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THE PUBLIC ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES - VOLUME 1
THE PUBLIC ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES - VOLUME 1 DEMOSTHENES I have tried to render the speeches into such English as a political orator of
the present day might use without attempting to impart to them any antique
colouring such as the best-known English translations either had from the first
or have acquired by lapse of time. It is of the essence of political oratory
that it is addressed to contemporaries and the translation of it should
therefore be into contemporary English; though the necessity of retaining some
of the modes of expression which are peculiar to Greek oratory and political
life makes it impossible to produce completely the appearance of an English
orator's work. The qualities of Demosthenes' eloquence sometimes suggest rather
the oratory of the pulpit than that of the hustings or that of Parliament and of
the law-courts. I cannot hope to have wholly succeeded in my task; but it seemed
to be worth undertaking and I hope that the work will not prove to have been
altogether useless.
I have made very little use of other translations; but I must acknowledge a debt
to Lord Brougham's version of the Speeches on the Chersonese and on the Crown
which though often defective from the point of view of scholarship and based on
faulty texts are (together with his notes) very inspiring. I have also at one
time or another consulted most of the standard German French and English
editions of Demosthenes. I cannot now distinguish how much I owe to each; but I
am conscious of a special debt to the editions of the late Professor Henri Weil
and of Sir J.E. Sandys and (in the Speech on the Crown) to that of Professor
W.W. Goodwin. I also owe a few phrases in the earliest speeches to Professor
W.R. Hardie whose lectures on Demosthenes I attended twenty years ago. My
special thanks are due to my friend Mr. P.E. Matheson of New College for his
kindness in reading the proof-sheets and making a number of suggestions which
have been of great assistance to me.
The text employed has been throughout that of the late Mr. S.H. Butcher in the
_Bibliotheca Classica Oxoniensis_. Any deviations from this are noted in their
place.
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION i. 7
LIST OF SPEECHES TRANSLATED
Traditional Order In this Edition
ORATION I. OLYNTHIAC I i. 87
II. OLYNTHIAC II i. 99
III. OLYNTHIAC III i. 109
IV. PHILIPPIC I i. 68
V. ON THE PEACE i. 120
VI. PHILIPPIC II i. 133
VIII. ON THE CHERSONESE ii. 3
IX. PHILIPPIC III ii. 26
XIV. ON THE NAVAL BOARDS i. 31
XV. FOR THE FREEDOM OF THE RHODIANS i. 56
XVI. FOR THE MEGALOPOLITANS i. 45
XVIII. ON THE CROWN ii. 47
XIX. ON THE EMBASSY i. 144
NOTES ii. 149
INTRODUCTION
Demosthenes the son of Demosthenes of Paeania in Attica a rich and highly
respected factory-owner was born in or about the year 384 B.C. He was early
left an orphan; his guardians mismanaged his property for their own advantage;
and although soon after coming of age in 366 he took proceedings against them
and was victorious in the law-courts he appears to have recovered comparatively
little from them. In preparing for these proceedings he had the assistance of
Isaeus a teacher and writer of speeches who was remarkable for his knowledge of
law his complete mastery of all the aspects of any case with which he had to
do and his skill in dealing with questions of ownership and inheritance.
Demosthenes' speeches against his guardians show plainly the influence of
Isaeus and the teacher may have developed in his pupil the thoroughness and the
ingenuity in handling legal arguments which afterwards became characteristic of
his work.
Apart from this litigation with his guardians we know little of Demosthenes'
youth and early manhood. Various stories have come down to us (for the most part
not on the best authority) of his having been inspired to aim at an orator's
career by the eloquence and fame of Callistratus; of his having overcome serious
physical defects by assiduous practice; of his having failed nevertheless
owing to imperfections of delivery in his early appearances before the people
and having been enabled to remedy these by the instruction of the celebrated
actor Satyrus; and of his close study of the _History_ of Thucydides. Upon the
latter point the evidence of his early style leaves no room for doubt and the
same studies may have contributed to the skill and impressiveness with which in
nearly every oration he appeals to the events of the past and sums up the
lessons of history. Whether he came personally under the influence either of
Plato the philosopher or of Isocrates the greatest rhetorical teacher of his
time and a political pamphleteer of high principles but little practical
insight is much more doubtful. The two men were almost as different in
temperament and aims as it was possible to be but Demosthenes' familiarity with
the published speeches of Isocrates and with the rhetorical principles which
Isocrates taught and followed can scarcely be questioned.
In the early years of his manhood Demosthenes undertook the composition of
speeches for others who were engaged in litigation. This task required not only
a very thorough knowledge of law but the power of assuming as it were the
character of each separate client and writing in a tone appropriate to it; and
not less the ability to interest and to rouse the active sympathy of juries
with whom feeling was perhaps as influential as legal justification. This part
however of Demosthenes' career only concerns us here in so far as it was an
admirable training for his later work in the larger sphere of politics in which
the same qualities of adaptability and of power both to argue cogently and to
appeal to the emotions effectively were required in an even higher degree.
At the time when Demosthenes' interest in public affairs was beginning to take
an active form Athens was suffering from the recent loss of some of her most
powerful allies. In the year 358 B.C. she had counted within the sphere of her
influence not only the islands of Lemnos Imbros and Scyros (which had been
guaranteed to her by the Peace of Antalcidas in 387) but also the chief cities
of Euboea the islands of Chios Cos Rhodes and Samos Mytilene in Lesbos the
towns of the Chersonese Byzantium (a city of the greatest commercial
importance) and a number of stations on the south coast of Thrace as well as
Pydna Potidaea Methone and the greater part of the country bordering upon the
Thermaic Gulf. But her failure to observe the terms of alliance laid down when
the new league was founded in 378 had led to a revolt which ended in 355 or
354 in the loss to her of Chios Cos Rhodes and Byzantium and of some of the
ablest of her own commanders and left her treasury almost empty. About the same
time Mytilene and Corcyra also took the opportunity to break with her. Moreover
her position in the Thermaic region was threatened first by Olynthus at the
head of the Chalcidic League which included over thirty towns; and secondly by
Philip the newly-established King of Macedonia who seemed likely to displace
both Olynthus and Athens from their positions of commanding influence.[1]
Nevertheless Athens though unable to face a strong combination was probably
the most powerful single state in Greece. In her equipment and capacity for
naval warfare she had no rival and certainly no other state could vie with her
in commercial activity and prosperity. The power of Sparta in the Peloponnese
had declined greatly. The establishment of Megalopolis as the centre of a
confederacy of Arcadian tribes and of Messene as an independent city commanding
a region once entirely subject to Sparta had seriously weakened her position;
while at the same time her ambition to recover her supremacy kept alive a
feeling of unrest throughout the Peloponnese. Of the other states of South
Greece Argos was hostile to Sparta Elis to the Arcadians; Corinth and other
less important cities were not definitely attached to any alliance but were not
powerful enough to carry out any serious movement alone. In North Greece
Thebes though she lacked great leaders was still a great power whose
authority throughout Boeotia had been strengthened by the complete or partial
annihilation of Platacae Thespiae Orchomenus[2] and Coroneia. In Athens the
ill feeling against Thebes was strong owing to the occupation by the Thebans of
Oropus[2] a frontier town which Athens claimed and their treatment of the
towns just mentioned towards which the Athenians were kindly disposed. The
Phocians who had until recently been unwilling allies of Thebes were now
hostile and not insignificant neighbours and about this time entered into
relations with both Sparta and Athens. The subject of contention was the
possession or control of the Temple of Apollo at Delphi which the Phocians had
recently taken by force from the Delphians who were supported by Thebes; and in
the 'Sacred War' to which this act (which was considered to be sacrilege) gave
rise in 355 B.C. the Thebans and Locrians fought against the Phocians in the
name of the Amphictyonic Council a body (composed of representatives of tribes
and states of very unequal importance[3]) to which the control of the temple
traditionally belonged. Thessaly appears to have been at this time more or less
under Theban influence but was immediately dominated by the tyrants of Pherae
though the several cities seem each to have possessed a nominally independent
government. The Greek peoples were disunited in fact and unfitted for union by
temperament. The twofold desire felt by almost all the more advanced Greek
peoples for independence on the one hand and for 'hegemony' or leadership
among other peoples on the other rendered any effective combination
impossible and made the relations of states to one another uncertain and
inconstant. While each people paid respect to the spirit of autonomy when their
own autonomy was in question they were ready to violate it without scruple when
they saw their way to securing a predominant position among their neighbours;
and although the ideal of Panhellenic unity had been put before Greece by
Gorgias and Isocrates its realization did not go further than the formation of
leagues of an unstable character each subject as a rule to the more or less
tyrannical domination of some one member.
Probably the power which was most generally feared in the Greek world was that
of the King of Persia. Several times in recent years (and particularly in 387
and 367) he had been requested to make and enforce a general settlement of
Hellenic affairs. The settlement of 387 (called the King's Peace or the Peace
of Antalcidas after the Spartan officer who negotiated it) had ordained the
independence of the Greek cities small and great with the exception of those
in Asia Minor which were to form part of the Persian Empire and of Lemnos
Imbros and Scyros which were to belong to Athens as before. The attempt to
give effect to the arrangement negotiated in 367 failed and the terms of the
Peace of Antalcidas though it was still appealed to when convenient as a
charter of liberty also came to be disregarded. But there was always a sense of
the possibility or the danger of provoking the great king to exert his strength
or at least to use his wealth to the detriment of some or all of the Greek
states; though at the moment of which we are speaking (about 355) the Persian
Empire itself was suffering from recent disorders and revolutions and the king
had little leisure for interfering in the affairs of Greece.
It was to the department of foreign and inter-Hellenic affairs that Demosthenes
principally devoted himself. His earliest political speeches however were
composed and delivered in furtherance of prosecutions for the crime of proposing
illegal legislation. These were the speeches against Androtion (spoken by
Diodorus in 355) and against Leptines (in 354). Both these were written to
denounce measures which Demosthenes regarded as dishonest or unworthy of
Athenian traditions. In the former he displays that desire for clean-handed
administration which is so prominent in some of his later speeches; and in the
prosecution of Leptines he shows his anxiety that Athens should retain her
reputation for good faith. Both speeches like those of the year 352 against
Timocrates (spoken by Diodorus) and against Aristocrates (spoken by Euthycles)
are remarkable for thoroughness of argument and for the skill which is displayed
in handling legal and political questions though like almost all Athenian
forensic orations they are sometimes sophistical in argument.
The first speech which is directly devoted to questions of external policy is
that on the Naval Boards in 354; and this is followed within the next two years
by speeches delivered in support of appeals made to Athens by the people of
Megalopolis and by the exiled democratic party of Rhodes. From these speeches it
appears that the general lines of Demosthenes' policy were already determined.
He was in opposition to Eubulus who after the disastrous termination of the
war with the allies had become the leading statesman in Athens. The strength of
Eubulus lay in his freedom from all illusion as to the position in which Athens
stood in his ability as a financier and in his readiness to take any measures
which would enable him to carry out his policy. He saw that the prime necessity
of the moment was to recruit the financial and material strength of the city;
that until this should be effected she was quite incapable of carrying on war
with any other power; and that she could only recover her strength through
peace. In this policy he had the support of the well-to-do classes who suffered
heavily in time of war from taxation and the disturbance of trade. On the other
hand the sentiments of the masses were imperialistic and militant. We gather
that there were plenty of orators who made a practice of appealing to the
glorious traditions of the past and the claim always made by Athens to
leadership among the Greek states. To buy off the opposition which his policy
might be expected to encounter Eubulus distributed funds freely to the people
in the shape of 'Festival-money' adopting the methods employed before him by
demagogues very different from himself in order that he might override the
real sentiments of the democracy; and in spite of the large amounts thus spent
he did in fact succeed in the course of a few years in collecting a
considerable sum without resorting to extraordinary taxation in greatly
increasing the navy and in enlarging the dockyards. For the success of this
policy it was absolutely necessary to avoid all entanglement in war except
under the strongest compulsion. The appeals of the Megalopolitans and the
Rhodians to yield to which would probably have meant war with Sparta and with
Persia must be rejected. Even in dealing with Philip who was making himself
master of the Athenian allies on the Thermaic coast the fact of the weakness of
Athens must be recognized and all idea of a great expedition against Philip
must be abandoned for the present. At the same time some necessary measures of
precaution were not neglected. It was essential to secure the route to the
Euxine over which the Athenian corn-trade passed if corn was not to be sold at
famine prices. For this purpose therefore alliance was made with the Thracian
prince Cersobleptes; and when Philip threatened Heraeon Teichos on the
Propontis an expedition was prepared and was only abandoned because Philip
himself was forced to desist from his attempt by illness. Similarly when Philip
appeared likely to cross the Pass of Thermopylae in 352 an Athenian force was
sent (on the proposal of Diophantus a supporter of Eubulus) to prevent him. The
failure of Eubulus and his party to give effective aid to Olynthus against
Philip was due to the more pressing necessity of attempting to recover control
of Euboea: it had clearly been their intention to save Olynthus if possible.
But when this had proved impossible and the attempt to form a Hellenic league
against Philip had also failed facts had once more to be recognized; and since
Athens was now virtually isolated peace must be made with Philip on the only
terms which he would accept--that each side should keep what it _de facto_
possessed at the time.
Demosthenes was generally in opposition to Eubulus and his party of which
Aeschines (once an actor and afterwards a clerk but a man of education and
great natural gifts) was one of the ablest members. Demosthenes was inspired by
the traditions of the past but had a much less vague conception of the moral to
be drawn from them than had the multitude. Athens for him as for them was to
be the first state in Hellas; she was above all to be the protectress of
democracy everywhere against both absolutism and oligarchy and the leader of
the Hellenes in resistance to foreign aggression. But unlike the multitude
Demosthenes saw that this policy required the greatest personal effort and
readiness for sacrifice on the part of every individual; and he devotes his
utmost energies to the task of arousing his countrymen to the necessary pitch of
enthusiasm and of effecting such reforms in administration and finance as in
his opinion would make the realization of his ideal for Athens possible. In the
speeches for the Megalopolitans and the Rhodians the nature of this ideal is
already becoming clear both in its Athenian and in its Panhellenic aspects. But
so soon as it appeared that Philip at the head of the half-barbarian
Macedonians and not Athens was likely to become the predominant power in the
Hellenic world it was against Philip that all his efforts were directed; and
although in 346 he is practically at one with the party of Eubulus in his
recognition of the necessity of peace he is eager when the opportunity seems
once more to offer itself to resume the conflict and when it is resumed to
carry it through to the end.
We have then before us the sharp antagonism of two types of statesmanship. The
strength of the one lies in the recognition of actual facts and the avoidance
of all projects which seem likely under existing circumstances to fail. The
other is of a more sanguine type and believes in the power of enthusiasm and
self-sacrifice to transform the existing facts into something better and to win
success against all odds. Statesmen of the former type are always attacked as
unpatriotic and mean-spirited; those of the latter as unpractical and reckless.
There is truth and falsehood in both accusations: but since no statesman has
ever combined all the elements of statesmanship in a perfect and just
proportion and since neither prudence and clear-sightedness nor enthusiastic
and generous sentiment can ever be dispensed with in the conduct of affairs
without loss a larger view will attach little discredit to either type. While
therefore we may view with regret some of the methods which both Demosthenes
and Aeschines at times condescended to use in their conflicts with one another
and with no less regret the disastrous result of the policy which ultimately
carried the day we need not hesitate to give their due to both of the
contending parties: nor while we recognize that Eubulus and Phocion (his
sturdiest supporter in the field and in counsel) took the truer view of the
situation and of the character of the Athenians as they were need we (as it is
now fashionable to do) denounce the orator who strove with unstinting personal
effort and self-sacrifice to rouse the Athenians into a mood in which they could
and would realize the ideal to which they no less than he professed their
devotion.
But the difficulties in the way of such a realization were wellnigh insuperable.
Neither the political nor the military system of Athens was adapted to such a
policy. The Sovereign Assembly though capable of sensible and energetic action
at moments of special danger was more likely to be moved by feeling and
prejudice than by businesslike argument particularly at a time when the
tendency of the best educated and most intelligent men was to withdraw from
participation in public life; and meeting as the Assembly did (unless specially
summoned) only at stated intervals it was incapable of taking such rapid
well-timed and decisive action as Philip could take simply because he was a
single man sole master of his own policy and personally in command of his own
forces. The publicity which necessarily attached to the discussions of the
Assembly was a disadvantage at a time when many plans would better have been
kept secret; and rapid modifications of policy to suit sudden changes in the
situation were almost impossible. Again while no subjects are so unsuited
under any circumstances for popular discussion as foreign and military affairs
the absence in Athens of a responsible ministry greatly increased the
difficulties of her position. It is true that the Controller of the Festival
Fund (whose office gradually became more and more important) was now appointed
for four years at a time while all other offices were annual; and that he and
his friends and their regular opponents were generally ready to take the lead
in making proposals to the Council or the Assembly. But if they chose to remain
silent they could do so;[4] no one was bound to make any proposal at all; and
on the other hand any one might do so. With such a want of system far too much
was left to chance or to the designs of interested persons. Moreover the
Assembly felt itself under no obligation to follow for any length of time any
lead which might be given to it or to maintain any continuity or consistency
between its own decrees. In modern times a minister brought into power by the
will of the majority of the people can reckon for a considerable period upon
the more or less loyal support of the majority for himself and his official
colleagues. In Athens the leader of the moment had to be perpetually adapting
himself afresh to the mood of the Assembly and even to deceive it in order
that he might lead at all or carry out the policy which in his opinion his
country's need required. It is therefore a remarkable thing that both Eubulus
and Demosthenes succeeded for many years in maintaining a line of action as
consistent as that taken by practical men can ever be.
The fact that the Council of Five Hundred which acted as a standing committee
of the people and prepared business for the Assembly and was responsible for
the details of measures passed by the Assembly in general form was chosen by
lot and changed annually as did practically all the civil and the military
officials (though the latter might be re-elected) was all against efficiency
and continuity of policy.[5] After the system of election by lot the most
characteristic feature of the Athenian democracy was the responsibility of
statesmen and generals to the law-courts.[6] Any citizen might accuse them upon
charges nominally limited in scope but often serving in reality to bring their
whole career into question. Had it been certain that the courts would only
punish incompetence or misconduct and not failure as such little harm would
have resulted. But although there were very many acquittals in political trials
the uncertainty of the issue was so great and the sentences inflicted upon the
condemned so severe (commonly involving banishment at least) that the liability
to trial as a criminal must often have deterred the statesman and the general
from taking the most necessary risks; while the condemnation of the accused had
usually the result of driving a really able man out of the country and
depriving his fellow countrymen of services which might be urgently required
when they were no longer available.
The financial system was also ill adapted for the purposes of a people
constantly liable to war. The funds required for the bare needs of a time of
peace seem indeed to have been sufficiently provided from permanent sources of
income (such as the silver mines the rent of public lands court fees and
fines and various indirect taxes): but those needed for war had to be met by a
direct tax upon property levied _ad hoc_ whenever the necessity arose and not
collected without delays and difficulties. And although the equipment of ships
for service was systematically managed under the trierarchic laws[7] it was
still subject to delays no less serious. There was no regular system of
contribution to State funds and no systematic accumulation of a reserve to meet
military needs. The raising of money by means of loans at interest to the State
was only adopted in Greece in a few isolated instances:[8] and the practice of
annually distributing surplus funds to the people[9] however necessary or
excusable under the circumstances was wholly contrary to sound finance.
An even greater evil was the dependence of the city upon mercenary forces and
generals whose allegiance was often at the call of the highest bidder and in
consequence was seldom reliable. There is no demand which Demosthenes makes with
greater insistence than the demand that the citizens themselves shall serve
with the army. At a moment of supreme danger they might do so. But in fact
Athens had become more and more an industrial state and men were not willing to
leave their business to take care of itself for considerable periods in order
to go out and fight unless the danger was very urgent or the interests at
stake of vital importance; particularly now that the length of campaigns had
become greater and the seasons exempted from military operations shorter. In
many minds the spread of culture and of the ideal of self-culture had produced
a type of individualism indifferent to public concerns and contemptuous of
political and military ambitions. Moreover the methods of warfare had undergone
great improvement; in most branches of the army the trained skill of the
professional soldier was really necessary; and it was not possible to leave the
olive-yard or the counting-house and become an efficient fighter without more
ado. But the expensiveness of the mercenary forces; the violent methods by which
they obtained supplies from friends and neutrals as well as foes if as often
happened their pay was in arrear; and the dependence of the city upon the
goodwill of generals and soldiers who could without much difficulty find
employment under other masters were evils which were bound to hamper any
attempt to give effect to a well-planned and far-sighted scheme of action.
It also resulted from the Athenian system of government that the general while
obviously better informed of the facts of the military situation than any one
else could be and at the same time always liable to be brought to trial in case
of failure had little influence upon policy unless he could find an effective
speaker to represent him. In the Assembly and in the law-courts (where the
juries were large enough to be treated in the same manner as the Assembly
itself) the orator who could win the people's ear was all powerful and expert
knowledge could only make itself felt through the medium of oratory.
A constitution which gave so much power to the orator had grave disadvantages.
The temptation to work upon the feelings rather than to appeal to the reason of
the audience was very strong and no charge is more commonly made by one orator
against another than that of deceiving or attempting to deceive the people. It
is indeed very difficult to judge how far an Athenian Assembly was really
taken in by sophistical or dishonest arguments: but it is quite certain that
such arguments were continually addressed to it; and the main body of the
citizens can scarcely have had that first-hand knowledge of facts which would
enable them to criticize the orator's statements. Again the oration appealed to
the people as a performance no less than as a piece of reasoning. Ancient
political oratory resembled the oratory of the pulpit at the present day not
only because it appealed perpetually to the moral sense and was in fact a kind
of preaching; but also because the main difficulty of the ancient orator and the
modern preacher was the same: for the Athenians liked being preached at as the
modern congregation 'enjoys' a good sermon and were therefore almost equally
immune against conversion. The conflicts of rival orators were regarded mainly
as an entertainment. The speaker who was most likely to carry the voting (except
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