were also present delegates (Pylagori) from various towns. These were not members of the Council, and had no vote, but might speak. Athens sent three such delegates to each meeting. (See Goodwin, pp. 338, 339.)

150. \_make the circuit\_, or 'beat the bounds'. The actual proceedings (according to Aeschines' account, summarized in the Introd. to this Speech) were much more violent.

\_It was clearly impossible\_, &c. The argument is unconvincing. Aeschines may have known of the intention of the Locrians without their having served a formal summons.

158. \_one man\_: i.e. Philip.

169. *the Prytanes*: the acting Committee of the Council.

*set fire to the wicker-work*: i.e. probably the hurdles, &c., of which the booths were partly composed. Probably a bonfire was a well-understood form of summons to an Assembly called in an emergency.

*the draft-resolution*. See *Introd.*, vol. i, p. 18.

*on the hill-side*: i.e. on the Pnyx, the meeting-place of the Assembly.

171. *the Three Hundred*. See n. on 102.

176. *philippize*. The word was coined during the wars with Philip, on the analogy of 'medize'—the term used of the action of the traitors who supported the invading Persians (Medes) early in the fifth century.

177. *to Eleusis*, which was on the most convenient (though not the shortest) route for an army marching to Thebes.

180. *Battalus*: a nickname given to Demosthenes by his nurse on account of the impediment in his speech from which he suffered in early days, or of his general delicacy. Aeschines had tried to fix an obscene interpretation upon it.

*Creon*. See *Speech on the Embassy*, 247.

*at Collytus*: i.e. at the Rural Dionysia held in that deme.

189. *any one*: lit. 'any one who chooses,' i.e. to call him to account. The expression ([Greek: ho boulomenos]) is apparently half technical, as applied to a self-appointed prosecutor. (Cf. Aristophanes, *Plutus* 908 and 918.)

194. *the general*: i.e. at Chaeroneia.

195. *Philip employed*. Most editors say '*Aeschines* employed'. But this would require [Greek: outos] not [Greek: ekeinos], and 218 also supports the interpretation here given.

198. *treasured up*, &c. The suggestion seems to be that Aeschines foresaw the disasters, but concealed his knowledge, 'storing them up' in order to make a reputation out of them later.

204. *to leave their land*, &c.: i.e. at the time of Xerxes' invasion in 480, when the Athenians abandoned the city and trusted to the 'wooden walls' of their ships.

208. On this magnificent passage, see the treatise *On the Sublime*, chaps, xvi, xvii.

209. *poring pedant*: lit. 'one who stoops over writings'. Here used perhaps with reference to Aeschines' having 'worked up' allusions to the past for the purpose of his Speech, while he remained blind to the great issues of the present. Many editors think that the reference is to his earlier occupation as a schoolmaster or a clerk; but this is perhaps less suitable to the context.

210. *staff...ticket*. The colour of the staff indicated the court in which the juror was to sit; the ticket was exchanged for his pay at the end of the day.

214. *a very deluge*. He is thinking, no doubt, of the disaster at Chaeroneia and the destruction of Thebes.

215. *while their infantry*-, &c. The Theban forces when prepared for action would naturally camp outside the walls (see Olynth. I, 27, where Demosthenes similarly thinks of the Athenian army encamping outside Athens). But although they were thus encamped outside, and had left their wives and children unguarded within, they allowed the Athenian soldiers to enter the city freely.

216. *the river*: probably the Cephissus. Both battles are otherwise unknown. If one of them was in winter, it must have taken place not long after the capture of Elateia, and several months before the battle of Chaeroneia.

219. *somewhere to lay the blame*: or possibly, 'some opportunity of recovering himself,' or 'some place of retreat'. But the interpretation given (which is that of Harpocration) is supported by the use of [Greek: *anenenkein*] in 224.

227. *counters all disappear*. The calculation was made by taking away, for each item of debt or expenditure, so many counters from the total representing the sum originally possessed. When the frame (or *abacus*) containing the counters was left clear, it meant that there was no surplus. (The right reading, however, may be [Greek: *an kathair osin*], 'if the counters are decisive,' or [Greek: *han kathair osin*], 'whatever the counters prove, you concede.')

231. *cancel them out* ([Greek: *antanelein*]): strictly, to strike each out of the account in view of something on the opposite side (i.e. in view of the alternative which you would have proposed).

234. *collected in advance*: i.e. Athens had been anticipating her income.

238. *if you refer*-, &c. Aeschines had accused Demosthenes of saddling Athens with two-thirds of the expense of the war, and Thebes with only one-third.

\_three hundred\_, &c. See *Speech on Naval Boards*, 29 n.

243. \_customary offerings\_, made at the tomb on the third and ninth days after the death.

249. \_Philocrates\_: not Philocrates of Hagnus, the proposer of the Peace of 346, but an Eleusinian. For Diondas, see 222. The others are unknown.

251. \_Cephalus\_. Cf. 219. He was an orator and statesman of the early part of the fourth century. (The best account of him is in Beloch, *Attische Politik*-, p. 117.)

258. \_the attendants' room\_. The 'attendants' are those who escorted the boys to and from school—generally slaves.

259. \_the books\_, &c. Cf. 129 and notes. The books probably contained the formulae of initiation, or the hymns which were chanted by some Dionysiac societies. The service described here is probably that of the combined worship of Dionysus-Sabazios and the Great Mother (Cybele).

\_dressing\_, &c. The candidate for initiation was clothed in a fawn-skin, and was 'purified' by being smeared with clay (while sitting down, with head covered) and rubbed clean with bran, and after the initiation was supposed to enter upon a new and higher life. It is possible that the veiling and disguising with clay originally signified a death to the old life, such as is the ruling idea in many initiations of a primitive type. (Cf. Aristophanes, travesty of an initiation-ceremony in the *Clouds*—256.)

260. \_fennel and white poplar\_. These were credited with magical and protective properties.

\_Euoe, Saboe\_: the cry to Sabazios. One is tempted to render it by 'Glory! Hallelujah!' In fact, the Dionysiac 'thiasoi', or some of them, had many features, good as well as bad, in common with the Salvation Army. The cry 'Euoe, Saboe' is of Thracian origin; 'Hyes Attes' is Phrygian. The serpents, the ivy, and the winnowing-fan figured in more than one variety of Dionysiac service. It is not certain that for 'ivy-bearer' ([Greek: kittophorhos]) we should not read 'chest-bearer' ([Greek: kistophoros]) used with reference to the receptacle containing sacred objects, of which we hear elsewhere in connexion with similar rites.

261. \_fellow-parishioners\_; lit. 'members of your deme'. Each deme kept the register of citizens belonging to it. Enrolment was possible at the age of 18 years, and had to be confirmed by the Council. (See Aristotle, *Constitution of Athens*-, chap. xiii.)

262. \_collecting figs\_, &c. Two interpretations are possible: (1) that the spectators in derision threw fruit—probably not of the best—at Aeschines on the stage, and he gathered it up, as a fruiterer collects

fruit from various growers, and lived on it; or (2) that while he was a strolling player, Aeschines used to rob orchards. Of these (1) seems by far the better in the context.

267. I leave the abysm., &c. The opening of Euripides' *Hecuba*. The line next quoted is unknown. 'Evil in evil wise' ([Greek: kakon kak\_os]) is found in a line of Lynceus, a fourth-century tragedian.

282. \_denied this intimacy with him\_: or possibly (with the scholiast), 'declined this office.'

284. \_the tambourine-player\_. Such instruments were used in orgiastic rites.

285. Hegemon and Pythocles were members of the Macedonian party, who were put to death in 317 by order of the Assembly. (See *Speech on Embassy*, 215, 314.)

287. \_same libation\_: i.e. the same banquet. The libation preceded the drinking. To 'go beneath the same roof' with a polluted person was supposed to involve contamination.

\_in the revel\_. Cf. *Speech on the Embassy*, 128. The reference, however, is here more particularly to Philip's revels after the battle of Chaeroneia, in which, Demosthenes suggests, the Athenian envoys took part.

289. The genuineness of the epitaph is doubtful. Line 2 is singularly untrue. The text is almost certainly corrupt in places (e.g. ll. 3 and 10).

\_their lives\_, &c. As the text stands, [Greek: aret\_es] and [Greek: deimatos] must be governed by [Greek: brab\_e.], 'made Hades the judge of their valour or their cowardice.' But this leaves [Greek: ouk esa\_osan psuchas] as a quasiparenthesis, very difficult to accept in so simple and at the same time so finished a form of composition as the epigram. There are many emendations.

\_ 'Tis God's\_, &c. The line, [Greek: m\_eden hamartein esti the\_on kai panta katorhthou], is taken from Simonides' epitaph on the heroes of Marathon. The sense of the couplet is plain from 290; but [Greek: en biot\_e] in l. 10 is possibly corrupt.

300. \_the confederacy\_, i.e. Athens, Thebes, and their allies at Chaeroneia.

301. \_our neighbours\_, especially Megara and Corinth.

308. \_the inactivity which you\_, &c.: i.e. abstention from taking a prominent part in public life.

309. *opening of ports*: i.e. to Athenian commerce.

311. *What pecuniary assistance*, &c. Demosthenes is thinking of his own services in ransoming prisoners, &c. Some editors translate, 'What public financial aid have you ever given to rich or poor?' i.e. 'When have you ever dispensed State funds in such a way as to benefit any one?' It is impossible to decide with certainty between the two alternatives; but the meanings of [Greek: politik\_e] ('citizen-like', 'such as one would expect from a good fellow-citizen') and [Greek: koin\_e], which I assume, seem to be supported by 13 and 268 respectively.

312. *leaders of the Naval Boards*. See *Introd. to Speech on Naval Boards*.

*damaging attack*, &c. This probably refers to modifications introduced on Aeschines' proposal into Demosthenes' Trierarchic Law of 340, not at the time of its enactment, but after some experience of its working. (See Aeschines, 'Against Ctesiphon,' 222.)

313. Theocrines was a tragic actor, who was attacked in the pseudo-Demosthenic Speech 'Against Theocrines'. Harpocration's description of him as a 'sycophant', or dishonest informer, may be merely an inference from the Speech.

318. *your brother*. See *Speech on the Embassy*, 237, 249. It is not known which brother is here referred to.

319. Philammon was a recent Olympic victor in the boxing match; Glaucus, a celebrated boxer early in the fifth century.

320. *owner of a stud*. To keep horses was a sign of great wealth in Athens.

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