|
THE PUBLIC ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES - VOLUME 2
THE PUBLIC ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES - VOLUME 2 DEMOSTHENES About the same time a controversy begun in the previous year in regard
to Halonnesus was renewed. This island had belonged to Athens but had
been occupied by pirates. At some time not recorded (but probably since
the Peace of 346) Philip had expelled the pirates and taken possession of
the island. He now sent a letter offering to give Halonnesus to Athens
but not to _give it back_ (since this would concede their right to it); or
else to submit the dispute to arbitration. He also offered to discuss a
treaty for the settlement of private disputes between Athenians and
Macedonians and to concert measures with Athens for clearing the Aegean
of pirates. He was willing to extend the advantages of the Peace to other
Greek States but not to agree that he and Athens should respectively
possess 'what was their own' instead of 'what they held'; though he was
ready to submit to arbitration in regard to Cardia and other disputed
places. He again denied having made the promises attributed to him and
asked for the punishment of those who slandered him. Hegesippus replied in
an extant speech ('On Halonnesus') while Demosthenes insisted that no
impartial arbitrator could possibly be found. Philip's terms in regard to
Halonnesus were refused but the Athenian claim to the island was not
withdrawn.
Philip spent the greater part of 342 and 341 in Thrace mainly in the
valley of the Hebrus where he endured very great hardships through the
winter and founded colonies of Macedonian soldiers the chief of these
being Philippopolis and Cabyle. He also entered into relations with the
Getae beyond the Haemus and garrisoned Apollonia on the Euxine. These
operations were all preparatory to his projected attack upon Byzantium.
(Byzantium and Athens were at this time on unfriendly terms owing to the
part taken by the latter in the Social War.)
But the immediate subject of the present Speech was the state of affairs
in the Chersonese in 342. The Chersonese (with the exception of Cardia)
had been secured for Athens in 357 but had been threatened by Philip in
352[2] when he made alliance with Cardia and forced the neighbouring
Thracian Prince Cersobleptes to submit. Soon after the Peace of
Philocrates Athens sent settlers to the Chersonese under Diopeithes.
Cardia alone refused to receive them and Diopeithes with a mercenary
force prepared to compel the Cardians to admit them; while Philip sent
troops to hold the town and complained to Athens in threatening terms of
the actions of Diopeithes and more particularly of an inroad which
Diopeithes had made upon Philip's territory in Thrace. Diopeithes had been
ill-supported with money and men by Athens and had had recourse to
piratical actions in order to obtain supplies thus arousing some
indignation at Athens; but the prospect of the heavy expenditure which
would be necessary if an expedition were sent to his aid was also
unattractive. Demosthenes however proposed that Diopeithes should be
vigorously supported on the ground that Philip was really at war with
Athens and that this was not the time to interfere with the general who
alone was pushing the Athenian cause. The speech was delivered early in
the spring of 341. It is a masterpiece of oratory at once statesmanlike
and impassioned and shows a complete command of every variety of tone.
The latter part of it contains a strong denunciation of the Macedonian
party in Athens a defence of the orator's own career and an urgent
demand for the punishment of disloyalty. At the same time Demosthenes does
not embody the policy which he advises in any formal motion. For this we
have to wait for the Third Philippic.]
{1} It was the duty men of Athens of every speaker not to allow either
malice or favour to influence any speech which he might make but simply
to declare the policy which he considered to be the best particularly
when your deliberations were concerned with public affairs of great
importance. But since there are some who are led on to address you partly
out of contentiousness partly from causes which I need not discuss it is
for you men of Athens--you the People--to dismiss all other
considerations and both in the votes that you give and in the measures
that you take to attend solely to what you believe to be for the good of
the city. {2} Now our present anxiety arises out of affairs in the
Chersonese and the campaign now in its eleventh month which Philip is
conducting in Thrace. But most of the speeches which we have heard have
been about the acts and intentions of Diopeithes. For my part I conceive
that all charges made against any one who is amenable to the laws and can
be punished by you when you will are matters which you are free to
investigate either immediately or after an interval as you think fit;
and there is no occasion for me or any one else to use strong language
about them. {3} But all those advantages which an actual enemy of the
city with a large force in the Hellespont is trying to snatch from you
and which if we once fall behind-hand we shall no longer be able to
recover--these surely are matters upon which our interest demands that
our plans be formed and our preparations made with the utmost dispatch;
and that no clamour no accusations about other matters be allowed to
drive us from this point.
{4} Often as I am surprised at the assertions which are habitually made in
your presence nothing men of Athens has surprised me more than the
remark which I heard only lately in the Council--that one who advises you
ought forsooth to advise you plainly either to go to war or to keep the
peace. {5} Very good.[3] If Philip is remaining inactive if he is keeping
nothing that is ours in violation of the Peace if he is not organizing
all mankind against us there is nothing more to be said--we have simply
to observe the Peace; and I see that for your part you are quite ready
to do so. But what if the oath that we swore and the terms upon which we
made the Peace stand inscribed for our eyes to see? {6} What if it is
proved that from the outset before Diopeithes sailed from Athens with the
settlers who are now accused of having brought about the war Philip
wrongfully seized many of our possessions--and here unrepealed are your
resolutions charging him with this--and that all along he has been
uninterruptedly seizing the possessions of the other Hellenic and foreign
peoples and uniting their resources against us? What is _then_ the
meaning of the statement that we ought either to go to war or to keep the
Peace? {7} For we have no choice in the matter: nothing remains open to us
but the most righteous and most necessary of all acts--the act that they
deliberately refuse to consider--I mean the act of retaliation against the
aggressor: unless indeed they intend to argue that so long as Philip
keeps away from Attica and the Peiraeus he does the city no wrong and is
not committing acts of war. {8} But if _this_ is their criterion of right
and wrong if _this_ is their definition of peace then although what
they say is iniquitous intolerable and inconsistent with your security
as all must see at the same time these very statements are actually
contradictory of the charges which they are making against Diopeithes. {9}
Why I beg to ask[n] are we to give Philip full leave to act in whatever
way he chooses so long as he does not touch Attica when Diopeithes is
not to be allowed even to assist the Thracians without being accused of
initiating war? But even if this inconsistency is brought home to them
still we are told the conduct of the mercenaries in ravaging the
Hellespontine country is outrageous and Diopeithes has no right to drive
the vessels to shore[n] and ought to be stopped. {10} I grant it: let it
be done: I have nothing to say against it. Yet nevertheless if their
advice is genuinely based on considerations of right and right alone I
consider that they are bound to prove that as surely as they are seeking
to break up the force on which _Athens_ at present relies by slandering
its commander to you when he tries to provide funds to support it so
surely _Philip's_ force will be disbanded if you accept their advice. If
they fail to prove this you must consider that they are simply setting
the city once more upon the same course which has already resulted in the
utter ruin of her fortunes. {11} For surely you know that nothing in the
world has contributed so much to Philip's successes as his being always
first on the scene of action. With a standing force always about him and
knowing beforehand what he intends to do he suddenly falls upon
whomsoever he pleases: while we wait until we learn that something is
happening and only then in a turmoil make our preparations. {12} It
follows of course that every position which he has attacked he holds in
undisturbed possession; while we are all behindhand; all our expenditure
proves to have been so much useless waste; we have displayed our hostility
and our desire to check him; but we are too late for action and so we add
disgrace to failure.
{13} You must therefore not fail to recognize men of Athens that now as
before all else that you hear consists of mere words and pretexts; and
that the real aim of all that is being done is to secure that you may
remain at home that Athens may have no force outside the city and that
thus Philip may give effect to all his desires without let or hindrance.
Consider in the first place what is actually occurring at the present
moment. {14} He is at present passing the time[n] in Thrace with a great
army under him; and as we are told by those who are on the spot[n] he is
sending for a large addition to it from Macedonia and Thessaly. Now if he
waits for the Etesian winds[n] and then goes to Byzantium and besieges
it tell me first whether you think that the Byzantines will persist in
their present infatuation[n] and will not call upon you and entreat you
to go to their aid? {15} I do not think so. Why I believe that they would
open their gates to men whom they distrust even more than they distrust
you (if such exist) rather than surrender the city to Philip--supposing
that is that he does not capture them first. And then if we are unable
to set sail from Athens and if there are no forces there on the spot to
help them nothing can prevent their destruction. {16} 'Of course' you
say 'for the men are possessed and their infatuation passes all bounds.'
Very true; and yet they must be preserved; for the interests of Athens
require it. And besides we cannot by any means be certain that he will
not invade the Chersonese. Indeed if we are to judge by the letter which
he has sent to you he there says that he _will_ punish the settlers[n] in
the Chersonese. {17} If then the army that is now formed there is in
existence it will be able to help the Chersonese and to injure some part
of Philip's country. But when once it is dissolved what shall we do if he
marches against the Chersonese? 'We shall of course put Diopeithes on his
trial.' And how will that improve our position? 'Well we should go to the
rescue from Athens ourselves.' What if the winds make it impossible? {18}
'But of course he will not really get there.' And who can guarantee
that? Do you realize men of Athens or take into account what the coming
season of the year is the season against which some think you ought to
evacuate the Hellespont and hand it over to Philip? What if when he
leaves Thrace he does not go near the Chersonese or Byzantium at all--for
this too is a possibility which you must consider--but comes to
Chalcis[n] or Megara just as he lately came to Oreus? Is it better to
resist him here and to allow the war to come into Attica or to provide
something to keep him busy there? The latter course is surely the better.
{19} Realizing these things therefore as you all must and taking due
account of them you must not Heaven knows look askance at the force
which Diopeithes is trying to provide for Athens or attempt to disband
it. You must yourselves prepare another force to support it: you must help
him freely with money and give him in all other respects your loyal
co-operation. {20} If Philip were asked to say whether he would wish these
soldiers who are now with Diopeithes--describe them as you will for I in
no way dispute your description--to be prosperous and in high favour with
the Athenians and to be augmented in numbers by the co-operation of the
city; or whether he would rather see them broken up and destroyed in
consequence of calumnious charges against them; he would prefer I
imagine the latter alternative. Can it then be that there are men among
us here who are trying to bring about the very thing that Philip would
pray Heaven for? And if so do you need to seek any further for the cause
of the total ruin of the city's fortunes?
{21} I wish therefore to examine without reserve the present crisis of
our affairs to inquire what we ourselves are now doing and how we are
dealing with it. We do not wish to contribute funds nor to serve with the
forces in person; we cannot keep our hands from the public revenues;[n] we
do not give the contributions of the allies[n] to Diopeithes nor do we
approve of such supplies as he raises for himself; {22} but we look
malignantly at him we ask whence he gets them what he intends to do and
every possible question of that kind: and yet we are still not willing to
confine ourselves to our own affairs in consequence of the attitude which
we have adopted; we still praise with our lips those who uphold the
dignity of the city though in our acts we are fighting on the side of
their opponents. {23} Now whenever any one rises to speak you always put
to him the question 'What are we to do?' I wish to put to _you_ the
question 'What are we to _say_?' For if you will neither contribute nor
serve in person nor leave the public funds alone nor grant him the
contributions nor let him get what he can for himself nor yet confine
yourselves to your own affairs I do not know what I can say. For when you
give such licence to those who desire to make charges and accusations
that you listen to them even when they denounce him by anticipation for
his alleged intentions--well what _can_ one say?
{24} The possible effect of this is a matter which some of you require to
understand and I will speak without reserve; for indeed I could not speak
otherwise. All the commanders who have ever yet sailed from Athens--if I
am wrong I consent to any penalty that you please[n]--take money from the
Chians from the Erythraeans[n] from any people from whom they can
severally get it--I mean any of the Asiatic settlers who are now in
question. {25} Those who have one or two ships take less those who have a
larger force take more. And those who give to them do not give either
little or much for nothing; they are not so insane: in fact with these
sums they buy immunity from injury for the merchants who sail from their
ports freedom from piracy the convoying of their vessels and so on.
They call the gifts 'benevolences'[n] and that is the name given to the
sums thus obtained. {26} And in the present case when Diopeithes is there
with his army it is obvious that all these peoples will give him money.
From what other source do you imagine that a general can maintain his
troops when he has received nothing from you and has no resources from
which he can pay his men? Will money drop from the sky? Of course not. He
subsists upon what he can collect or beg or borrow. {27} The real effect
therefore of the accusations made against him here is simply to warn
every one that they should refuse to give him anything since he is to pay
the penalty for his very intentions not to speak of any action that he
may have taken or any success that he may have achieved. That is the only
meaning of the cry that 'he is preparing a blockade' or 'he is
surrendering[n] the Hellenes'. Do any of his critics care about the
Hellenes who live in Asia? {28} Were it so they would be more thoughtful
for the rest of mankind than for their own country. And the proposal to
send another general to the Hellespont amounts to no more than this. For
if Diopeithes is acting outrageously and is driving the vessels to shore
then gentlemen one little wax-tablet[n] is enough to put an end to it
all: and what the laws command is that for these offences we should
impeach the wrong-doers--not that we should keep a watch upon our own
forces at such expense and with so many ships.[n] {29} Such insanity
really passes all bounds. No! Against the enemy whom we cannot arrest and
render amenable to the laws it is both right and necessary to maintain a
force to send war-ships and to contribute war-funds: but against one of
ourselves a decree an impeachment a dispatch-boat[n] will answer our
purpose. These are the means which sensible men would use: the policy of
the other side is the policy of men whose spitefulness[n] is ruining your
fortunes. {30} And that there should be some such men bad though it is
is not the worst. No! for you who sit there are already in such a frame of
mind that if any one comes forward and says that Diopeithes is the cause
of all the mischief or Chares[n] or Aristophon[n] or any Athenian
citizen that he happens to name you at once agree and clamorously
declare that he is right; {31} but if any one comes forward and tells you
the truth and says 'Men of Athens this is nonsense. It is Philip that
is the cause of all this mischief and trouble; for if he were quiet the
city would have nothing to disturb her' you cannot indeed deny the
truth of his words but you seem I think to be annoyed as though you
were losing something.[n] {32} And the cause of these things is this--and
I beseech you in Heaven's name to let me speak unreservedly when I am
speaking for your true good--that some of your politicians have contrived
that you should be terrifying and severe in your assemblies but easy-
going and contemptible in your preparations for war. And accordingly if
any one names as the culprit some one whom you know you can arrest in your
own midst you agree and you wish to act; but if one is named whom you
must first master by force of arms if you are to punish him at all you
are at a loss I fancy what to do and you are vexed when this is brought
home to you. {33} For your politicians men of Athens should have treated
you in exactly the opposite way to this; they should train you to be kind
and sympathetic in your assemblies; for there it is with the members of
your own body and your own allies that your case is argued: but your
terrors and your severity should be displayed in your preparations for
war where the struggle is with your enemies and your rivals. {34} As it
is by their popular speeches and by courting your favour to excess they
have brought you into such a condition that while in your assemblies you
give yourselves airs and enjoy their flattery listening to nothing but
what is meant to please you in the world of facts and events you are in
the last extremity of peril. Imagine in God's name what would happen if
the Hellenes were to call you to account for the opportunities which in
your indolence you have now let pass and were to put to you the
question {35} 'Is it true men of Athens that you send envoys to us on
every possible occasion to tell us of Philip's designs against ourselves
and all the Hellenes and of the duty of keeping guard against the man
and to warn us in every way?' We should have to confess that it was true.
We do act thus. 'Then' they would proceed 'is it true you most
contemptible of all men that though the man has been away for ten months
{36} and has been cut off from every possibility of returning home by
illness and by winter and by wars you have neither liberated Euboea nor
recovered any of your own possessions? Is it true that you have remained
at home unoccupied and healthy--if such a word can be used of men who
behave thus--and have seen him set up two tyrants in Euboea one to serve
as a fortress directly menacing Attica the other to watch Sciathus; {37}
and that you have not even rid yourselves of these dangers--granted that
you did not want to do anything more--but have let them be? Obviously you
have retired in his favour and have made it evident that if he dies ten
times over you will not make any move the more. Why trouble us then with
your embassies and your accusations?' If they speak thus to us what will
be our answer? What shall we say Athenians? I do not see what we can say.
{38} Now there are some who imagine that they confute a speaker as soon
as they have asked him the question 'What then are we to do?' I will
first give them this answer--the most just and true of all--'Do not do
what you are doing now.' {39} But at the same time I will give them a
minute and detailed reply; and then let them show that their willingness
to act upon it is not less than their eagerness to interrogate. First men
of Athens you must thoroughly make up your minds to the fact that Philip
is at war with Athens and has broken the Peace--you must cease to lay the
blame at one another's doors--and that he is evilly-disposed and hostile
to the whole city down to the very ground on which it is built; {40} nay
I will go further--hostile to every single man in the city even to those
who are most sure that they are winning his favour. (If you think
otherwise consider the case of Euthycrates[n] and Lasthenes of Olynthus
who fancied that they were on the most friendly terms with him but after
they had betrayed their city suffered the most utter ruin of all.) But
his hostilities and intrigues are aimed at nothing so much as at our
constitution whose overthrow is the very first object in the world to
him. {41} And in a sense it is natural that he should aim at this. For he
knows very well that even if he becomes master of all the rest of the
world he can retain nothing securely so long as you are a democracy; and
that if he chances to stumble anywhere as may often happen to a man all
the elements which are now forced into union with him will come and take
refuge with you. {42} For though you are not yourselves naturally adapted
for aggrandizement or the usurpation of empire you have the art of
preventing any other from seizing power and of taking it from him when he
has it; and in every respect you are ready to give trouble to those who
are ambitious of dominion and to lead all men forth into liberty. And so
he would not have Freedom from her home in Athens watching for every
opportunity he may offer--far from it--and there is nothing unsound or
careless in his reasoning. {43} The first essential point therefore is
this--that you conceive him to be the irreconcilable foe of your
constitution and of democracy: for unless you are inwardly convinced of
this you will not be willing to take an active interest in the situation.
Secondly you must realize clearly that all the plans which he is now so
busily contriving are in the nature of preparations against this country;
and wherever any one resists him he there resists him on our behalf. {44}
For surely no one is so simple as to imagine that when Philip is covetous
of the wretched hamlets[n] of Thrace--one can give no other name to
Drongilum Cabyle Masteira and the places which he is now seizing--and
when to get these places he is enduring heavy labours hard winters and
the extremity of danger;--{45} no one can imagine I say that the
harbours and the dockyards and the ships of the Athenians the produce of
your silver-mines and your huge revenue have no attraction for him or
that he will leave you in possession of these while he winters in the
very pit of destruction[n] for the sake of the millet and the spelt in the
silos[n] of Thrace. No indeed! It is to get these into his power that he
pursues both his operations in Thrace and all his other designs. {46} What
then as sensible men must you do? Knowing and realizing your position
as you do you must lay aside this excessive this irremediable[n]
indolence: you must contribute funds and require them from your allies;
you must so provide and act that this force which is now assembled may be
held together; in order that as Philip has the force in readiness that is
to injure and enslave all the Hellenes you may have in readiness that
which shall preserve and succour them. {47} You cannot effect by isolated
expeditions any of the things which must be effected. You must organize a
force and provide maintenance for it and paymasters and a staff of
servants; and when you have taken such steps as will ensure the strictest
possible watch being kept over the funds you must hold these officials
accountable for the money and the general for the actual operations. If
you act thus and honestly make up your minds to take this course you
will either compel Philip to observe a righteous peace and remain in his
own land--and no greater blessing could you obtain than that--or you will
fight him on equal terms.
{48} It may be thought that this policy demands heavy expenditure and
great exertions and trouble. That is true indeed; but let the objector
take into account what the consequences to the city must be if he is
unwilling to assent to this policy and he will find that the ready
performance of duty brings its reward. {49} If indeed some god is offering
us his guarantee--for no human guarantee would be sufficient in so great a
matter--that if you remain at peace and let everything slide Philip will
not in the end come and attack yourselves; then although before God and
every Heavenly Power it would be unworthy of you and of the position that
the city holds and of the deeds of our forefathers to abandon all the
rest of the Hellenes to slavery for the sake of our own ease--although
for my part I would rather have died than have suggested such a thing--
yet if another proposes it and convinces you let it be so: do not defend
yourselves: let everything go. {50} But if no one entertains such a
belief if we all know that the very opposite is true and that the wider
the mastery we allow him to gain the more difficult and powerful a foe we
shall have to deal with what further subterfuge is open to us? Why do we
delay? {51} When shall we ever be willing men of Athens to do our duty?
'When we are compelled' you say. But the hour of compulsion as the word
is applied to free men is not only here already but has long passed; and
we must surely pray that the compulsion which is put upon slaves may not
come upon us. And what is the difference? It is this--that for a free man
the greatest compelling force is his shame at the course which events are
taking--I do not know what greater we can imagine; but the slave is
compelled by blows and bodily tortures which I pray may never fall to our
lot; it is not fit to speak of them.
{52} I would gladly tell you the whole story and show how certain persons
are working for your ruin by their policy. I pass over however every
point but this. Whenever any question of our relations with Philip arises
at once some one stands up and talks of the blessings of peace of the
difficulty of maintaining a large force and of designs on the part of
certain persons to plunder our funds; with other tales of the same kind
which enable them to delay your action and give Philip time to do what he
wishes unopposed. {53} What is the result? For you the result is your
leisure and a respite from immediate action--advantages which I fear you
will some day feel to have cost you dear; and for them it is the favour
they win and the wages for these services. But I am sure that there is no
need to persuade you to keep the Peace--you sit here fully persuaded. It
is the man who is committing acts of war that we need to persuade; for if
he is persuaded you are ready enough. {54} Nor is it the expenditure
which is to ensure our preservation that ought to distress us but the
fate which is in prospect for us if we are not willing to take this
action: while the threatened 'plunder of our funds' is to be prevented by
the proposal of some safeguard which will render them secure not by the
abandonment of our interests. {55} And even so men of Athens I feel
indignant at the very fact that some of you are so much pained at the
prospect of the plunder of our funds when you have it in your power both
to protect them and to punish the culprits and yet feel no pain when
Philip is seizing all Hellas piecemeal for his plunder and seizing it to
strengthen himself against you. {56} What then is the reason men of
Athens that though Philip's campaigns his aggressions his seizure of
cities are so unconcealed none of my opponents has ever said that _he_
was bringing about war? Why is it those who advise you not to allow it
...
|
