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THE LIFE OF THE RT. HON. SIR CHARLES W. DILKE - VOL. 2

STEPHEN GWYNN

COMPLETED AND EDITED BY

GERTRUDE M. TUCKWELL

LITERARY EXECUTRIX OF SIR CHARLES DILKE

WITH PORTRAITS AND ILLUSTRATIONS

IN TWO VOLUMES

VOL. II.

CONTENTS OF VOL. II.

CHAPTER

XXXV. EGYPT (1884)

XXXVI. FRANCHISE AND REDISTRIBUTION (JULY TO DECEMBER 1884)

XXXVII. FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN 1884

XXXVIII. DIVIDED COUNSELS (JANUARY AND FEBRUARY 1885)

XXXIX. THE FALL OF KHARTOUM AND THE PENJDEH INCIDENT

XL. REDISTRIBUTION: COERCION AND DEVOLUTION (1885)

XLI. FALL OF ADMINISTRATION (JUNE TO JULY 1885)

XLII. OUT OF OFFICE (JULY 1885)

XLIII. THE TURNING-POINT (JULY 1885 TO JULY 1886)

XLIV. THE RADICAL PROGRAMME _VERSUS_ HOME RULE (JULY TO DECEMBER 1885)

XLV. BEGINNING OF THE HOME RULE SPLIT (DECEMBER 1885 TO FEBRUARY
1886)

XLVI. THE FIRST HOME RULE BILL (FEBRUARY TO JULY 1886)

XLVII. LADY DILKE--76 SLOANE STREET

XLVIII. FOREIGN POLICY

XLIX. PUBLIC LIFE AND RETURN TO PARLIAMENT (1886-1894)

L. INDIA AND FRANCE--RHODES AND BISMARCK (1886-1892)

LI. PERSONAL LIFE--IN OPPOSITION (1895-1904)

LII. LABOUR (1870-1911)

LIII. WORK FOR NATIVE RACES (1870-1911)

LIV. THE BRITISH ARMY

LV. IMPERIAL DEFENCE

LVI. ARMY AND NAVY IN PARLIAMENT

LVII. DEATH OF LADY DILKE--PARLIAMENT OF 1905

LVIII. FOREIGN AFFAIRS (1890-1910)

LIX. THE LAST YEARS

LX. LITERARY WORK AND INTERESTS

LXI. TABLE TALK

INDEX

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS TO VOL. II

SIR CHARLES W. DILKE IN THE YEAR 1908
From a drawing by W. Strang.

MRS. MARK PATTISON
From a photograph taken about 1878.

SIR THOMAS WENTWORTH 1ST BARON WENTWORTH (DIED
MARCH 3RD 1550-51)
From a painting ascribed to Theodore Bernardi.

BISMARCK
From a photograph given by him to Sir Charles W. Dilke.

SIR CHARLES W. DILKE ROWING
From a photograph reproduced by permission of the _Daily Mirror_.

DOCKETT EDDY
From photographs.

PYRFORD ROUGH
From photographs.

LADY DILKE IN THE YEAR 1903
From a photograph by Thomson.

THE LIFE OF SIR CHARLES DILKE

CHAPTER XXXIV

OCTOBER 1883-DECEMBER 1884

I.

The interval between the Sessions of 1883 and 1884 was critical for the
question of electoral reform which interested Liberals beyond all other
questions but involved the risk of bringing dissensions in the Cabinet
to the point of open rupture. As the months went by Mr. Chamberlain and
Lord Hartington used less and less concealment of their differences
while it was well known to all the Cabinet that the alliance between
Chamberlain and Dilke was complete and unconditional. Whoever broke with
Chamberlain broke with Dilke. Fortunately a certain bond of personal
sympathy in spite of divergent views existed between Lord Hartington
and Sir Charles Dilke and this bond largely helped to hold Mr.
Gladstone's Government together.

In the negotiations which followed between the leaders of the two great

Parties Sir Charles Dilke was able to show the full measure of his

Party should possess at that moment a representative with whom Lord

The same confidence could hardly have been given by them to Lord
Hartington who held that "equalization of the franchise was pressing
mainly on account of the pledges that had been given and not much for
any other reason." [Footnote: Letter to Mr. Gladstone of October 24th
1883 quoted by Mr. Bernard Holland in his _Life of the Duke of
Devonshire_ vol. i. p. 395.] Most Liberals took a very different view
of the need for this reform. Further Lord Hartington held that
franchise and redistribution should be treated simultaneously and he
was unwilling to extend the franchise in Ireland.

At a Cabinet on October 25th 1883 the question of simultaneous or
separate treatment of the problems had been settled. Mr. Gladstone says
Sir Charles 'made a speech which meant franchise first and the rest
nowhere.' On the Irish question Sir Charles was instructed to get
accurate statistics as to the effects of equalizing the franchise
between boroughs and counties and 'on Friday November 16th' he notes
'I wrote to Chamberlain: "I have some awful figures for poor Hartington
to swallow--700000 county householders in the Irish counties."' Lord
Hartington still stuck to his point of linking redistribution and
franchise.

But on November 22nd

'Mr. Gladstone read a long and admirable memorandum in favour of the
views held by him by Chamberlain and by me as to franchise and
redistribution--that is franchise first with a promise of
redistribution but no Bill; and Hartington received no support after
this from any members of the Cabinet.'

There were however matters in which Lord Hartington's Conservative
tendencies found an ally in the Prime Minister. On November 28th 1883
at the Committee of the Cabinet on Local Government

'Chamberlain noted: "Mr. Gladstone hesitates to disfranchise the
freeholders in boroughs--persons voting as householders in boroughs
and as freeholders in the counties in which the boroughs are
constituted. I am in favour of one man one vote and told him so."
Our not getting one man one vote was entirely Mr. Gladstone's fault
for the Cabinet expected and would have taken it Hartington alone
opposing as he opposed everything all through.'

The question of widening the franchise in Ireland was still unsettled
and Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Hartington both made allusion to it in
public speeches at this moment. The speeches apart from their marked
difference in general tone were on this point in flat contradiction to
each other and on December 2nd Lord Hartington wrote to Mr. Gladstone
with a threat of resignation. On that day he delivered at Accrington a
long eulogy of the Whigs who had 'formed a connecting link between the
advanced party and those classes which possessing property powers and
influence are naturally averse to change.' The Whigs it was he
contended who had by their guidance and their action reduced changes in
the direction of popular reform to the 'calm and peaceful process of
constitutional acts.'

'At this moment there was a conflict raging between Chamberlain and
Hartington and in their autumn speeches each of them pretty plainly
attacked the other's policy. Chamberlain wrote to me: "Why does
Hartington think _aloud_ when he thinks one thing and is going to do
the other? And why does he snub the Caucus when he has made up his
mind to do exactly what they want? If he cannot learn to be a little
more diplomatic he will make a devil of a rum leader!" A little
later Chamberlain gave me "passages from a speech which _ought_ to
be delivered: 'Yes gentlemen I entirely agree with Lord
Hartington. It is the business and duty of Radicals to lead great
popular movements and if they are fortunate enough to kindle the
fire of national enthusiasm and to stir the hearts of the people
then it will be the high prerogative of the great Whig noble who has
been waiting round the corner to direct and guide and moderate the
movement which he has done all in his power to prevent and
discourage.'"

'The storm between Hartington and Chamberlain having broken out
again Chamberlain wrote to me on December 5th enclosing a letter
of reproof from Mr. Gladstone and saying: "I replied casuistically
that I would endeavour to exclude from my speeches the slightest
reference to Hartington but that he was really too trying. I
reminded Mr. G. that I had asked if I were free to argue the
question and that he had said: Yes--no one taking exception." In
the following week Chamberlain came to town and dined with me
and we discussed the matter. Although Mr. Gladstone had blown
Chamberlain up he was really much more angry with Hartington.'

It appears from the _Life of the Duke of Devonshire_ that Mr. Gladstone
continued through December his attempts to mediate. [Footnote: See _Life
of the Duke of Devonshire_ by Mr. Bernard Holland vol. i p. 398 _et
seq_.] The matter is thus related by Sir Charles though not from first-
hand knowledge since he went to Toulon in the middle of December and
stayed there till January 8th 1884:

'During my absence I had missed one Cabinet the first that I ever
missed and perhaps the only one. It was held suddenly on January
3rd and I could not arrive in time. Mr. Gladstone had come up from
Hawarden under the impression that Hartington was going to resign
because we would not produce a redistribution scheme along with
franchise. On the morning of the 3rd however he received a letter
in which Hartington gave way on the understanding that Mr. Gladstone
would state the general heads of his redistribution scheme. The
subject was not named at the Cabinet of the 3rd which dealt with
Egypt only. But the Cabinet adjourned to the 4th and on January 4th
discussed South Africa and also ... received a statement from Mr.
Gladstone as to his intention to state the heads of our
redistribution scheme in "very general terms." On the 10th I noted:
"The Cabinets have resulted in peace between Lord Hartington and Mr.
Gladstone but the Reform Bill will be less complete than I had
hoped." "Mr. Gladstone calmed Hartington by promising not to run
away from us after franchise and before redistribution which was
what Hartington feared he meant to do."'

Discussion upon the detail of the Bill was resumed and on January 23rd
1884

'the Chancellor (Lord Selborne) Hartington Kimberley and Dodson
supported by Mr. Gladstone forced against Harcourt Chamberlain
and myself a decision not to attach any condition of residence to
the property vote.'

'On January 28th there was a meeting of the Committee of the Cabinet
on the Franchise Bill in Mr. Gladstone's room. Chamberlain was
anxious to "make Hartington go out on franchise." I asked him how he
thought it was to be done and he replied: "If he is restive now
raise the question of Mr. Gladstone's statement on redistribution
and oppose all limitations in that statement"; and he added that Mr.
Gladstone had only agreed to make the statement unwillingly to quiet
Hartington and that if Hartington were not quieted Mr. Gladstone
would go back about it. Chamberlain and I on this occasion tried to
make the Franchise Bill more Radical but failed Mr. Gladstone
opposing us on old-fashioned grounds.'

'Chamberlain came to me' (on April 26th) 'about a plan which Mr.
Gladstone was to broach at the next Cabinet for putting off the
operation of the Franchise Act until January 1st '86 in order to
give time for redistribution to be dealt with. We decided to oppose
it on the ground that it would not improbably lead to our being
forced into holding an election on the old franchise.'

At the beginning of the Session Sir Charles helped on the general policy
of Radicalism by one of his many minor electoral reforms. This was a
Bill to extend over the United Kingdom the right of keeping the poll
open till eight o'clock at night which he had secured as a privilege
for Londoners in 1878. He notes that on February 11th he 'fought with
Tory obstructives as to hours of polling and won'; but the violent
resistance which was offered at first did not continue and the Bill
passed quietly in July after time had been given to discuss it in the
constituencies.

'On this day (July 22nd) I had a long and curious conversation with
Healy as to Irish redistribution and as to the hours of poll in
counties with regard to which he was against extension but said
that he was forced to support it in public. He told me that his
private opinion was that the Land Act had quieted Ireland.'

The 'Representation of the People' Bill as the franchise measure was
called was introduced on February 28th 1884 and made steady progress
Liberals finding their task facilitated by the difficulties of their
opponents.

'On May 7th I wrote to Chamberlain to say that I had to speak at a
house dinner of the Devonshire Club that night and to ask him if
there was anything he wanted said to which he replied: "Note
Randolph Churchill's letter to Salisbury with reference to the
Conservative Caucus and the vindication of the Birmingham one." It
was impossible not to notice this important letter which
revolutionized politics for some time.'

'_May 14th_.--After the Cabinet I was informed by Chamberlain that a
week earlier on Wednesday May 7th Randolph Churchill had sent to
him to know whether if he broke with the Conservatives the
Birmingham Liberals would support him as an independent candidate.'

Sir Charles's letter to his agent at this time sums up the political
position:

'The Tory game is to delay the franchise until they have upset us
upon Egypt before the Franchise Bill has reached the Lords.... Our
side will be in a humour to treat as traitors any who do not insist
that the one Bill and nothing else shall be had in view--in face of
the tremendous struggle impending in the Lords.'

'On _May 13th_ I had received a letter from Mr. Gladstone in answer
to one from me in a matter which afterwards became important and
but for Chamberlain's strong stand would have forced me to leave the
Government. I had so strong an opinion in favour of woman's suffrage
that I could not undertake to vote against it even when proposed as
an amendment to a great Government Bill.'

Sir Charles had written as follows:

'ANTIBES
'_Easter Eve_ '84.

'I had thought till lately that the Woman's Suffrage division in
Committee on the Franchise Bill would have been so hollow that my
absence from it would not have mattered; but as I find that
Grosvenor thinks that it will not be hollow it becomes my duty to
write to you about it. I myself think Grosvenor wrong; the woman's
suffrage people claim some 250 "friends" but this they do by
counting all who having voted with them once have abstained from
voting for many years and who are really foes. The division can
only be a close one if the Tory party as a body support the view
which is Northcote's I believe and was Disraeli's but many of the
leaders would be bitterly opposed to such a course. Mr. Disraeli
left the woman's suffrage amendment an open question on his own
Reform Bill and forbade the Government Whips to tell against the
amendment but the mass of the Tory party voted in the majority. On
this next occasion there will be a larger Liberal vote against the
change than there was last year and I do not believe that there
will be a larger Tory vote in its favour. But supposing that I am
wrong and Grosvenor right I should feel no difficulty in voting
against the amendment on the grounds of tactics which would be
stated provided that Fawcett and Courtney who are the only other
thick-and-thin supporters of woman's suffrage in the Government
voted also but I cannot vote if they abstain. Under these
circumstances what had I better do?'

Mr. Gladstone wrote back on May 11th:

'The question as to the votes of members of the Government on
woman's suffrage is beyond me and I have always intended to ask the
Cabinet and (like the Gordon rescue) at the proper time. The
distinction appears to me as clear as possible between supporting a
thing in its right place and forcing it into its wrong place. To
nail on to the extension of the franchise founded upon principles
already known and in use a vast social question which is surely
entitled to be considered as such appears to me in principle very
doubtful. When to this is added the admirable pretext--nay the fair
argument--it would give to the House of Lords for "putting off" the
Bill I cannot see the ground for hesitation. But I quite understand
what (I believe) is your view that there should be one rule for all
the members of the Government.'

'This was an important letter. The words "(like the Gordon rescue)
at the proper time" seem to show that Mr. Gladstone had already made
up his mind to send an expedition to Khartoum although he would not
say so. The body of the letter proved that Mr. Gladstone had a very
strong opinion against me on the main point and the consultation of
the Cabinet (which was dead against woman suffrage) and the one
rule for all members of the Government meant that he intended to
force my vote by a Cabinet resolution and killing two birds with
one stone to attack at the same time Fawcett who had walked out on
several questions and announced his intention of walking out on
others.

'By May 22nd I had finally made up my mind that I could not vote
against the woman franchise amendment--even as a mere matter of
tactics and deference to others--if Courtney and Fawcett went out on
the matter. I could not speak to them about it because of the
"Cabinet secret" doctrine. Childers had been directed by the Cabinet
to sound Courtney because he was Courtney's official superior in
the Treasury. Childers was to offer Courtney that if he would vote
against the amendment he should be allowed to speak for woman
franchise on the merits and that none of its opponents in the
Cabinet (that is all except myself) should speak against it on the
merits. I noted: "On the whole I think that we shall walk out and
not be turned out for so doing." I again explained my position to
Mr. Gladstone.... I felt that the majority of those voting for woman
franchise on this occasion would be Tories voting for party
reasons and in order to upset the Bill. I was therefore unwilling
to go out on this occasion but thought I could not do otherwise
than make common cause with Courtney. On the merits of woman
franchise I had and have a strong opinion. I always thought the
refusal of it contrary to the public interest. The refusal of the
franchise also affects the whole position of women most
unfavourably.' [Footnote: Mrs. Fawcett wrote thanking him 'in the
name of the friends of Women's Suffrage. Your being a member of the
Cabinet made your position in the matter one of special difficulty;
but I do assure you that our gratitude is real and unfeigned.']

On May 24th Sir Charles told the Cabinet what 'I had told Mr. Gladstone
in a letter which I had written to him on Easter Eve and renewed on the
occasion when he made the reply which has been quoted above.'

When the amendment was reached Dilke with Fawcett and Courtney
abstained. This led to serious trouble. Sir Charles wrote on June 12th
in his Diary:

'Hartington is very angry with me for not voting and wants me
turned out for it. He has to vote every day for things which he
strongly disapproves and this makes the position difficult. He says
that my position was wholly different from that of Fawcett and
Courtney because I was a party to the decision of the Cabinet and
that custom binds the minority in the collective decision of Her
Majesty's servants. This is undoubtedly the accepted theory. Poor
Hibbert was made to vote. [Footnote: Sir John Tomlinson Hibbert (d.
1908) at this time Financial Secretary to the Treasury was an able
administrator and held office in Mr. Gladstone's four
administrations. He assisted materially in the passing of the
Execution within Gaols Act Married Women's Property Act and Clergy
Disabilities Act and was keenly interested in the reform of the
Poor Law.] I fear the Cabinet put the yoke not of political
necessity but of their personal prejudice against woman suffrage
on the necks of their followers.'

The matter came up at a Cabinet on June 14th and was made worse because
a letter from Lord Hartington 'offensive in tone' had been circulated
by accident. However Mr. Gladstone issued a minute about my walking out
on woman's suffrage which concluded by a proposal if his colleagues
concurred to request me to remain in the Government. Thus ended a
personal crisis which to use the French phrase had been 'open' since
my letter to Mr. Gladstone dated 'Antibes Easter Eve.'

'Chamberlain wrote to me: "It is settled"; and I wrote back: "It is
settled. I would not have asked you to stand by me as I have no
constitutional case and your conduct in so doing could not be
defended. I always count on your friendship but this would have
...

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